G.R. No. 196015 - Rural Bank of Mabitac, Laguna, Inc. vs. Canicon

Case Summary (G.R. No. 196015)

Petitioner, Respondents, and Charges

Criminal Case No. 12508-B arose from a complaint for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (in relation to PD No. 1689). An information was filed against three employees (Aguilar, Canicon, Espeleta). After preliminary investigation and arraignment, Espeleta and Canicon pleaded not guilty; Aguilar remained at large. The amended information filed after reinvestigation dropped Espeleta from the charges; subsequent RTC proceedings produced conflicting orders on that amendment and Espeleta’s status.

Key Dates, Orders and Procedural History

Preliminary investigation by Prosecutor Juarez found probable cause; information filed April 24, 2003.
June 12, 2003: Espeleta filed an urgent motion for reinvestigation.
July 28, 2003: Lomarda’s reinvestigation report recommended dismissal of Espeleta and filing of an amended information; August 4, 2003: motion filed to amend information.
September 17, 2003: RTC (Judge Cabuco-Andres) granted motion and admitted amended information dropping Espeleta.
November 15, 2006: RTC (Judge Laguilles) recalled/set aside the September 17, 2003 order and reinstated Espeleta as co-accused, issuing warrant.
October 23, 2007: RTC (Judge Baybay) granted respondents’ motion for reconsideration, set aside the November 15, 2006 resolution, and reinstated the September 17, 2003 order admitting the amended information.
CA denied petitioner’s Rule 65 certiorari; petitioner filed Rule 45 petition with the Supreme Court, which granted the petition.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Whether petitioner (private complainant) has standing to file the petition without Solicitor General conformity.
Whether reinstating the original information would expose Espeleta to double jeopardy.
Whether the CA erred in finding absence of grave abuse of discretion by the RTC in issuing the October 23, 2007 order. Sub-issues included alleged deprivation of due process (lack of notice of reinvestigation and the motion to amend) and whether the trial court made an independent evaluation of the evidence when admitting the amended information.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis

The Court applied the 1987 Constitution (right against double jeopardy, among others), Rules of Court provisions (Rule 112 on preliminary investigation, Rule 117 Sec. 7 on double jeopardy, Rule 65 and Rule 45 procedures), and administrative law on the Solicitor General’s role. Jurisprudential authorities referenced include Crespo v. Mogul, Martinez, Mosquera, Dee, Perez, People v. Pilpa and related precedents governing prosecutor discretion, court discretion after an information is filed, and private complainant standing in certiorari.

Standing and the Role of the Solicitor General

The Court reaffirmed that the Solicitor General (OSG) has exclusive authority to represent the State in criminal appeals to the CA or Supreme Court; the State is the real offended party in criminal prosecutions and the private complainant’s interest is primarily civil. Nevertheless, the Court recognized established exceptions permitting a private offended party to file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 where dismissal is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Applying those principles, the Court held that petitioner had legal personality to file the certiorari petition because the dismissal of Espeleta foreclosed petitioner’s civil remedy deemed instituted in the criminal case and the dismissal was alleged to involve grave abuse. The OSG’s failure to oppose tacitly recognized petitioner’s standing in the CA proceedings.

Double Jeopardy Analysis

The Court applied Rule 117, Sec. 7’s four elements for attachment of double jeopardy: (1) valid information sufficient to sustain conviction; (2) court of competent jurisdiction; (3) arraignment and plea; and (4) conviction, acquittal, or dismissal without the accused’s express consent. Elements one through three were satisfied. The dispositive question was whether the dismissal was with Espeleta’s express consent. While filing an urgent motion for reinvestigation does not by itself constitute consent, the Court found that Espeleta’s counsel’s failure to object to the amendment—manifested in counsel’s “no objection” at the hearing—amounted to express consent under controlling precedent. Likewise, the subsequent reinstatement prompted by Espeleta’s own motion for reconsideration did not create a bar by double jeopardy because dismissals stemming from an accused’s motion do not generally cause final jeopardy to attach. Consequently, reinstating the original information would not place Espeleta in double jeopardy.

Prosecutorial Discretion and the Court’s Exclusive Role After Filing of an Information

The Court reiterated that preliminary investigation and determination of probable cause are executive functions within the prosecutor’s discretion; however, once an information is filed in court, disposition of the case (including motions to dismiss, reinvestigations, amendments, or withdrawal) is subject to the court’s discretion. Citing Crespo v. Mogul and subsequent cases, the Court stressed that the trial court must exercise its own independent judicial discretion and evaluation of evidence rather than merely deferring to the prosecution’s conclusions. The prosecution’s change of position or reinvestigation cannot automatically bind the court once the matter is before the judiciary.

Requirement of Independent Judicial Evaluation; Failure Constituted Grave Abuse

The Court examined the RTC orders that admitted the amended information (September 17, 2003) and the later order reinstating that admission (October 23, 2007). It found that those orders contained no independent assessment or stated reasons reflecting the trial court’s own evaluation of the evidence to justify admitting the amended information that dropped Espeleta. The September 17, 2003 order admitted the amended information “without objection” but gave no reasons;

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 196015)

Procedural Posture and Relief Sought

Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by Rural Bank of Mabitac, Laguna, Inc. (petitioner) seeking nullification of the Court of Appeals' (CA) September 29, 2010 Decision and March 4, 2011 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 104984 (collectively, Assailed Decision).
At the CA, petitioner sought certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna Branch 31 October 23, 2007 Order which set aside the RTC’s November 15, 2006 Resolution and reinstated its September 17, 2003 Order in Criminal Case No. 12508‑B.
The CA denied petitioner’s certiorari petition; the present Rule 45 petition to the Supreme Court raises whether the CA correctly found absence of grave abuse of discretion by the RTC.

Factual Background

Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689, against employees Rica W. Aguilar (at large), Melanie M. Canicon (arrested), and Merlita L. Espeleta (arrested).
Prosecutor Alfredo P. Juarez, Jr. conducted the preliminary investigation and found probable cause, recommending filing of information.
Information for estafa (docketed I.S. No. 03-51) was filed on April 24, 2003 before the RTC of Biñan, Laguna, later transferred to RTC of San Pedro, Laguna and docketed as Criminal Case No. 12508-B.
Warrant of arrest issued for all three accused; only Canicon and Espeleta were arrested.
On June 12, 2003, Espeleta filed an urgent motion for reinvestigation alleging hurried preliminary investigation and denial of opportunity to present evidence; petitioner opposed the motion.
Despite the pending urgent motion, Espeleta and Canicon were arraigned on June 30, 2003 and pleaded not guilty.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Melchorito M. E. Lomarda conducted a reinvestigation; his July 28, 2003 Report recommended dismissal as to Espeleta and filing of an amended information dropping Espeleta and recommending bail for remaining accused.
On August 4, 2003, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to amend the information, attaching the amended information which excluded Espeleta.
On September 17, 2003, Judge Stella Cabuco-Andres issued an Order granting the prosecution’s motion and admitting the amended information, noting “without objection on the part of Atty. Jose de Leon, Jr., counsel for accused Canicon, and Atty. Joseph Arrojado, counsel for accused Espeleta.”
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the September 17, 2003 Order. The Provincial Prosecutor (Prosecutor Lomarda) denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on September 26, 2003 on grounds that Branch 31 had already acquired jurisdiction.
On November 15, 2006, Judge Zenaida G. Laguilles issued a Resolution recalling and setting aside the September 17, 2003 Order and reinstating Espeleta as co-accused, reasoning that the reinvestigation was conducted without prior leave of court and thus was a nullity.
Espeleta and Canicon moved for reconsideration of the November 15, 2006 Resolution. In its October 23, 2007 Order, Judge Rommel O. Baybay granted their motion for reconsideration, set aside the November 15, 2006 Resolution, and reinstated the September 17, 2003 Order admitting the amended information (thereby again excluding Espeleta).
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the October 23, 2007 Order was denied on April 21, 2008; petitioner then filed certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, which denied certiorari on grounds including that the prosecutor has sole discretion to indict and that the trial court’s admission of the amended information effectively dismissed the case against Espeleta.
Petitioner then sought review by the Supreme Court under Rule 45.

Issues Presented (as framed in the source)

Whether petitioner has standing to file the petition without the conformity of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Whether the present petition, which seeks reinstatement of the original information, places Espeleta in double jeopardy.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the October 23, 2007 Order reinstating the September 17, 2003 Order.
Whether petitioner was deprived of due process when the RTC admitted the amended information based on the reinvestigation, despite alleged lack of notice to petitioner of the reinvestigation and the motion.
Whether the trial court made its own independent evaluation of the evidence when it admitted the amended information dropping Espeleta as accused.

Controlling Legal Doctrines & Authorities Cited

OSG has the sole authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals (Administrative Code (1987), Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, Sec. 35(1)).
The State, not the private complainant, is the real offended party in criminal prosecutions; the private complainant’s interest is primarily civil (People v. Piccio; People v. Santiago).
Exceptions permitting private offended party standing to file certiorari against dismissal: Dee v. Court of Appeals; Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.; Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals — private complainant may file Rule 65 certiorari where dismissal is tainted with grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Elements for double jeopardy to attach under Rule 117, Sec. 7: (1) valid information sufficient in form and substance; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) accused arraigned and pleaded; and (4) accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
Prosecutorial determination of probable cause is an executive function and enjoys wide discretion; but that discretion is not immune from review when tainted by grave abuse or arbitrary disregard of jurisprudential parameters (Leviste v. Alameda; Aguilar v. Department of Justice).
Once an information has been filed in court, disposition of the case (including reinvestigation, amendments, dismissal) is within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court — the court must make an independent evaluation of the evidence and not merely adopt the prosecution’s conclusions (Crespo v. Mogul; Martinez v. Court o