Title
Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
Case
G.R. No. 14594
Decision Date
Jan 29, 1920
Plaintiffs claimed good faith possession of land, sought compensation for fish ponds; Supreme Court ruled against them, upholding defendant's ownership.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 14594)

Factual Background

The plaintiffs alleged that, prior to the year 1915, they constructed fish ponds on parts of “Hacienda de Sta. Clara.” They further alleged that they remained in possession and enjoyed those fish ponds until the defendant entity, The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, was declared the absolute owner of “Hacienda de Sta. Clara” in Registration Case No. 8719, a declaration that necessarily defeated the plaintiffs’ claim to ownership over the land where the fish ponds stood.

The complaint prayed for (a) the defendant to pay the value of the fish ponds and (b) for the declaration of a right of retention over the portions of land occupied by the plaintiffs until full payment was made. It was undisputed in the record that no lease contract existed between the plaintiffs and the defendant, and that no rent had been paid for the use and enjoyment of the land upon which the fish ponds had been constructed. The core dispute thus reduced to whether, by appropriating the fish ponds built on its land, the defendant was obligated to indemnify the plaintiffs for their value, or whether the plaintiffs could compel the defendant to sell the land to them at a price allegedly fixed in their brief at W.04 per square meter.

Procedural History in the Trial Court

After the complaint was filed on February 2, 1916, the defendant interposed a demurrer, which the trial court overruled. The defendant then excepted to that ruling and filed an answer that generally denied the material averments. Subsequently, the defendant sought an order requiring the plaintiffs to submit a bill of particulars, and the petition was granted. After the plaintiffs filed their bill of particulars, the defendant filed an amended answer, again generally denying the material averments and asserting res judicata as a special defense, along with special defenses that the plaintiffs’ possession was never in good faith.

The defendant also asserted that, if the plaintiffs had made improvements, such improvements were not made in good faith. As counterclaim, the defendant alleged that before the filing of the complaint, the plaintiffs occupied and enjoyed for many years the land belonging to the defendant entity described in the complaint; that they profited from the fruits and improvements without paying any rent or canon, despite demands; and that the rent or canon amounted to P75,000. The defendant asked for denial of the complaint and for a judgment condemning the plaintiffs jointly and severally to pay P75,000 and the costs.

The plaintiffs requested that the defendant file a bill of particulars of the facts alleged in the counterclaim. After hearing the case and receiving evidence from both sides, the trial court rendered judgment absolving the defendant from the complaint and absolving the plaintiffs from the counterclaim, and it made no findings as to costs. The plaintiffs’ counsel excepted to the judgment, asked for a new trial, and then appealed by filing the corresponding bill of exceptions, which was approved and transmitted together with the evidence to this Court.

Issues Framed by the Parties and the Court

The Court treated as controlling the Civil Code provisions on indemnification and the owner-possessor relationship under Arts. 361 to 364 and 451 to 457. The parties admitted that these articles applied, and the Court held that the first determinative step was to identify the nature of the fish ponds because Civil Code indemnity depends on whether the expenditures are necessary, useful, or made purely for ostentation and mere pleasure, and also on whether the possessor acted in good faith or bad faith.

Accordingly, the legal controversy required the Court to decide: first, whether the fish ponds involved useful expenditures within the meaning of Art. 453 of the Civil Code; second, whether the plaintiffs possessed the land in good faith; and third, whether the defendant acted in bad faith by knowingly permitting the construction of the fish ponds, within the meaning of Art. 364.

Classification of the Expenditures: Useful Expenditures Under Article 453

The Court examined the evidence on how fish ponds are constructed. It found that a witness, Ceferino Cacnio for the plaintiffs, testified that fish ponds are built by digging into the land and using the dug earth to form dikes or embankments for holding water in which fish are kept. The Court noted that the record did not expressly show that the particular fish ponds were built exactly in that manner. Nevertheless, it reasoned that because Cacnio had made the sketch of the ponds and had appraised their costs or value based on the described construction method, the fish ponds fell within the class described by the witness.

On that basis, the Court concluded that the expenditures for construction were useful expenditures payable to a possessor in good faith under the applicable provisions. It distinguished “useful” expenditures from “necessary” expenditures and from expenditures purely for ostentation or mere pleasure, emphasizing that Art. 453 speaks in terms of “necessary expenditures” (gastos necesarios), “useful expenditures” (gastos útiles), and “expenditures purely for ostentation and mere pleasure” (gastos de puro lujo o mero recreo). The Court stressed that a structure may be an “improvement” and may increase the value of land, yet still not fall under Art. 453 categories if it does not correspond to the statutory concepts.

The Court explained, doctrinally, that necessary expenditures preserve the realty and keep it capable of producing its natural, industrial, and civil fruits; useful expenditures enable production but are regarded as inferior since they are only the source of certain fruits; and expenditures for ostentation or mere pleasure are of little importance because they affect only civil fruits and not natural or industrial fruits. Applying those principles, the Court held that fish ponds produce industrial fruits by enabling the owner to harvest benefits that would not be available without the fish ponds. It observed that the owner could have used the land agriculturally without the ponds, but would have had to incur expenditures, whereas with fish ponds already built, the owner would need only to reap fruits. The Court framed it as unjust for the owner to appropriate industrial fruits produced through the useful expenditures of a possessor in good faith without indemnifying the possessor.

Good Faith of the Plaintiffs: Failure of Proof Based on the Registration Case

After classifying the expenditures as useful, the Court turned to the question whether the plaintiffs were possessors in good faith. It examined Exhibit A, which was the decision in Registration Case No. 8719 rendered on August 5, 1915, declaring the defendant entity the owner of the lands on which the fish ponds stood.

The Court found that Exhibit A actually showed that the plaintiffs had not been in possession in good faith. The Court reasoned that in the registration case the defendant had been the petitioner, and the plaintiffs had been oppositors. The plaintiffs in that case alleged that they had been in possession of the fish ponds under conditions for prescription of title. However, this Court held in the registration decision that the allegation had not been duly proven, and thus it dismissed their opposition.

The Court further held that the registration decision found that the defendant had been in possession of “La Hacienda de Sta. Clara” publicly and under a claim of ownership from time immemorial, with only one interruption that led to the defendant’s action of revindication in 1905 against persons unlawfully withholding possession, including three of the present plaintiffs: Eduardo Rivera, Rufino Salaw, and Anacleto Aguinaldo. From those findings, the Court concluded that the registration decision established the defendant’s possession and claim of ownership, and it followed that the plaintiffs’ possession, if it existed, was not under claim of ownership. The Court stated that if the plaintiffs had possessed under claim of ownership, the Court would not have decreed registration in the defendant’s name.

Consequently, the Court characterized the plaintiffs at most as mere usufructuaries. Since the plaintiffs conceded that neither they nor their constituents entered into a lease contract with the defendant nor paid rent, the Court held that they took possession merely to profit without the true owner’s consent. The Court treated that circumstance as constituting real bad faith. It also invoked Art. 445 of the Civil Code, stating that possession de facto cannot be recognized in favor of two different persons, and therefore the recognition of the defendant’s possession implied the illegality and bad faith, if the plaintiffs’ possession had existed at all.

Alleged Bad Faith of the Owner: Lack of Evidence Under Article 364

The Court then addressed whether the defendant entity acted in bad faith by knowingly permitting the construction of the fish ponds under Art. 364. The Court held that the record did not show proof of such bad faith. The appellants asked the Court to infer bad faith from the fact that the fish ponds had existed for many years and argued that the defendant could not have ignored their existence. The Court rejected the inference because Art. 364 distinguishes between permitting or tolerating the existence of a construction and permitting the possessor to commence or begin and to carry out the construction. It held that bad faith is deemed to exist only in the second scenario, where the owner allowed the construction to be initiated and carrie

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