G.R. No. 119976 - Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections

Case Summary (G.R. No. 119976)

Factual Background

Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for Representative of the First District of Leyte on March 8, 1995 and entered “seven months” as her period of residency in the constituency immediately preceding the election. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo challenged petitioner’s qualification, alleging she failed the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement and relying on petitioner’s Voter Registration Record and the original Certificate of Candidacy. Petitioner promptly filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy which changed the contested entry to “since childhood,” but the Provincial Election Supervisor declined to accept the amendment as filed out of time; petitioner therefore filed the amended certificate and her answer with the COMELEC head office on March 31, 1995. The COMELEC Second Division, by a 2–1 vote, found the petition meritorious, struck off the amended certificate and cancelled the original certificate, reasoning that the seven-month entry matched petitioner’s voter registration showing six months in Tolosa and other documentary and conduct-based indicia of domicile outside the district.

Procedural History

Private respondent filed SPA No. 95–009 before the COMELEC Second Division, which promulgated its disqualifying Resolution on April 24, 1995. Petitioner moved for reconsideration; the COMELEC en banc denied the motion on May 7, 1995. On May 11, 1995 the COMELEC first allowed petitioner’s proclamation if canvass results so warranted and then, by a subsequent resolution the same day, suspended proclamation in the event she obtained the highest votes. Petitioner alleged she received 70,471 votes against Montejo’s 36,833 according to the provincial canvass and brought the matter to this Court in G.R. No. 119976, seeking to set aside the COMELEC resolutions and secure proclamation.

Issues Presented

The Court framed the principal issues as: whether petitioner satisfied the Constitution’s residence qualification for a Representative under Art. VI, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution; whether the COMELEC properly exercised jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the time limits prescribed by Section 78, B.P. Blg. 881; and whether, after the election, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner’s qualifications.

Parties’ Contentions

Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the required one-year residence in the First District of Leyte on the basis of her voter registration form and the original Certificate of Candidacy showing six or seven months’ residence in Tolosa. Petitioner maintained that the “seven months” entry was an honest mistake reflecting actual physical stay in Tolosa rather than legal domicile, that her domicile or residence of origin was Tacloban City within the First District since childhood, and that she never intended to abandon that domicile; petitioner also raised procedural defenses alleging the COMELEC had lapsed jurisdiction under Section 78, B.P. Blg. 881 and that after the election the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal would be the proper forum.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Court, through Justice Kapunan, held that petitioner possessed the requisite residence qualifications to run for Representative of the First District of Leyte. The Court set aside the COMELEC’s Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995, and directed the COMELEC to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. The majority found the COMELEC had misapplied principles of domicile and residence, accepted petitioner’s explanation that the erroneous entry was an honest mistake, and determined that the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to hear disqualification cases even after the election under R.A. No. 6646; the Court also held that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction over contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court began by reaffirming that for electoral purposes the constitutional term “residence” is used synonymously with “domicile,” a concept importing both physical presence and intention to remain, citing established precedents such as Ong v. Republic and Uytengsu v. Republic. The Court explained the legal distinction between mere residence and domicile and reiterated the three requisites for acquiring a new domicile of choice: bodily presence, animus manendi, and intent to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi). Applying these principles, the Court found the contested notation of “seven months” in petitioner’s original Certificate of Candidacy to be an honest and excusable mistake caused by the juxtaposition of entries in the form and by the circumstances of petitioner’s forced voter registration in Tolosa after private respondent opposed her registration in Tacloban. The Court held that a certificate of candidacy is not conclusive if the record shows the entry was inadvertent and that documentary admissions which are not of decisive probative value cannot defeat substantial evidence of a domicile of origin. On the question whether petitioner lost her Tacloban domicile by marriage, the Court analyzed Art. 110, Civil Code, and the distinctions between domicile and residence in civil law, and concluded that the husband’s power to fix the family actual residence did not ipso facto erase a wife’s domicile of origin; the Court further observed that the subsequent enactment of the Family Code, Art. 69 and constitutional guarantees of equality for women supported a modern view permitting a widow to choose or resume her domicile. The Court applied the settled test for rebutting the presumption of continuity of domicile and found private respondent’s evidence insufficient to prove abandonment. On jurisdictional questions the Court treated the Section 78, B.P. Blg. 881 deadline as directory, relied on Marcelino v. Cruz to permit departure from strict time limits in the interest of substantial justice, and invoked R.A. No. 6646, Secs. 6 and 7 to uphold COMELEC’s power to proceed after the election; it also held that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal takes exclusive jurisdiction only after a candidate becomes a member.

Dissenting Opinions

Several members of the Court dissented or filed separate opinions. Justice Padilla dissented on the ground that the original sworn entry of “seven months” in the Certificate of Candidacy was decisive and that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner for failing the one-year residence requirement; he also argued that Section 6, R.A. 6646 mandated that votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted, and that the provincial canvass should proclaim the highest-voted qualified candidate. Justice Regalado also dissented, stressing that petitioner had acquired a domicile by operation of law upon marriage and had not automatically reacquired her do

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 119976)

Parties and Posture

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was the petitioner who filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Representative of the First District of Leyte and later sought relief from this Court after COMELEC resolutions cancelled her candidacy and suspended any proclamation.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and Cirilo Roy Montejo were the respondents, the latter having filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification before the COMELEC.
The case reached the Supreme Court by petition attacking COMELEC Resolutions of April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 that declared petitioner not qualified and suspended any proclamation.

Facts

Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy on March 8, 1995 and entered in item no. 8 that her residence in the constituency immediately preceding the election was "Years and seven Months."
Private respondent Montejo filed a petition on March 23, 1995 alleging petitioner did not meet the constitutional one-year residency requirement and relying on petitioner’s Voter Registration Record and the March 8 certificate.
Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy on March 29, 1995 changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" but the Provincial Election Supervisor refused to accept the amendment as filed out of time.
Petitioner thereafter filed the amended certificate and her answer with the COMELEC head office on March 31, 1995 and asserted that the original "seven" months entry was an honest mistake and that Tacloban City remained her domicile.
The COMELEC Second Division, by a 2–1 vote on April 24, 1995, struck off the amended certificate and cancelled the original certificate, finding petitioner not to have complied with the one-year residency requirement.
The COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration the day before the elections and later issued inconsistent resolutions on May 11, 1995 regarding proclamation and its suspension.
Petitioner alleged she won the May 8, 1995 congressional election with 70,471 votes against Montejo’s 36,833 votes and filed a Supplemental Petition seeking relief from the COMELEC actions.

Issues

Whether petitioner satisfied the constitutional residency requirement of one year in the First District of Leyte on the day of the May 8, 1995 election.
Whether COMELEC properly exercised jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner within and outside the time limits prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code and related statutes.
Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
Whether an amendment to a Certificate of Candidacy submitted after the filing deadline may be admitted to correct an honest mistake.

Contentions

Private respondent contended petitioner lacked the required one-year residency and relied on petitioner’s March 8 Certificate of Candidacy and Voter Registration Record showing six months in Tolosa, Leyte.
Petitioner contended the March 8 entry of "seven" months was the result of an honest misinterpretation or mistake and sought to correct it to "since childhood" to reflect her domicile in Tacloban City.
Petitioner also contended that COMELEC lost jurisdiction under Section 78 of B.P. 881 and that after the election the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal possessed exclusive jurisdiction over qualifications.
COMELEC’s Second Division contended that the amendment could not be admitted because the change in the period of residence was a substantial matter affecting qualification and that petitioner had not shown animus manendi in the First District.

Statutory Framework

Art. VI, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution prescribes that a member of the House of Representatives must be a registered voter in the district and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election.
B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 78 governs petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy and prescribes time limits for filing and decision.
R.A. No. 6646, Secs. 6 and 7 address the effect of disqualification cases and permit continuation of proceedings after the election with possible suspension of proclamation.
Art. VI, Sec. 17, 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all questions relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members.
Article 110, Civil Code and Article 69, Family Code w