Title
Saludo, Jr. vs. American Express International, Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 159507
Decision Date
Apr 19, 2006
A congressman sued AMEX for wrongful credit card dishonor, claiming Southern Leyte residency. SC ruled venue proper, affirming residency for venue purposes.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 159507)

Factual Background

Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages in the RTC of Maasin City against American Express International, Inc. and two of its officers alleging wrongful dishonor and later cancellation of his AMEX principal card and a supplementary card issued to his daughter. The complaint traced the first dishonor to payments made in the United States by the supplementary cardholder in April 2000 and the second to a payment at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo while petitioner attended an official event. Petitioner alleged respondents suspended and later canceled his account for alleged nonpayment, denied receipt of statements, and wrongfully imposed late charges, causing him actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Pleadings and Affirmative Defenses

Respondents interposed an answer denying the material allegations and asserted affirmative defenses including lack of cause of action and improper venue. They maintained that none of the parties resided in Southern Leyte and relied on petitioner’s community tax certificate indicating Pasay City and the fact that the complaint was prepared and signed in Pasay City to support their contention that venue was improperly laid in Maasin.

Trial Court Proceedings

The trial court, Branch 25, RTC Maasin City, denied respondents’ affirmative defenses in an Order dated September 10, 2001 and again in an Order dated January 2, 2002 denying reconsideration. The court found the complaint sufficient to state a cause of action and accepted petitioner’s allegation that he was a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte. The court took judicial notice of petitioner’s status as the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte and held that such status and the residency requirement for that office dispelled doubts about his residence in the province.

Court of Appeals Proceedings

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion by the trial judge in denying the affirmative defense of improper venue. The appellate court issued a temporary restraining order on March 14, 2002 enjoining further proceedings. In its Decision of May 22, 2003 the Court of Appeals granted the petition, concluded venue was improperly laid because none of the parties resided in Southern Leyte, and held that petitioner was actually residing in Pasay City as shown by his community tax certificate and law office. The appellate court vacated the RTC orders, converted the TRO into a writ of preliminary injunction conditioned on a P5,000,000 bond, and instructed that the RTC may only dismiss the complaint.

Parties’ Contentions before the Supreme Court

Before the Supreme Court petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred by refusing to take judicial notice of the undisputed fact that he was the incumbent congressman and therefore a resident of Southern Leyte; that the appellate court wrongly treated the community tax certificate and associated facts as judicial admissions; that the appellate court disregarded relevant Supreme Court precedents; and that it improperly speculated about petitioner’s motive in choosing venue.

Issue Presented

The dispositive issue presented for resolution was whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the RTC of Maasin City because none of the parties, including petitioner as plaintiff, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing.

Supreme Court Ruling

The Supreme Court granted the petition for review on certiorari. It reversed and set aside the Decision dated May 22, 2003 and the Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the RTC Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172. The Court found that venue was properly laid in Maasin City.

Legal Reasoning on the Meaning of “Resides”

The Court reiterated that personal actions are governed by Section 2, Rule 4 and that the plaintiff’s election of venue is regulated by the Rules of Court. It restated long-standing doctrine distinguishing residence from domicile, relying on Koh v. Court of Appeals and Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, and observed that for purposes of venue the term “resides” connotes actual, physical habitation or place of abode and not technical domicile. The Court explained that where a plaintiff is domiciled in a place for election law purposes, the more exacting conception of residence for that purpose includes personal presence and conduct indicative of intent to remain, and that a domicile entails residence coupled with the intention to remain.

Application of Law to the Facts

The Court found that petitioner’s status as the duly elected representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of filing was admitted and that, as a matter of law, one seeking or holding that office must have the residence qualification of the district. Consequently, petitioner was properly deemed to have residence in Southern Leyte for venue purposes. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in elevating petitioner’s community tax certificate and the location of his law office into conclusive proof that he resided only in Pasay City. The Court emphasized that a person may have multiple residences and that a community tax certificate is not determinative of residence for venue.

Judicial Notice and the Trial Court’s Finding

The Supreme Court upheld the tria

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