G.R. No. 46100 - Rizal vs. Mercado

Case Summary (G.R. No. 46100)

Factual Background

On January 10, 1935, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment in civil case No. 44808 against the defendant therein and herein petitioner. Petitioner received notice of the judgment on January 14, 1935. On January 23, 1935, he filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the judgment was contrary to law and the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion by order dated January 30, 1935. Petitioner received notice of the denial on February 6, 1935. On February 8, 1935, he excepted to the order and asked for a new trial on the same grounds.

By order of February 16, 1935, the Court of First Instance denied the motion for new trial. On February 21, 1935, petitioner filed his exception and notice of appeal. On March 2, 1935, he filed the corresponding bill of exceptions. The Court of Appeals, in dismissing petitioner’s appeal, treated the material timeline as decisive of timeliness, particularly in light of the number and sequence of motions for new trial and the periods remaining after each denial.

Trial Court and Court of Appeals’ Action

The core procedural ruling challenged in the petition originated from the dismissal by the second division of the Court of Appeals of petitioner’s appeal from the trial court’s judgment. The Court of Appeals relied on the ultimate facts concerning the dates of notice, the filing of petitioner’s motions, the denial orders, and the date when petitioner filed his exception and notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals’ dismissal effectively held that petitioner’s appellate steps were untimely when measured against the periods governing motions for new trial and their relation to the filing of the notice of intention to appeal.

The Principal Issue

The decisive issue before the Court was whether the filing on February 21, 1935 of petitioner’s exception and notice of intention to appeal was timely, considering that it occurred after the denial of his second motion for new trial and in the context of the number of days remaining for the presentation of another motion for new trial within the law’s thirty-day period. Related to that issue was whether petitioner’s acts suspended the running of the remaining period, and whether the filing of a second motion for new trial—based on the same grounds—could suspend the period more than the first motion did.

Parties’ Positions in the Certiorari Proceeding

Petitioner sought reversal of the Court of Appeals’ dismissal, asking that the Court of Appeals reinstate the appeal and decide it on the merits. Respondents Josefa Rizal Mercado et al. did not oppose the prayer for reversal; they expressed assent to what petitioner prayed for, primarily so that they would not be condemned to pay costs, and they requested judgment on the merits.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning on Timeliness

The Court approached the timeliness question by computing and analyzing the remaining statutory period for filing a motion for new trial and by applying established doctrines on how motions for new trial affect appellate periods.

From January 14, 1935, when petitioner received notice of the judgment, to January 23, 1935, when he filed his motion for reconsideration (treated as equivalent to a motion for new trial), nine days elapsed, leaving twenty-one days within the thirty-day period then allowed. The Court held that the filing of this motion for reconsideration (equivalent to a motion for new trial) suspended the running of the remaining twenty-one days until February 6, 1935, when petitioner was notified of the order denying the motion for reconsideration. In so ruling, the Court relied on prior jurisprudence including Pascua vs. Ocampo and Aguilar, 59 Phil., 48, Blouse vs. Moreno and Garcia, 60 Phil., 741, Levett vs. Sy Quia, 61 Phil., 847, and Rodriguez vs. Rovira, 63 Phil, 476, as well as later cases such as Layda vs. Legazpi, 39 Phil., 83, San Miguel Brewery vs. Legarda, 48 Phil., 507, and Agra vs. Zandueta, 56 Phil., 528.

The Court then addressed the effect of petitioner’s second motion for new trial filed on February 8, 1935. It held that this second motion did not suspend the running of the remaining twenty-one days, because it was based on the same grounds relied upon in the first motion. In doing so, the Court invoked the doctrine in Aquino vs. Tongco, 61 Phil., 840, which enunciated that a party may file several motions for new trial within the thirty-day period, but each motion must rest on different legal grounds.

The Court used a structured analysis based on the consequences that would have flowed if petitioner had followed different procedural options. It noted that petitioner could have filed additional motions for new trial within the remaining period. If petitioner had filed a third motion for new trial while still within the time remaining after the first suspension and before the remaining period elapsed, such a third motion would have been timely; and if it were denied, petitioner would then have five days to file his exception and notice of intention to appeal, absent a choice to take advantage of remaining time to file another motion. Alternatively, if the third motion were not valid or did not suspend the running of the remaining period, the period would have expired on the eighth day, or on March 1, 1935; in that event, the expiration would be equivalent to the denial of the third motion, and petitioner would have had the right to file his exception and notice of intention to appeal within five days.

From that perspective, the Court held that the filing of petitioner’s exception and notice of intention to appeal on February 21, 1935 was done on time, because it occurred within the legally relevant period for filing another motion for new trial. The Court further held that petitioner’s bill of exceptions filed on March 2, 1935 was also timely, because for that purpose petitioner had ten days counting from the date of the notice of intention to appeal.

The Court then stated the controlling rule in generalized form: where the filing of a notice of intention to appeal in an ordinary civil case is done within the period remaining for the presentation of another motion for new trial, the filing is timely even if five days had elapsed from the denial of the last motion for new trial, so long as the notice is filed within the law’s thirty-day period for presenting motions for new trial. That period excludes any time the trial court may have taken to decide the motions.

Disposition and Effect of the Ruling

Based on the

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 46100)

The case arose from Alfredo Hidalgo Rizal’s petition for certiorari seeking reversal of a Court of Appeals decision that dismissed his appeal from a Court of First Instance of Manila judgment.
The petition attacked the dismissal on procedural and timing grounds relating to the perfection of the appeal following denial of motions for reconsideration and for new trial.
The respondents, Josefa Rizal Mercado et al., expressed assent to the petition’s prayer in order to avoid liability for costs, and they requested a decision on the merits.
The Supreme Court resolved the matter through a decision upon new trial of the petitioner’s certiorari petition that the Court had previously granted by resolution dated February 4, 1939.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Alfredo Hidalgo Rizal appeared as petitioner and was the defendant in the original civil action.
Josefa Rizal Mercado et al. appeared as respondents and were the adverse parties in the original civil action.
The Court of Appeals (second division) had dismissed Rizal’s appeal from the Court of First Instance of Manila judgment.
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, reversed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The Supreme Court’s disposition followed its grant of certiorari by resolution on February 4, 1939, after which the parties submitted memoranda supporting their positions.
The decision notes that the original decision on the case, dated October 28, 1938, had not been published.

Key Factual Allegations

On January 10, 1935, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment in civil case No. 44808 against the defendant and herein petitioner, Alfredo Hidalgo Rizal.
Rizal received notice of the judgment on January 14, 1935.
On January 23, 1935, Rizal filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the judgment was contrary to law and the weight of the evidence.
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration by order dated January 30, 1935.
On February 6, 1935, Rizal received notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
On February 8, 1935, Rizal excepted to the denial and asked for a new trial on the same grounds.
By order dated February 16, 1935, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.
On February 21, 1935, Rizal filed his exception and notice of appeal.
On March 2, 1935, Rizal filed his bill of exceptions.
The Court of Appeals’ dismissal turned on the perceived timeliness of the exception, notice of appeal, and the bill of exceptions in light of the multiple motions for new trial.

Procedural Timeline Computation

The Court treated the filing on January 23, 1935 as a motion that is equivalent to a motion for new trial for purposes of suspension of the appeal period.
From January 14, 1935 (notice of judgment) to January 23, 1935 (filing of the motion), nine days elapsed, while twenty-one of the thirty days remained within which the defendant could file a motion of the character authorized by law.
The filing of the motion equivalent to a motion for new trial suspended the running of the remaining twenty-one days.
The Court held that the remaining days did not begin to run again until February 6, 1935, the date of notice of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.
The Court held that the filing of the second motion for new trial on February 8, 1935 did not suspend the running of the remaining twenty-one days because the second motion rested on the same grounds as the first.
The Court relied on the doctrine in Aquino vs. Tongco (61 Phil., 840) that several motions for new trial may be filed within thirty days, but each must rest on different legal grounds.
It reasoned that Rizal could have filed additional motions for new trial within the remaining time, but that even if the filing of another motion would be denied, the defendant’s right to file an exceptio