Case Summary (A.M. No. CA-20-36-P)
Procedural Posture
The Court of First Instance dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended and supplemental complaint on defendants’ motion for failure to state a cause of action. Because the appeal raised only a question of law, it was taken directly to the Supreme Court.
Facts Alleged in the Complaint
Plaintiffs alleged continuous and uninterrupted use, for more than twenty years, of a road or passage traversing defendants’ land for access between their residences and Igualdad Street and the public market of Naga City. They alleged recognition of that easement by defendants and predecessors. Plaintiffs further alleged that on May 12, 1953 defendants (through agents) began constructing a chapel in the middle of the right of way, impeding its use, and on July 10, 1954 other defendants, with approval, forcibly erected posts, barbed wire and otherwise closed the passage, preventing plaintiffs’ access.
Legal Issue Presented
Whether an easement of right of way (servitude of passage) may be acquired by prescription (acquisitive prescription, adverse possession) under the then-applicable law.
Relevant Statutory and Doctrinal Framework
- Civil Code provisions governing easements and their classification (continuous or discontinuous; apparent or non-apparent) were central to the analysis. The opinion cites both Old and New Civil Code provisions: Articles 532 and 615 (classification), Articles 537 and 539 and 620 and 622 (modes of acquisition and limitations), and Article 1959 of the Old Civil Code (prescription of ownership and other real rights, excluding certain easements by virtue of Article 539).
- Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure), section 41, providing a ten-year prescriptive period for acquisition of rights in real estate by adverse possession, was discussed for its potential impact on prior rules.
- Doctrinal authorities cited include Manresa and Sánchez Román on the nature of discontinuous servitudes. Commentaries (Professor Tolentino) and foreign authority (17 Am. Jur.) were also referenced in the Court’s discussion of continuity and adverse possession.
Precedents and Authority Considered by the Court
- Bargayo v. Camumot (40 Phil.) and Cuayong v. Benedicto (37 Phil.) were cited as prior decisions applying the rule that discontinuous easements (such as rights of way) could not be acquired by prescription under the Old Civil Code.
- Municipality of Dumangas v. Bishop of Jaro (34 Phil.) was discussed at length because it had held that a right of way had been acquired; the Court analyzed the basis of that decision and distinguished it from ordinary prescriptive acquisition.
- The Court also examined scholarly opinions and the possible effect of Act No. 190 on the rule disallowing prescription for discontinuous easements.
Majority Reasoning
The majority held that an easement of right of way is essentially discontinuous (intermittent) because its exercise depends on human action at intervals — it is impossible physically for passage to be incessant. Under the Civil Code regime in force, discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by express title and not by prescription (citing the pertinent articles). The majority relied on established doctrine (Manresa, Sánchez Román) and prior Philippine decisions to conclude that a right of way could not be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Although Cuayong v. Benedicto had suggested that Act No. 190 might have changed the rule, the majority declined to adopt such a change absent clear statutory or controlling jurisprudential clarification. The majority therefore affirmed the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Concurrence (Justice Reyes, J.B.L.)
Justice Reyes concurred in the result and elaborated the doctrinal basis. He emphasized that possession of a right consists in its enjoyment or exercise; because the exercise of a right of way is necessarily intermittent, the possession is not continuous in the sense required for acquisitive prescription (the Civil Code requires continuous possession). He also read Act No. 190’s section 41 as preserving the requirement of uninterrupted possession by qualifying ten-year prescription with the same continuity requirement. On the Dumangas decision, Justice Reyes explained that it rested on an implied encumbrance or grant (Article 567 of the old Civil Code) and on immemorial user rather than on ordinary ten- or thirty-year adverse possession; thus Dumangas did n
Case Syllabus (A.M. No. CA-20-36-P)
Citation and Procedural Posture
- Reported at 103 Phil. 84, G.R. No. L-10619, decided February 28, 1958.
- Appeal taken directly to the Supreme Court from an order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur dated March 6, 1955.
- The trial court dismissed the amended and supplemental complaint of plaintiffs on defendants’ motion that it did not state a cause of action.
- The appeal involves only a question of law concerning whether an easement of right of way can be acquired through prescription.
Factual Allegations (as stated in the amended and supplemental complaint and reproduced by the appealed order)
- Plaintiffs alleged continuous and uninterrupted use for more than 20 years of a road/passageway traversing defendants’ land in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City from their residences and back.
- Plaintiffs alleged recognition and respect for their private legal easement of road/right of way by the defendants and their predecessors in interest.
- On May 12, 1953, defendants Jose Roco, through co-defendants Raymundo Martinez and their men, allegedly began constructing a chapel in the middle of the right of way, with the construction actually impeding and disturbing plaintiffs’ continuous exercise of their rights over the right of way.
- On July 10, 1954, new defendants Natividad Roco and Gregorio Miras, Jr., with approval of Jose Roco and aided by men and laborers, allegedly planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire, and closed the passageway hermetically against plaintiffs’ protests, thereby preventing plaintiffs from going to or coming from their homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of Naga City.
Legal Issue Presented
- Whether an easement of right of way (servitude of passage) can be acquired through prescription.
Holding (Majority)
- The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal: an easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription under the present law (Old and New Civil Codes) and applicable jurisprudence, unless and until the law is changed or clarified.
Legal Reasoning — Framework of Civil Code Provisions (as applied by the Court)
- The Old and New Civil Codes recognize easements as continuous or discontinuous (intermittent), and as apparent or non-apparent (Old Code Arts. 532, 537, 539; New Code Arts. 615, 620, 622).
- Discontinuous easements are those used at intervals and depend upon acts of man; easements of right of way are considered discontinuous.
- Continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by title or prescription; continuous non-apparent and discontinuous easements (apparent or not) may be acquired only by title.
- Article 1959 of the Old Civil Code (prescription of ownership and other real rights) excludes the exception established by Article 539 (relating to discontinuous easements).
- Precedent: Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857, 867, and Cuayong (Cuaycong) v. Benedicto, 37 Phil. 781, held that discontinuous easements (such as right of way) could not be acquired by prescription under the Old Civil Code.
- The Court noted that under Article 539 of the Old Civil Code no discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any event (as held in Cuayong v. Benedicto).
Consideration of Contradictory Authority and Arguments
- The Court acknowledged that in Municipality of Dumangas v. Bishop of Jaro, 34 Phil. 545, the Tribunal held that continued public use of a path to and from a church gave the church (and the public) a right of way by prescription.
- The majority analyzed Dumangas and concluded its ratio decidendi rested on Article 567 of the Old Civil Code (implied obligation to grant right of way when an estate is enclosed by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner) and on the concept of immemorial usage, not on prescription in the sense of adverse possession under the Civil Code.
- The Court observed that the Dumangas decision likely invoked "prescription" in the sense of "immemorial usage" rather than