Title
Risos-Vidal vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 206666
Decision Date
Jan 21, 2015
Former President Estrada, convicted of plunder, pardoned in 2007, regained eligibility to run for public office; Supreme Court upheld COMELEC's dismissal of disqualification petitions.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 206666)

Procedural history before COMELEC and the Supreme Court

Following Estrada’s filings for elective office, multiple petitions to disqualify him arose. COMELEC Second Division dismissed the 2013 disqualification petition filed by Risos‑Vidal (SPA No. 13‑211 (DC)) on April 1, 2013 and the En banc denied reconsideration on April 23, 2013. Risos‑Vidal filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court seeking annulment of those COMELEC resolutions. Alfredo Lim was permitted to intervene at the Supreme Court level and presented substantially the same arguments that Estrada’s pardon did not remit the perpetual disqualification and that, if Estrada were disqualified, Lim (second placer) should be declared the mayor.

Single controlling legal question presented

Although five issues were framed by the petitioner, the Supreme Court identified one essential question: whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Estrada’s pardon restored his right to vote and be voted for and thus qualified him to run for public office.

Petitioner’s (Risos‑Vidal) principal arguments

Risos‑Vidal asserted the pardon was conditional because Estrada’s acceptance indicated assent to a precondition in the preambular clause that he had publicly committed not to seek elective office. She relied on Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code to argue that restoration of the right to hold public office and suffrage and remission of accessory penalties (such as perpetual absolute disqualification) must be expressly stated in a pardon; she contended Estrada’s pardon did not expressly restore those specific political rights.

COMELEC / OSG and Estrada’s principal defenses

COMELEC and the OSG defended the COMELEC resolutions, emphasizing (i) COMELEC’s prior 2010 rulings concerning Estrada’s presidential candidacy which had held the pardon restored his rights, (ii) that the pardon’s language (“restored to his civil and political rights”) was plain and sufficient, and (iii) that a rigid, formalistic reading of Articles 36 and 41 to require specific formulaic words was unnecessary and impermissible if it unduly restricted the President’s constitutional pardoning power. Estrada urged that the pardon was absolute in form and effect, restored his full civil and political rights (including eligibility), and that COMELEC’s factual determinations about pardon and eligibility were not subject to reversal except for grave abuse of discretion.

Standard of review and scope of certiorari

The Court reiterated that review of COMELEC decisions by certiorari is limited to grave abuse of discretion — a patent and gross exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court emphasized deference to COMELEC given its constitutional competence over election matters; a successful certiorari must show COMELEC acted in a whimsical, arbitrary or capricious manner or otherwise refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law.

Majority’s disposition: petition denied; COMELEC resolutions affirmed

Applying the limited certiorari standard, the Court denied the petition for certiorari and the petition‑in‑intervention and affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s April 1, 2013 resolution and the COMELEC En banc’s April 23, 2013 resolution. The Court held that Estrada’s pardon was absolute and that it restored his civil and political rights, including the right to seek public elective office.

Majority’s reasoning on presidential pardoning power

The Court stressed the plenary nature of the President’s pardoning power under the 1987 Constitution (Article VII, Section 19) and that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code must be construed so as not to erode that constitutional prerogative. The Court explained that Articles 36 and 41 are best read as procedural or conventional prescriptions (requiring express restoration where intended) which must be harmonized with the President’s constitutional authority; they do not, in the Court’s view, limit the President’s power to restore rights by clear, express language.

Majority’s textual reading of the pardon

The Court found the dispositive language of the pardon — “He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights” — to be complete, unambiguous and constitutionally sufficient to satisfy the express‑restoration requirements of Articles 36 and 41. The Court rejected the argument that the third preambular Whereas clause (that Estrada had publicly committed to no longer seek elective office) converted the pardon into a conditional pardon, treating preambular clauses as non‑operative and not controlling where the dispositive clause is clear.

Consideration of relevant jurisprudence (Monsanto and others)

The Court discussed Monsanto v. Factoran and distinguished concurring views that urged a strict formulaic requirement; it treated Monsanto’s majority as not adopting an unduly strict rule and used Monsanto to support that a clear assertion of restoration of civil and political rights suffices. The Court also reasoned that prior COMELEC determinations and its own jurisprudence support that a pardon restoring civil and political rights includes the political rights of suffrage and to hold office.

COMELEC’s reliance on prior rulings and res judicata considerations

The Court upheld COMELEC’s exercise of judicial cognizance of its 2010 rulings on the same issue: the COMELEC had consistently held Estrada’s pardon restored his eligibility, and those rulings were final and non‑appealable under the constitutional framework and COMELEC procedural rules. The Court concluded Risos‑Vidal failed to show cogent grounds that would warrant reversal, and that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in treating the matter as settled.

Consideration of electoral interests and the popular vote

The Court noted the public interest in protecting voters’ choices and construed any ambiguity in favor of the pardonee and the people who voted for him; the opinion states that where there is doubt about legal technicalities in election cases, courts should give primacy to the will of the electorate subject to the limits of the law.

On intervention by Alfredo S. Lim

The Court found Lim’s petition‑in‑intervention unnecessary to decide separately because his arguments substantially mirrored Risos‑Vidal’s. In the majority analysis the Court nevertheless discussed considerations on timeliness and intervention and found no separate ground to change the outcome, ultimately dismissing the petition‑in‑intervention as w

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