Title
Salomon vs. National Electrification Administration
Case
G.R. No. 81816
Decision Date
Jan 26, 1989
Natividad Salomon, elected LUELCO Director, was disqualified after her appointment to Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as it violated P.D. No. 269 and LUELCO by-laws, upheld by the Supreme Court.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 81816)

Factual Background

Petitioner was elected Director for District II of LUELCO on July 20, 1986, with a term scheduled to expire in April 1988. After the election, Eduardo P. Marzan, who obtained the second highest number of votes, filed an election protest with the NEA. NEA found that petitioner was not a bona fide member of the cooperative at the time of her election and ruled against her.

Petitioner then filed a letter-appeal dated February 25, 1987, which functioned as a motion for reconsideration of NEA’s decision. On February 27, 1987, petitioner, being Barangay Captain of Natividad (Poblacion), Naguilian, La Union, was appointed by the then Minister of Local Government Jaime N. Ferrer as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union, representing the barangay officials. Petitioner took her oath on March 18, 1987 and thereafter assumed her duties.

In April 1987, NEA Deputy Administrator Rodrigo Cabrera ruled that petitioner’s designation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disqualified her from continuing as LUELCO Director and that the Board could appoint her successor for the unexpired portion of the term. The ruling relied on Section 21 of P.D. No. 269, which provides that “elective officers of the government; except barrio captain and councilors, shall be ineligible to become officers and/or directors of any (electric cooperative),” and on the incorporation of the same prohibition in LUELCO’s by-laws, which stated that “No person shall be eligible to become or to remain a board member of the cooperative who holds an elective office in the government above the level of a barangay captain.”

NEA Ruling and the Board’s Appointment of a Successor

Acting on petitioner’s reconsideration request, Deputy Administrator Cabrera communicated to LUELCO through a radio message that petitioner’s letter-appeal had become moot and academic and that the Board could use Article IV, Section 12 of the by-laws to fill the District II vacancy. In response, on April 26, 1987, LUELCO adopted Resolution No. 15-0487 appointing Eduardo P. Marzan as a member of the Board to serve the unexpired portion of petitioner’s term and notifying NEA accordingly.

On April 28, 1987, petitioner filed with NEA another letter-appeal dated April 26, 1987, requesting that Resolution No. 15-0487 be declared null and void. In a letter dated May 7, 1987, NEA’s Editha S. Bueno furnished petitioner a copy of a NEA legal memorandum (dated October 7, 1980) concluding that a Barangay Captain appointed to the Sangguniang Bayan—a position higher than a Barangay Captain—is disqualified to run for Director and, if already elected, ceases to be a Director from the time the person qualifies and assumes office. NEA’s May 7, 1987 communication was treated in effect as a denial of petitioner’s request to annul Resolution No. 15-0487.

Action Before the Office of the President and Filing of the Petition

On August 25, 1987, petitioner wrote the President through the Executive Secretary seeking reinstatement as LUELCO Director, invoking Section 13 of P.D. No. 269, which required that NEA issuances be subject to approval of the Office of the President. On January 21, 1988, Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Samilo M. Barlongay sustained NEA’s May 7, 1987 ruling.

Petitioner then brought the present petition for certiorari, challenging the NEA ruling dated May 7, 1987, the supporting Office of the President action dated January 21, 1988, and the effect of LUELCO’s adoption of Resolution No. 15-0487. She framed the controlling question as whether she was legally disqualified to continue as an elected Director because of her designation as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union as representative of barangay officials.

The Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner contended that her designation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan fell within the “other kind” of membership described in that legislative body—membership that was appointive rather than elective. She maintained that because her position was filled by appointment or designation by the President (or the President’s alter ego) under Section 205(2) of the Local Government Code, she was an appointed public official and not an “elective officer” within the meaning of Section 21 of P.D. No. 269, as amended, and Section 3(c), Article IV of LUELCO’s by-laws. On that basis, she asserted that the statutory and by-law ineligibility should not apply to her.

The Court’s Ruling on the Sole Issue

The Court rejected petitioner’s theory and held her contention untenable. The Court reasoned that, although Section 21 of P.D. No. 269 and the corresponding by-law provisions referred to elective officers of the government, the prohibition properly extended to an appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, because the office itself was an elective office. The Court viewed the disqualification as keyed to the holding of the office, not solely to whether the assumption resulted exclusively from election by the public at large. It treated the assumption of office as a condition that may occur through appointment without negating the legislative purpose of the restriction.

The Court explained that the disqualification aimed to prevent incumbents of elective offices from exerting political influence and pressure over the management of the cooperative’s affairs. The purpose would not be fully achieved, the Court said, if a person appointed to an elective office could avoid the disqualification and thereby still wield influence and pressure comparable to an elected office-holder. Thus, the Court held that an appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, like petitioner, could exercise the powers and prerogatives attached to that position and therefore should remain subject to the same restriction on continued service as a cooperative director.

Applying that rationale to the facts, the Court held that petitioner—having been appointed as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, a position above the rank of barangay captain—could not remain as LUELCO Director without violating the spirit and intent of Section 21 of P.D. No. 269 and LUELCO’s by-laws. The Court cited Matabuena vs. Cervantes, which it used for the interpretive principle that what falls with

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