Case Summary (G.R. No. 152259)
Petitioner
Alfredo T. Romualdez — accused of intervening, directly or indirectly, in a government business/transaction/contract/application (sale/transfer of NASSCO assets to BASECO) during July 16–29, 1975.
Respondent(s)
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) — issued the challenged Resolutions denying petitioner’s motions to quash/dismiss and ordering arraignment and pre‑trial to proceed. The People of the Philippines (PCGG initiated complaint; Office of the Special Prosecutor and Ombudsman handled reinvestigation/prosecution).
Key Dates
Alleged offense: July 16–29, 1975. Information filed: July 12, 1989. Procedural history highlights: Dec. 27, 1996 (first Motion to Dismiss/Defer Arraignment); Jan. 9, 1997 (SB order to file Motion for Reinvestigation); Jan. 21, 1998 (Supreme Court dismissed petitioner’s petition for certiorari/prohibition); Nov. 9, 1998 (Motion to Quash); Sept. 22, 1999 (Special Prosecution Office recommended dismissal; Ombudsman ordered evidence to be presented in court); Oct. 8, 1999 (second Motion to Quash); Feb. 9, 2000 (SB denied motion); June 19–29, 2001 (Motion for Leave / Motion to Dismiss admitted); Nov. 20, 2001 and Mar. 1, 2002 (SB Resolutions denying dismissal and reconsideration); Decision under review: July 29, 2004.
Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis
Primary statute: Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti‑Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Procedural rules invoked: Rule 65 (certiorari), Rule 117 (motion to quash), Rule 116 (bill of particulars). Constitutional framework: 1987 Philippine Constitution is the operative constitutional framework for the Court’s decision (decision dated 2004). The Court also considered historical application of Section 17, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution as it related to petitioner’s immunity argument.
Procedural Posture
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to set aside the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions (Nov. 20, 2001 and Mar. 1, 2002) that denied motions to quash/dismiss and ordered arraignment/pre‑trial. The petitioner advanced repetitive preliminary objections and raised constitutional challenges to Section 5 of RA 3019, alleged defects in the information, lack of preliminary investigation, prescription, and claimed derivative immunity under the 1973 Constitution.
Facts Alleged in the Information
The Information charged that between July 16 and July 29, 1975, petitioner — related by affinity within the third civil degree to President Ferdinand E. Marcos — willfully and unlawfully, with evident bad faith and for self‑interest or that of others, intervened in a contract between NASSCO (a GOCC) and BASECO (a private corporation allegedly majority‑owned by Marcos) whereby NASSCO sold and transferred equipment and facilities to BASECO for P5,000,000.00.
Motions and Sandiganbayan Orders
Petitioner filed multiple preliminary motions: a Motion to Dismiss/Defer Arraignment (Dec. 27, 1996), Motions to Quash (Nov. 9, 1998; Oct. 8, 1999), and another Motion to Dismiss (filed June 19, 2001 after leave was granted). The Sandiganbayan denied these motions (Feb. 9, 2000; Nov. 20, 2001) and denied reconsideration (Mar. 1, 2002), directing arraignment and pre‑trial to proceed.
Issues Presented
The Court distilled the issues to: (1) constitutionality of Section 5, RA 3019; (2) whether the Information is unconstitutionally vague; (3) whether there was a valid preliminary investigation; (4) whether the criminal action had prescribed; and (5) whether petitioner enjoyed immunity under then Section 17, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution.
Court’s Disposition
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan and rejected each of petitioner’s substantive and procedural challenges.
Procedural Ruling on Repetitive Motions and Waiver
The Court emphasized that repetitive preliminary motions to invalidate or summarily terminate an indictment (whether called a motion to quash or motion to dismiss) are disfavored because they delay justice and burden courts. Grounds not raised in a first motion to quash are generally deemed waived under Rule 117; a subsequent second motion raising those omitted grounds is therefore improper. The Court observed that petitioner had filed successive motions and thus procedurally forfeited many of the grounds now urged in the certiorari petition.
Constitutionality of Section 5, RA 3019 — General Principle
The Court rejected petitioner’s facial challenge to Section 5 on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. It explained that the overbreadth and void‑for‑vagueness doctrines have been developed primarily in the free‑speech (First Amendment) context and, as a general rule in the Court’s jurisprudence, are inapt as a mechanism for facial invalidation of criminal statutes. Instead, penal statutes are ordinarily tested as applied to the defendant’s conduct; a statute is presumed constitutional and the challenger bears a heavy burden to rebut that presumption.
Constitutionality of Section 5 — Specific Analysis
Section 5 proscribes intervention, directly or indirectly, by the spouse or any relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree of specified high officials, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government, subject to enumerated exceptions. The Court held that Section 5 provides a sufficiently definite statement of the proscribed conduct: (1) the class of persons covered (spouse or relatives by consanguinity/affinity within the third civil degree of specified officials) and (2) the proscribed act (intervening, directly or indirectly, in government business/transaction/contract/application). The statutory term “intervene” can be construed by ordinary meaning (to “come between”), and the courts can apply the law to the particular facts at trial. The Court concluded the statute was not unconstitutionally vague when applied to petitioner.
Overbreadth and Vagueness Doctrines — Court’s View
The Court reiterated that overbreadth and vagueness doctrines were developed mainly for free‑speech cases; applying them to penal statutes risks inappropriate facial invalidation. The Court explained the proper test for vagueness: whether a penal statute defines the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand the proscribed conduct. A reasonable degree of certainty is required, not absolute precision. On that standard, Section 5 met constitutional requirements.
Statutory Construction of “Intervene”
The absence of a statutory definition of “intervene” does not render Section 5 void for vagueness because the word bears an ordinary meaning (“to come between”) which courts can apply. The legislatively used general terms are permissible; the judiciary may construe general statutory language in its natural, plain and ordinary acceptation, and evidentiary particulars of “how” intervention occurred are matters for trial.
Adequacy of the Information and Remedy
The Court held the Information sufficiently alleged the essential elements of a Section 5 offense and gave petitioner the requisite notice to prepare an intelligent defense. Where an information is alleged to be vague in particulars, Rule 116, Section 9 provides the remedy of a bill of particulars before arraignment; a motion to quash is not the proper vehicle to obtain such details. Elements constituting the offense must be stated; evidentiary details need not be pleaded in the information.
Preliminary Investigation Issue
Petitioner argued that PCGG’s conduct of the preliminary investigation violated due process because PCGG acted as complainant and investigator. The Court acknowledged Cojuangco v. PCGG (1990) which disallowed a biased PCGG preliminary investigation; but in this case the Sandiganbayan suspended proceedings and afforded petitioner reinvestigation by the Ombudsman (as required by precedent and procedure). The Court found the Sandiganbayan followed the corrective procedure (suspending trial while reinvestigation occurred), so the lack of a valid PCGG preliminary investigation did not mandate quashal of the Information.
Prescription (Statute of Limitations)
Petitioner argued the offense prescribed because the alleged acts occurred in 1975 and RA 3019’s prescriptive period was ten years. The Court relied on Act No. 3326 (prescription for special laws) which begins prescription from commission or, if not known, from discovery and from the institution of judicial proceedings. The Court applied established precedent (Desierto and related rulings) holding that where illicit transactions were concealed and only discoverable after EDSA and the creation of investigation bodies (PCGG), prescription is computed from discovery. Given the government’s inability to detect alleged collusive acts during Marcos’ administration, discovery occurred later and the Information filed July 12, 1989 was within
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 152259)
Procedural Posture
- Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, seeking to set aside the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated November 20, 2001 and March 1, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 13736 (denying Motion to Dismiss and denying reconsideration, respectively).
- Case citation: 479 Phil. 265 EN BANC; G.R. No. 152259; decision rendered July 29, 2004.
- Supreme Court treated the petition as properly before it, received memoranda from petitioner, the Office of the Ombudsman (Special Prosecution), and the Office of the Solicitor General; case deemed submitted for resolution on March 6, 2003 upon receipt of petitioner's memorandum.
- Relief sought below and here: dismissal/quashal of the information and deferral of arraignment/pre-trial; the Sandiganbayan denied the motions and proceeded to arraignment and pre-trial schedule.
Facts
- On July 12, 1989, the People of the Philippines through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed an information before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner with violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended.
- The Information alleges that petitioner, brother-in-law of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and related by affinity within the third civil degree, willfully and unlawfully intervened (directly or indirectly) between July 16 and July 29, 1975 in a contract / transaction between National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO) and Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), resulting in the sale/transfer of NASSCO ownership, titles and equipment to BASECO for the amount of P5,000,000.00; charged as contrary to law.
- Procedural chronology of petitioner’s defensive motions and actions:
- December 27, 1996: petitioner filed first Motion to Dismiss and to Defer Arraignment, alleging no valid preliminary investigation and, alternatively, that the preliminary investigation was biased and partial.
- January 9, 1997: Sandiganbayan First Division ordered petitioner to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special Prosecutor within 15 days.
- Petitioner sought recourse before the Supreme Court (petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for TRO) which the Court dismissed on January 21, 1998 for failure to show grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan.
- November 9, 1998: petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
- September 22, 1999: Special Prosecution Officer reported reinvestigation concluded and recommended dismissal; Deputy Special Prosecutor and Special Prosecutor approved but Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disagreed and ordered that petitioner be allowed to present evidence in court.
- October 8, 1999: petitioner filed a second Motion to Quash and to Defer Arraignment.
- February 9, 2000: Sandiganbayan denied the second Motion to Quash for lack of merit.
- June 19, 2001: petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Motion to Dismiss; on June 29, 2001 the Sandiganbayan admitted the motion and the attached (third) Motion to Dismiss.
- Grounds raised in the (third) Motion to Dismiss (as admitted June 29, 2001) included:
- I. Violation of right to due process during preliminary investigation (A. no valid preliminary investigation; B. investigation conducted by biased/partial investigator).
- II. Violation of constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation.
- III. Immunity from criminal prosecution under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution.
- IV. Extinction of criminal action or liability by prescription.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division)
- Sandiganbayan held that all grounds raised by petitioner, except the constitutional immunity ground, had already been raised and passed upon by the court in previous resolutions; thus they were not newly meritorious grounds.
- On the immunity ground (Article VII, Section 17 of 1973 Constitution) the Sandiganbayan ruled the provision became effective only in 1981; since the alleged intervention occurred in 1975, the immunity amendment was inapplicable.
- In denying the Motion for Reconsideration the Sandiganbayan ruled:
- Petitioner’s right to a preliminary investigation was not violated because he was afforded reinvestigation (i.e., trial held in abeyance and reinvestigation ordered/completed).
- Petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation was not violated: the Information set forth the essential elements of the offense charged with sufficient particularity.
- Result: Motions denied; arraignment and pre-trial to proceed.
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
- Petitioner assigned multiple alleged errors; the core issues condensed by the Court are:
- Whether Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional (vagueness, overbreadth, due process, presumption of innocence implications).
- Whether the Information is unconstitutionally vague and fails to inform petitioner of the nature and cause of the accusation.
- Whether there was a valid preliminary investigation (or whether petitioner’s due process rights were violated at that stage).
- Whether the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription.
- Whether petitioner is immune from criminal prosecution under Section 17, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution (as amended).
Supreme Court — Overall Disposition
- The Supreme Court held that the Petition has no merit.
- The petition was dismissed and the questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan were affirmed.
- Costs were awarded against petitioner.
- The Court conducted a full merits discussion despite procedural objections on repetitious motions, given the importance of the issues in curtailing graft and corruption.
Preliminary Procedural Holding: Impropriety of Repetitive Motions
- The Court emphasized that repetitive motions to invalidate or summarily terminate a criminal indictment prior to plea and trial (whether labeled motion to quash, motion to dismiss, etc.) delay the administration of justice and unduly burden the courts.
- There is no substantial distinction between a motion to quash and a motion to dismiss in effect when both seek dismissal; both raise preliminary objections aiming to avoid trial.
- The Rules abhor repetitive motions: Rule 117 provides that grounds not raised in the first motion to quash are generally deemed waived.
- Petitioner’s filing of a Motion to Dismiss after prior motions to quash effectively constituted a prohibited second motion to quash and contravened the rules against repetitive preliminary motions.
- Because of these procedural lapses the petition could have been dismissed outright; nevertheless, the Court proceeded to address the substantive issues.
First Issue — Constitutionality of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019
- Text of Section 5 (quoted in full by the Court):
- "Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued