Case Summary (G.R. No. 159507)
Petition and Relief Sought
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages alleging wrongful dishonor, suspension and eventual cancellation of his AMEX principal and supplementary credit cards, and resulting injuries including inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and reputational harm. He prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees, against AMEX and/or its officers.
Factual Background Relevant to Venue
Two dishonor incidents were alleged: (1) in April 2000 petitioner’s daughter used a supplementary card in the United States and the transaction was dishonored; (2) petitioner’s principal card was dishonored in Tokyo while he stayed with other Philippine delegates. Respondents allegedly suspended the account for failure to pay a March 2000 balance; petitioner denied receipt of the statement of account and contested a late payment charge in June 2000; AMEX cancelled the cards on July 20, 2000.
Procedural History at Trial Court
The complaint was raffled to RTC Maasin Branch 25. Respondents answered, denied allegations, and pleaded affirmative defenses including lack of cause of action and improper venue. Respondents asserted none of the parties were residents of Southern Leyte and pointed to petitioner’s community tax certificate (CTC) issued in Pasay City and petitioner’s law office in Pasay as evidence that venue in Maasin was improper. The RTC (court a quo) issued an Order dated September 10, 2001 denying respondents’ affirmative defenses, including improper venue, and denied reconsideration in an Order dated January 2, 2002. The RTC took judicial notice that petitioner, as the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte, was a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte.
Court of Appeals Ruling and Relief Granted
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA), which, after issuance of a TRO, rendered a decision dated May 22, 2003 granting the petition. The CA held venue was improperly laid because, in its view, none of the parties — including petitioner — was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing. The CA relied principally on the CTC issued in Pasay City and the location of petitioner’s law office, treating those as judicial admissions. The CA reasoned that for venue purposes “residence” meant actual, physical habitation and continuity of stay; it concluded petitioner actually resided in Pasay. The CA directed the RTC to vacate its orders and enjoined further proceedings except to dismiss the complaint, converting the TRO into a preliminary injunction conditioned on a P5,000,000 bond and allowing refiling in courts in the National Capital Judicial Region.
Issue Presented to the Supreme Court
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in concluding venue was improperly laid in RTC Maasin because petitioner was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing.
Applicable Law and Legal Standards
- Venue of personal actions: Section 2, Rule 4, Rules of Court — personal actions may be commenced where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, at plaintiff’s election.
- Qualification for House of Representatives: Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution — among qualifications is being a resident of the district in which the representative shall be elected for at least one year preceding the election. (1987 Constitution applied; decision date is 2006.)
- Distinction between “residence” and “domicile”: Jurisprudence (Koh; Dangwa Transportation v. Sarmiento) recognizes “resides” in venue rules as connoting actual residence or place of abode (physical presence), distinct from domicile (permanent abode plus intent to remain).
- Community Tax Certificate (RA No. 7160, Section 160): CTC generally paid where individual’s residence is, or where principal office of juridical entity is located.
- Judicial notice: Courts may take judicial notice of facts of public knowledge and official status (Rule 129).
- Pleading verification: Section 4, Rule 7, Rules of Court — substantial compliance requirement; verification stating facts are true “of my own personal knowledge and belief” may suffice.
Supreme Court’s Analysis on “Residence” and Relevance of Office and CTC
The Court reiterated controlling authorities distinguishing “residence” for venue purposes from legal domicile, but it emphasized that for election law purposes the terms are more stringent and often treated as synonymous. Because petitioner was the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte, he necessarily met the constitutional residency requirement for that office under the 1987 Constitution; the Court accepted the trial court’s conclusion that his residence in Southern Leyte could be judicially noticed. The Court held that being a representative implied personal presence and conduct indicative of residency in the district, satisfying the less technical venue concept of residence (physical habitation or place of abode). The Court further held that a person may have multiple residences and that a CTC issued in Pasay and the existence of a law office in Pasay do not conclusively negate a residence in Southern Leyte for venue purposes. Consequently, reliance by the CA on the CTC and law office as dispositive judicial admissions was misplaced.
Rejection of CA’s Reliance on Koh and Forum‑Shopping Speculation
The Court distinguished Koh v. Court of Appeals, explaining that in Koh the plaintiff lacked actual residence in the place claimed and had only manifested intention to return there after retirement; Koh involved different facts. The CA’s suggestion that petitioner’s filing in Maasin was a “specie of forum shopping” or an effort to vex and unduly inconvenience defendants was rejected because the Rules give the plaintiff the option of venue, subject to the rule’s limits, and petitioner’s selection of his home district’s court was not capricious or in bad faith given his status as district representative.
Ruling on Pleading Verification
The Court found petitioner’s verification and certification of
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 159507)
Procedural Posture
- Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking reversal and setting aside of the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 and its Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying reconsideration.
- The Court of Appeals had granted respondents’ petition for certiorari, directed the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and enjoined the presiding judge from further proceedings in that case except to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue.
- Prior to the Court of Appeals decision, respondents obtained a temporary restraining order from the appellate court on March 14, 2002 enjoining the RTC judge from conducting further proceedings after the filing of the special civil action and posting of bond.
- Petitioner Saludo moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision; the appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution dated August 14, 2003.
- The Supreme Court considered a single substantive issue: whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the RTC because none of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing.
Factual Background
- Petitioner Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against American Express International, Inc. (AMEX), and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte; the case was raffled to Branch 25.
- The complaint alleged petitioner was “a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines.”
- The complaint alleged respondent AMEX “is a corporation doing business in the Philippines … with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City,” and that Fish and Mascrinas are officers who may be served at their office address.
- Cause of action arose from alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner’s AMEX principal credit card and a supplementary card issued to his daughter: the daughter’s supplementary card was dishonored in the United States in April 2000; petitioner’s principal card was dishonored when used at Hotel Okawa in Tokyo during an overseas congressional delegation.
- Petitioner alleged dishonors resulted from respondents’ unilateral suspension of his account for failure to pay a balance covering March 2000; he denied receipt of the corresponding statement of account and alleged wrongful late payment charges in June 2000; cancellation of the cards allegedly occurred on July 20, 2000.
- Petitioner claimed damages for great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing, and prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Defendants’ Answer and Affirmative Defenses
- Respondents denied the allegations in the complaint.
- Respondents raised affirmative defenses including lack of cause of action and improper venue.
- On improper venue, respondents contended the complaint should be dismissed because venue was improperly laid in Southern Leyte: none of the parties was a resident of Leyte; respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte; petitioner Saludo was allegedly not a resident because his community tax certificate (CTC), presented with his complaint verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City.
- Respondents further pointed to the complaint’s preparation in Pasay City and signing by a Pasay City lawyer as circumstantial support for petitioner’s residence in Pasay City.
- Respondents prayed for dismissal of the complaint on that basis.
Motions and Orders at the RTC
- Respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on the affirmative defense of improper venue.
- Petitioner Saludo filed Comments/Objections asserting that allegations refuting his residency in Southern Leyte were baseless, emphasizing his status as congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte and urging the court to take judicial notice of that fact.
- Petitioner argued that a congressman must meet residency qualifications prescribed by the Constitution and noted his membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines–Southern Leyte Chapter; he explained that his CTC was issued at Pasay because he had an office there and the office messenger obtained it.
- In an Order dated September 10, 2001, the RTC denied respondents’ affirmative defenses, finding the complaint contained sufficient allegations and rejecting the venue defense.
- The RTC reasoned that petitioner’s incumbency as Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte, with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, dispelled doubts about his actual residence, and that such fact could be taken judicial notice of; the RTC cited Core v. Core and Masa v. Mison regarding residence and domicile.
- Respondents sought reconsideration; the RTC denied it in an Order dated January 2, 2002.
Court of Appeals Proceedings and Decision
- Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion by the RTC judge in issuing the September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders.
- The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order on March 14, 2002 after respondents posted bond, enjoining the RTC judge from further proceedings.
- On May 22, 2003, the Court of Appeals granted respondents’ petition for certiorari, finding that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, was a resident of Southern Leyte.
- The appellate court adopted a narrower conception of “residence” for venue purposes (personal, actual or physical habitation with continuity and consistency) and relied upon petitioner’s CTC issued at Pasay City and his law office in Pasay City as judicial admissions negating his claimed residence in Southern Leyte.
- The Court of Appeals criticized the RTC for taking judicial notice of petitioner’s incumbency and residence, observing that no evidence had been adduced proving petitioner was then the congressman and actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon.
- The Court of Appea