Title
Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. L-32116
Decision Date
Apr 21, 1981
Maxima Castro’s loan consent was vitiated by fraud; bank’s negligence led to invalid mortgage and foreclosure, upheld by court ruling.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-32116)

Factual Background

In December 1959, respondent Maxima Castro sought a P3,000 loan from Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. She was accompanied by Severino and Catalina Valencia, who arranged the transaction and supplied personal data. On December 11, 1959 Castro signed a promissory note for P3,000 for her personal loan. On the same day the Valencias obtained a separate P3,000 loan and caused Castro to sign a second promissory note (Exhibit 2) as co-maker. Both loans were secured by a real-estate mortgage (Exhibit 6) on Castro’s house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. 7419. Castro later received notice of a sheriff’s sale and learned that the mortgage secured an obligation of P6,000 rather than P3,000.

Complaint and Relief Sought

On April 4, 1961 Castro filed suit denominated “Re: Sum of Money” against the bank, Desiderio, the Valencias, the sheriff Basilio Magsambol and Arsenio Reyes. She deposited P3,383 with the clerk as payment of her personal loan and in her amended complaint sought annulment of the promissory note (Exhibit 2) as to her, annulment of the mortgage (Exhibit 6) insofar as it exceeded P3,000, annulment of the foreclosure sale, application of her deposit to discharge her obligation, and an award of attorney’s fees, damages and costs.

Stipulation of Facts

The parties submitted a partial stipulation of facts admitting, among other matters, Castro’s ownership of the mortgaged property, the genuineness of her signatures on the relevant loan documents and promissory notes, the notice of sheriff’s sale dated February 13, 1961, postponement of the sale from March 10 to April 10, 1961, the sale held on April 11, 1961 with Arsenio Reyes as highest bidder, issuance of a transfer certificate to Reyes, and subsequent annotation of lis pendens by Castro.

Trial Evidence

At trial Castro testified that she was seventy years old, illiterate in English, spoke only Pampango, had only a second grade education, and that the Valencias handed her preprepared documents to sign without explanation or copies. She asserted that she did not learn of the P6,000 mortgage encumbrance until receipt of the sheriff’s letter in February 1961. The bank produced testimony that Castro had been interviewed and that she represented she sought P3,000 for investment in a drugstore and offered her property as security. The bank’s manager admitted that information in the application overstated Castro’s age, occupation and income.

Trial Court and Court of Appeals Rulings

The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment in favor of Castro and ordered, among other things, that (1) promissory note Exhibit 2 was invalid as to Castro; (2) mortgage Exhibit 6 was null and void insofar as it exceeded P3,000; (3) the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of April 11, 1961 was annulled; (4) Castro’s unpaid obligation was limited to P3,000 plus 12% interest and her deposit of P3,383 was to be applied; (5) the bank was ordered to reimburse Arsenio Reyes for the purchase price and expenses; and (6) the Valencias were ordered to pay the bank P3,000 plus interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto.

Issues Presented on Review

Petitioners raised six assignments of error summarized as follows: that the Court of Appeals erred in partially annulling Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 6 absent allegation or proof of fraud or unlawful conduct by petitioners; that the court improperly imputed the Valencias’ fraud to the bank in violation of the res inter alios acta principle; that Castro was estopped from impugning the transaction; that Castro’s negligence or acquiescence should deny her relief; that Castro’s consignation of P3,383 was invalid for failure to tender to the bank; and that the foreclosure sale held on the business day following the holiday was valid under Section 31, Revised Administrative Code.

Parties’ Contentions on Fraud, Mistake and Agency

Petitioners contended that the Valencias alone committed fraud and that the bank could not be prejudiced by that fraud under the res inter alios acta doctrine. They argued further that Castro’s conduct amounted to negligence or apparent authority conferred on the Valencias, thereby precluding her from impugning the instruments. Castro and respondents below contended that the Valencias defrauded Castro and misrepresented information to the bank, producing a mutual and substantial mistake that vitiated consent.

Findings on Fraud, Mistake and Bank’s Negligence

The Court found that the Valencias had defrauded Castro and that their misrepresentations to the bank produced substantial, mutual mistake affecting the consents of both Castro and the bank. The Court noted the bank’s failure to verify Castro’s qualifications or ensure she understood the documents she signed given her age, illiteracy and dependence, invoking Article 24 and Article 1332 of the Civil Code to afford protection. The Court further relied on Article 1342, holding that misrepresentation by a third person can vitiate consent where it results in mutual substantial mistake, and cited Hill v. Veloso to the same effect. The Court rejected petitioners’ estoppel and agency arguments because the Valencias’ authority was limited to following up Castro’s loan application and because the bank should have required a special power of attorney if it thought the Valencias acted on Castro’s behalf.

On Consignation of P3,383

The Court upheld Castro’s deposit of P3,383 with the clerk as a valid consignation sufficient to discharge her personal obligation for P3,000 plus interest. The Court reasoned that prior tender to the bank would have been futile given the bank’s position and the existing foreclosure proceedings, and that equitable considerations supported acceptance of the consignation under Article 1256.

On Validity of the Foreclosure Sale

The Court held the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of April 11, 1961 void. It explained that Section 9, Act No. 3135 required notices to be posted for not less than twenty days and, where the property exceeded PHP 400 in value, publication once a week for three consecutive weeks. The Court ruled that the pretermission rule of Section 31, Revised Administrative Code — permitting acts whose last day falls on a holiday to be done on the next business day — did not apply to a deputy sheriff’s fixed sale date because the pretermission rule governs statutory or periodical last days, not discretionary dates set by an officer; consequently the sale held on April 11 lacked the required notices for that day.

Disposition and Relief O

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