Case Summary (G.R. No. 182161)
Factual Background
Petitioner was among approximately 51 persons arrested in connection with the November 30, 2007 Manila Peninsula Hotel siege. After inquest proceedings at Camp Crame, the DOJ Secretary, at the request of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 on December 1, 2007, directing inclusion of petitioner and others in the Bureau of Immigration’s Hold Departure List. An Information charging Rebellion was filed on December 2, 2007. On December 13, 2007, the RTC, Makati (Branch 150) dismissed the charge against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause, finding the prosecution had not shown that the accused-civilians conspired with accused-soldiers to take up arms against the government. Despite dismissal, petitioner’s name remained on the HDO list; he was once detained/interrogated at NAIA and alleged repeated delays on departure and return flights due to the continued HDO listing. Petitioner sought lifting of the HDO from DOJ and, when not acted upon to his satisfaction, filed a petition for writ of amparo challenging the continued restraint on his right to travel.
Procedural History
After the RTC dismissed the Rebellion charge, the DOJ panel filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC later denied (order dated January 31, 2008). Petitioner filed a petition for the writ of amparo in the Court of Appeals; the CA dismissed the petition on February 4, 2008 and denied a motion for reconsideration on March 25, 2008. Petitioner sought review under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court, which rendered the decision under discussion and affirmed the CA.
Issues Presented
- Whether the writ of amparo — and the rights it protects — covers petitioner’s right to travel and whether the HDO constituted a violation or a threatened violation of petitioner’s rights to life, liberty, or security actionable by amparo. 2. Whether the Secretary of Justice has authority under the Administrative Code and DOJ Circulars (No. 17 and No. 18) to issue HDOs and whether that authority may be attacked in an amparo proceeding. 3. Whether petitioner had to seek relief by motion in the pending criminal case (in RTC-Makati) under Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo before invoking a separate amparo petition.
Governing Legal Standards and Precedents
The Court applied the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) and the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 of the Amparo Rule limits its coverage to violations or threats of violations of the rights to life, liberty and security of person, specifically targeting extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The Rule requires factual specificity in affidavits (Section 5) to establish prima facie existence of the ultimate facts showing a threat or violation. Section 22 expressly provides that when a criminal action has been commenced, no separate amparo petition shall be filed; reliefs under the writ must be pursued by motion in the criminal case. The Court relied on precedents cited in the petition: Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (interpreting the ambit of the amparo writ and the meanings of life, liberty, and security), Tapuz v. Del Rosario (on the amparo remedy supplemental nature and pleading specificity), and Marcos v. Sandiganbayan (on the court’s discretion to restrict travel where necessary to safeguard the administration of justice).
Court’s Analysis on the Scope of the Writ of Amparo
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that, in its present form, the Amparo Rule is confined principally to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances (and threats thereof). The writ is extraordinary and demands concrete, justifying allegations of fact detailing how the rights to life, liberty, or security have been or are being violated or threatened. The Court emphasized the requirement of a prima facie showing from supporting affidavits that the alleged threat or violation is being committed with sufficient attendant facts. Because the writ is extraordinary and supplementary to existing remedies, its issuance requires a demonstrable immediate and serious threat to the protected rights.
Court’s Analysis Regarding the Right to Travel and the HDO
While acknowledging that the right to travel is a component of the broader constitutional right to liberty, the Court held that the restriction on petitioner’s travel resulting from the pendency of a criminal case was not inherently unlawful. Citing Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, the Court noted that a person’s right to travel is subject to constraints necessary to safeguard the system of justice and that whether an accused may be permitted to leave is within the court’s sound discretion. The Court found that petitioner failed to demonstrate that the HDO’s continued listing caused an impairment rising to the level of a serious violation of his rights to life, liberty, or security for which amparo is the appropriate remedy. The isolated detentions and interrogations at NAIA, without more, did not establish the degree of deprivation contemplated by the Amparo Rule.
Requirement to Seek Relief in the Pending Criminal Case (Section 22)
The Court applied Section 22 of the Amparo Rule: because a criminal action had been commenced (Criminal Case No. 07-3126), petitioner’s remedy to seek lifting of the HDO lay by motion in the criminal case before the RTC-Makati, not by a separate amparo petition directly to the Court. The Court reiterated that once an information is filed, disposition of the case, including incidents such as motions to lift constraints tied to the prosecution, rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Petitioner did not file a motion to lift the HDO in the criminal case (unlike some co-accused), electing instead to challenge the DOJ’s authority directly before the Court. The Court held that petitioner’s choice to bypass the trial court and to invoke amparo was improper under Section 22.
On the Constitutionality of DOJ Circulars No. 17 and No. 18
The Supreme Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17 (1998) and Circular No. 18 (2007) prescribing procedures for Hold Departure Orders and watchlist orders. Because petitioner failed to present a justiciable controversy demonstrating an immediate and serious threat to rights protected by the Amparo Rule, the Court found it unnecessary to address the constitut
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 182161)
Case Caption, Citation and Nature of Relief Sought
- G.R. No. 182161; 621 Phil. 519; En Banc decision dated December 03, 2009.
- Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Court of Appeals Decision dated February 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 and the CA Resolution dated March 25, 2008 denying motion for reconsideration.
- Relief sought: issuance of the writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (as amended) to vindicate petitioner’s alleged violation of constitutional right to travel (liberty) due to a Hold Departure Order (HDO No. 45).
Undisputed Facts as Found by the Court of Appeals and Recited by the Supreme Court
- Petitioner was among those arrested during the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007.
- On the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner and about fifty others were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings.
- In the evening of November 30, 2007, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors (Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes) conducted inquest proceedings to determine probable cause for charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
- On December 1, 2007, upon request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 directing the Commissioner of Immigration to include petitioner and 49 others on the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) Hold Departure List in the interest of national security and public safety.
- On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150, Makati City.
- On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release upon Recognizance, asserting lack of evidence of specific participation and contending that constitutionally probable cause must be determined personally by a judge.
- On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause, reasoning that evidence failed to show conspiracy with accused-soldiers, mere presence and political expression did not make them conspirators, and cooperation penalized must be knowingly and intentionally rendered.
- On December 18, 2007, petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote DOJ Secretary requesting lifting of HDO No. 45 due to dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126; Secretary Gonzales replied same date that DOJ could not act until counselship was settled because Atty. J. V. Bautista also claimed to represent petitioner.
- On December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA because his name appeared in the Hold Departure List; counsel’s intervention reportedly allowed his scheduled flight to Hong Kong to proceed.
- On December 26, 2007, petitioner returned to the Philippines from Hong Kong; petitioner alleged that whenever he presented himself at NAIA for outbound flights he was detained and interrogated because of continued inclusion in the Hold Departure List.
- On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition for the writ of amparo, asserting the continued restraint on his right to travel due to HDO No. 45 and that the Secretary of Justice had not acted to lift the HDO.
- On January 24, 2008, respondents filed their Return raising affirmative defenses and justifications for the DOJ’s issuance and retention of HDO No. 45.
- On January 25, 2008, the CA held a hearing where petitioner’s counsel manifested petitioner was in Hong Kong and reiterated arguments that the DOJ Secretary lacked legal basis to issue HDO and that petitioner had not filed a motion to lift the HDO before RTC or DOJ so as not to recognize DOJ’s claimed power.
- On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching the RTC’s January 31, 2008 Order denying the DOJ’s Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC dismissal for utter lack of merit and noting the Motion was filed out of time.
- On February 4, 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the writ of amparo and denied relief; petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by CA Resolution dated March 25, 2008.
- The Supreme Court’s decision affirms the CA Decision and dismisses the petition.
Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition (RTC, Branch 150, Makati City)
- The DOJ Panel filed Information for Rebellion (I.S. No. 2007-1045) on December 2, 2007 after finding probable cause against petitioner and others.
- Petitioner’s Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause was filed on December 7, 2007.
- RTC issued Order dated December 13, 2007 dismissing charges against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause, explaining insufficiency of evidence linking accused-civilians to conspiracy with accused-soldiers and emphasizing that mere presence or political expression did not establish conspiracy.
- DOJ filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC denied by Order dated January 31, 2008 for utter lack of merit and for being filed out of time.
DOJ Actions: HDO No. 45 and DOJ Circulars
- DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez issued HDO No. 45 on December 1, 2007 at the request of the DILG, ordering the inclusion of petitioner and 49 others on the BID Hold Departure List citing national security and public safety.
- Respondents relied on DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders) and DOJ Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes) as basis for the Secretary’s authority to issue HDOs.
- Respondents asserted the DOJ Secretary’s authority derives from his mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987 as head of the principal law agency to investigate crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide immigration regulatory services.
- Petitioner contended DOJ Circular No. 17 provides no statutory basis and is not a statute; that the Circular appears not to be based on any statute and therefore lacks force of law.