G.R. No. L-533 - Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-533)

Petitioners’ Military Service and Commission

At the outbreak of hostilities in December 1941, petitioners were members of the Philippine Constabulary or civilians who joined guerilla units in Mindoro. In early 1943 the 6th Military District (led by Colonel Macario L. Peralta, Jr.) was recognized by General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area command. Thereafter:

Major Ramon Ruffy formed the Bolo Combat Team and was appointed Acting Commander of the 3rd Battalion, 66th Infantry, 61st Division.
Francisco, Fortus, Garcia, and Adeva received successive brevet or probationary commissions (2nd–3rd lieutenants, later promotions to 1st lieutenant or captain), by orders issued in the field and approved by the Philippine Army’s command structure.
They operated under orders, received pay and supplies from Allied channels, and were treated as members of the Philippine Army subject to military discipline.

Circumstances of the General Court-Martial Proceedings

After Jurado’s assassination, petitioners ceased to recognize the 6th Military District’s authority. The General Court-Martial tried and convicted Garcia, Francisco, Adeva, and Fortus; Ruffy was acquitted and Dinglasan’s case was dismissed. The petitioners then sought certiorari before the Supreme Court, challenging:

Their subjection to military law at the time of the offense.
The constitutionality of Article 93 of War (death or life imprisonment for murder in time of war) under the Constitution’s guarantee of Supreme Court review in capital or life‐imprisonment cases.

Applicability of Military Law During Enemy Occupation

Petitioners argued that all Philippine military regulations were suspended during Japanese occupation. The Court examined Winthrop’s Military Law and precedent:

Occupied‐territory civilians may be governed by occupying power’s laws, but this does not free existing military personnel—even if held in abeyance from discipline while inactive—from military jurisdiction for serious offenses (e.g., crimes “unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,” murder in time of war).
Recognized guerrilla units, integrated into the Philippine Army and under Allied operational control, remained subject to Articles of War despite enemy occupation.

Persons Subject to Military Law under Article 2 of War

Article 2(a) extends military jurisdiction to:
• Officers and enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army, including reservists on active duty.
• “All other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training” in the service.
Petitioners, having accepted commissions and operating under orders of the 6th Military District and Allied command, clearly fell within this definition and were therefore amenable to courts-martial.

Constitutionality of Article 93 of War—Majority Opinion

Petitioners claimed Article 93 violates Article VIII, Section 2(4) of the 1935 Constitution by denying Supreme Court review of death or life imprisonment sentences. The Court held:

Courts-martial are executive tribunals, created under the President’s Commander-in-Chief power and legislation, not part of the judicial branch.
The Constitution’s prohibition against depriving the Supreme Court of original jurisdiction over certain cases applies to the judicial department and does not extend to executive military tribunals.
Consequently, Article 93 is not unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court lacks original jurisdiction to review courts-martial verdicts.

Dissenting Opinion on Judicial Review

Justice Perfecto (dissenting) argued that:

Courts-martial function as “inferior courts” under Article VIII, Section