Title
Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 119976
Decision Date
Sep 18, 1995
A candidate’s residency qualification for Congress was challenged; the Supreme Court ruled her domicile valid, upholding her election despite a technical error in her candidacy filing.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 136592-93)

Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification by Montejo

On March 23, private respondent Montejo filed SPA 95-009 with the COMELEC, alleging petitioner did not meet the one-year residency requirement under the 1987 Constitution, based on her Voter Registration Record and her original COC, and prayed for her disqualification and cancellation of her certificate.

Amended Certificate of Candidacy and Timeliness Issue

On March 29, petitioner filed an amended COC, changing “seven months” to “since childhood” in Item 8, but the Leyte Provincial Election Supervisor rejected it as late. Petitioner then filed it at COMELEC central office on March 31, along with her answer, asserting an “honest misinterpretation” of Item 8 and confirming Tacloban City as her domicile.

COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution Striking and Cancelling COCs

On April 24, 1995, the COMELEC Second Division (2–1) found Montejo’s petition meritorious, struck off the amended COC, and cancelled the original COC. It held that (a) an amendment made after the filing deadline could not be admitted; (b) the change from “seven months” to “since childhood” was a substantial matter affecting her qualification; and (c) she failed to prove the honest-mistake defense.

En Banc Denial of Motion for Reconsideration

On May 7, 1995, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, finding no new substantial matters warranting re-examination of the Second Division’s April 24 resolution.

Conflicting May 11 Proclamations and Election Results

On May 11, the COMELEC first resolved that petitioner could be proclaimed should she win, then reversed itself and directed that her proclamation be suspended even if she obtained the highest vote. The Provincial Board of Canvassers had certified her victory by a large margin.

Issues on Qualifications and Jurisdiction

Petitioner framed two main issues:
I. Qualifications – Whether she satisfied the one-year residency requirement in the First District of Leyte.
II. Jurisdiction – (a) Whether COMELEC lost jurisdiction by deciding outside timelines of B.P. 881; (b) Whether HRET had exclusive post-election jurisdiction over her qualification.

Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Residence as Domicile

The Court held that for election purposes “residence” is synonymous with “domicile,” which combines physical presence in a fixed place with the intention to remain ( animus manendi ). Residence alone, without intent, does not constitute domicile, and one may have multiple residences but only one domicile at a time.

Distinction Between Residence and Domicile Explained

Drawing on Civil Code Art. 50 and jurisprudence (Ong vs. Republic, Uytengsu vs. Republic, Romualdez v. RTC, Nuval vs. Guray, Larena vs. Teves), the Court explained: residence involves factual presence for a purpose; domicile adds the intention of permanence. In election law, “residence” equals “domicile.”

Application to Petitioner’s Domicile of Origin

Petitioner’s 1938 onward factual ties to Tacloban City—schooling, work, familial projects, voter registration, maintaining her ancestral house, letters to PCGG, purchase of a residence certificate in 1992—established Tacloban as her domicile of origin and choice. Absence for education or employment does not dissolve domicile.

No Automatic Change of Domicile upon Marriage or Death

The Court rejected respondent’s view that under Civil Code Art. 110 petitioner lost her Tacloban domicile upon marrying Ferdinand E. Marcos and that his death automatically restored it. Art. 110 deals with actual residence for cohabitation, not legal domicile. The Family Code’s Art. 69 granting joint domicile-fixing power to spouses did not affect petitioner’s enduring domicile of origin.

Meeting the One-Year Residency Requirement

Because petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District from at least 1992 (Tacloban) and August 1994 (Tolosa), she more than satisfied the constitutional one-year residency requirement. Her Voter Registration Reco

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