G.R. No. 129079 - Republic vs. Tagle

Case Summary (G.R. No. 129079)

Factual Background

Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez owned two parcels of land in Barangay Salawag, Dasmariñas, Cavite, covered by TCT No. 14701, containing approximately 483,331 square meters. The Philippine Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC), later operating the Construction Manpower Development Center (CMDC) now attached to the Department of Trade and Industry, entered into agreements and occupancy arrangements with Benitez and the Philippine Women’s University (PWU) in the 1980s. PHRDC and its successors occupied the site, built facilities, and at various times negotiated purchase of portions of the property. Negotiations culminated in an offer and preparation of a Deed of Absolute Sale that Benitez did not sign. In August 1995 Benitez and PWU demanded payment of rentals and filed an unlawful detainer action against petitioner. Thereafter petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings under Executive Order No. 1035, deposited PHP 708,490.00 with the Philippine National Bank as provisional value, and moved for a writ of possession, which the RTC initially granted on May 24, 1996.

Trial Court Proceedings

The Regional Trial Court issued a writ of possession implementing the expropriation proceeding after finding that the deposit had been made and notice had been effected. The RTC later granted private respondent’s motion for reconsideration and quashed its May 24, 1996 Order, reasoning that petitioner already occupied the premises and that the writ was sought merely to use as leverage in the pending ejectment or unlawful detainer suit. The trial court reiterated this view when it denied petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration on February 20, 1997.

Procedural Posture Before the Supreme Court

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court, attacking the RTC Orders dated July 26, 1996 and February 20, 1997 as tainted with grave abuse of discretion for having quashed the writ of possession earlier issued in the expropriation proceedings. The matter was submitted for decision to the Supreme Court on petitioner’s memorandum.

Issue Presented

The dispositive legal issue was whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing a writ of possession previously issued under Executive Order No. 1035 on the ground that the expropriating government agency was already in physical possession of the property sought to be expropriated.

Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner maintained that issuance of the writ of possession was ministerial under Section 7 of Executive Order No. 1035 once the government made the prescribed deposit, and that the trial court thus had no discretion to quash the writ. Private respondent contended that the writ of possession contemplated by Section 2, Rule 67 and by P.D. No. 42 was intended to permit a plaintiff to take or enter into possession and therefore was unnecessary where the plaintiff was already in actual possession; she argued that the eminent domain proceeding could not be used to defeat the pending ejectment action.

Court’s Analysis and Legal Reasoning

The Court held that Executive Order No. 1035, particularly its Section 7, mandated a ministerial duty of the courts to issue a writ of possession upon deposit by the government of an amount equivalent to ten percent of the just compensation provided by P.D. No. 1533, and that the period for issuance shall not extend beyond five days from deposit. The Court emphasized that expropriation seeks not only physical entry but also the legal right to possess and to acquire title; mere physical occupation under a lapsed lease did not confer upon petitioner full ownership rights. The Court found the trial court’s refusal to issue the writ because petitioner was already in actual possession legally untenable, observing that denying the writ would produce a paradox in which petitioner could be compelled to vacate under an unlawful detainer judgment and then later be reinstalled by a writ issued in the expropriation proceeding. The Court noted that eminent domain is an inherent power of the State and that constitutional protection in Section 9, Article III of the Constitution merely limits that power by requiring just compensation. The Court further observed that in the present case petitioner had deposited not only the ten percent but th

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 129079)

Parties and Posture

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, PETITIONER instituted an eminent domain proceeding under Executive Order No. 1035 seeking to expropriate land in Dasmariñas, Cavite for the ASEAN Human Resources Development Project.
HON. LUCENITO N. TAGLE, PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, IMUS, CAVITE, BRANCH 20 issued and later quashed a writ of possession that he had previously granted in the expropriation case.
HELENA Z. BENITEZ, RESPONDENT is the registered owner of the subject land and opposed the issuance and maintenance of the writ of possession.
The petition is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court seeking annulment of the trial court orders quashing the writ of possession.

Key Facts

HELENA Z. BENITEZ owned land covered by TCT No. 14701 containing 483,331 square meters more or less.
The Philippine Human Resources Development Center occupied the property pursuant to agreements and improvements made in the 1980s for the ASEAN Human Resources Development Project.
Negotiations for sale of portions of the property were undertaken in the late 1980s and early 1990s but a final deed of sale was not executed by BENITEZ.
PETITIONER deposited with the Philippine National Bank the sum of P708,490.00 as provisional value and subsequently filed a motion for issuance of a writ of possession.
The trial court issued a writ of possession on May 24, 1996, the sheriff implemented the writ, and BENITEZ filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court granted on July 26, 1996, quashing the writ.
The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on February 20, 1997, prompting this petition.

Statutory Framework

Executive Order No. 1035 requires courts to give priority to expropriation cases and to issue a writ of possession upon deposit by the government implementing agency of an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the just compensation, and provides that issuance shall not extend beyond five days from such deposit.
P.D. No. 1533 governs the measure of just compensation referenced in Executive Order No. 1035.
Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 42, grants the plaintiff in eminent domain the right to take or enter upon possession upon deposit of the assessed value with the authorized depositary.
The constitutional limit on eminent domain is embodied in Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, which prohibits taking private property for public use without jus