G.R. No. 154953 - Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 154953)

Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis

Governing constitutional provision: 1987 Constitution, Art. XII, sec. 3 (classification of public domain lands; prohibition on private corporations acquiring alienable public lands except by lease). Statutory and regulatory authorities referenced: Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended), Republic Act No. 9176 (extension of filing period and related limits), DAO Nos. 20 and 38 (delegation of DENR functions), DAO No. 98-24, and Rules on Evidence (Rule 132, Sections 19, 23, 24). Relevant jurisprudence cited in the decision includes Republic v. Naguiat, Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, Director of Lands v. Acme Plywood Veneer Co., Inc., Natividad v. Court of Appeals, and other authorities cited in the record.

Procedural History

T.A.N. Properties filed an Application for Original Registration of Title (Land Registration Case No. T-635) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Tanauan, Batangas. Notices of initial hearing were published and posted; on initial hearing only the Republic, by the Director of Lands, had filed an opposition. The RTC issued an Order of General Default as to the whole world except the Republic. After hearings and testimony, the RTC rendered a decision (16 December 1999) adjudicating the land in favor of T.A.N. Properties, Inc. The Republic appealed; the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto (21 August 2002). The Republic then filed a petition for review to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.

Issues Presented to the Court

The decision identifies three primary issues: (1) whether the land is alienable and disposable; (2) whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier (the 30-year statutory period); and (3) whether respondent, a private corporation, is qualified under the Public Land Act and the Constitution to apply for registration of the subject land.

Trial Court Findings and Disposition

The RTC found that respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land in the concept of an owner for the requisite period (predating 12 June 1945) and concluded that a juridical person (corporation) may apply for registration where it and its predecessors had possessed the land for at least 30 years. The RTC adjudicated Lot 10705-B in favor of T.A.N. Properties, ordering issuance of a decree of registration upon finality.

Court of Appeals Rationale

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC, finding that Evangelista’s testimony showed sufficient knowledge of possession because of his neighborly proximity and employment; that a single witness’ testimony need not be corroborated as a matter of law; that Torres was competent to testify regarding respondent’s acquisition; and that events concerning land ownership were public knowledge in a small community, justifying reliance on the witness accounts presented.

Supreme Court Conclusion—Overall Result

The Supreme Court found merit in the Republic’s petition, set aside both the RTC and Court of Appeals decisions, and denied T.A.N. Properties, Inc.’s application for registration. The Supreme Court’s analysis rests on three principal determinations: insufficiency of proof that the land was alienable and disposable; failure to prove the required 30-year possession in the concept of an owner predating 12 June 1945; and constitutional and statutory disqualification of a private corporation to acquire the subject land as private property in the circumstances presented.

Burden to Prove Land Is Alienable and Disposable

The Court reiterated the presumption that lands not clearly shown to be private belong to the State and that the applicant bears the onus of overcoming that presumption by incontrovertible evidence. The Court held that the certifications submitted by respondent (a 3 June 1997 CENRO certificate and a memorandum by a Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR) were insufficient to establish that the property had been classified and released as alienable and disposable by the DENR Secretary. Under DAO Nos. 20 and 38, PENRO—not CENRO—has authority to issue land-classification certificates for areas over 50 hectares; the subject lot exceeded that threshold. The Regional Technical Director of FMS-DENR lacked authority to issue the memorandum relied upon. Hence, the certifications lacked proper provenance and statutory validation.

Formal Requirements to Establish Release from Public Domain

The Court explained that beyond CENRO/PENRO certifications, the applicant must show DENR Secretary approval of land classification and the official release of the land from the public domain, supported by verification survey results and by presenting the original classification authorized by the DENR Secretary or a certified true copy from the legal custodian. Public documents admissibility rules (Rule 132, Sections 19, 23–24) were applied: the submitted certifications were not shown to be entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by the proper custodian and were therefore not prima facie evidence of the facts asserted; at most they proved their date and due execution, not the substantive facts of classification and release.

Evidentiary Weaknesses and Discrepancies

The Court underscored that Torres, a private representative, merely identified the certifications but the government officials who issued them did not testify; thus their contents were hearsay and lacked probative value. The Court also observed an unexplained discrepancy in classification dates (DENR certifications reflecting 31 December 1925 versus the blueprint plan showing 31 December 1985) and noted the absence of the geodetic engineer or other competent declarants to reconcile the inconsistency. The Court declined to accept the surveyor’s notation on the plan as sufficient proof of classification.

Failure to Prove 30-Year Possession in the Concept of an Owner

On factual possession, the Court found respondent’s proofs wanting. Evangelista’s testimony was limited: he worked on the land only three years, professed knowledge because of neighborly proximity, and gave contradictory or incomplete information about family relationships among the Dimayugas (e.g., confusing succession and parentage). The Court found Evangelista’s uncorroborated statements insufficient to establish the continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse possession required to convert public land into private property by operation of law.

Corroboration and Competence of Other Witnesses

The Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the absence of a rule requiring corroboration of a single witness, noting that in the factual circumstances the single witness’s testimony was inadequate and that Torres’s testimony—largely recounting how respondent acquired the land—was hearsay insofar as it concerned the antecedent possession of the Dimayuga predecessors. LRA Records Officer Marquez authenticated reproductions of documentary records but did not explain critical inconsistencies. Tax declarations presented dated only from 1955, which raised an inference that the claim of ownership or possession was not asserted prior to 1955, contrary to the allegation of possession predating 1945.

Doctrine on Corporations and Acquisition of Alienable Public Lands

The Court reiterated the constitutional ban (1987 Constitution, Art. XII, sec. 3) on private corporations

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 154953)

Case Caption and Procedural Posture

G.R. No. 154953; Decision promulgated June 26, 2008 by the Supreme Court, First Division (Carpio, J.).
Petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Court of Appeals Decision dated 21 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658.
Court of Appeals had affirmed the 16 December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635.
Relief sought: reversal of the lower courts’ rulings and denial of T.A.N. Properties, Inc.’s application for original registration of title.

Antecedent Facts

Applicant: T.A.N. Properties, Inc.; Application for Original Registration of Title covering Lot 10705-B of subdivision plan Csd-04-019741, a portion of consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre.
Subject land description: area of 564,007 square meters (56.4007 hectares), located in San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
RTC scheduling and notices: initial hearing set for 11 November 1999 (set on 31 August 1999). Notice of Initial Hearing published in the Official Gazette (20 Sept. 1999 issue, Vol. 95, No. 38, pp. 6793–6794) and in People’s Journal Taliba (18 Oct. 1999), and posted on municipal bulletin board and on the land. All adjoining owners and pertinent government agencies were notified.
Oppositions and default: on 11 November 1999, only oppositor was the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order of General Default against the whole world except petitioner. Ceferino Carandang appeared as oppositor on 19 November 1999 and was given until 29 November 1999 to file written opposition but failed to do so; on 13 December 1999 the trial court reinstated the Order of General Default.
Respondent’s evidence at hearings of 13–14 December 1999: three witnesses — Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Operations Manager and authorized representative of respondent), Primitivo Evangelista (72‑year-old lifelong resident of San Bartolome), and Regalado Marquez (Records Officer II, LRA, Quezon City).
Family and title history offered by respondent’s witnesses: Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) allegedly had peaceful, adverse, open and continuous possession in the concept of an owner since 1942; succession to Antonio Dimayuga upon Kabesang Puroy’s death; Antonio executed a Deed of Donation (27 Sept. 1960) in favor of Fortunato Dimayuga, then executed a Partial Revocation of Donation (26 Apr. 1961) and the land was adjudicated to Prospero (Porting). Porting sold the land to respondent on 8 August 1997.

Trial Court Ruling (RTC, 16 December 1999)

RTC adjudicated Lot 10705-B in favor of and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., ordering issuance of a decree of registration once the decision became final.
RTC’s legal findings included that a juridical person or corporation may apply for registration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or more.
RTC concluded respondent’s predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, effecting conversion of the land to private property.
Petitioner appealed, contending insufficiency of proof of the requisite period of possession, generality of Evangelista and Torres’ testimonies, and the need for additional witnesses given the large area involved.

Court of Appeals Ruling (21 August 2002)

The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.
Key appellate findings: Evangelista’s knowledge derived from working on the land and being “practically neighbors” with Kabesang Puroy; Evangelista’s failure to name an uncle who continuously worked the land was not faulted since he was not asked to do so; Evangelista’s initial disclaimer about Fortunato’s relation to Kabesang Puroy did not detract from his statement that Fortunato took over possession after Kabesang Puroy’s death.
The Court of Appeals considered the community’s small scale as making the land’s disposition public knowledge.
On corroboration, the Court of Appeals found no law requiring corroboration of the testimony of a sole witness and held Torres competent to testify about respondent’s filing of application and acquisition from Porting.

Issues Before the Supreme Court

Whether the land is alienable and disposable.
Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Whether respondent (a private corporation) is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act and the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner's Contentions in Supreme Court Memorandum

The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in allowing registration to a corporate applicant given: (a) absence of proof that applicant or predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and (b) disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land.

Supreme Court Holding — Overview

The petition has merit.
The Supreme Court SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Court of Appeals Decision and the 16 December 1999 RTC Decision.
The Supreme Court DENIED the application for registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
Concurrence: Puno, C.J. (Chairperson), Corona, Azcuna, and Leonardo‑De Castro, JJ., concurred.

Supreme Court: Proof that the Land Is Alienable and Disposable

Legal starting point: all lands not clearly of private dominion are presumed part of the public domain; applicant bears burden of overturning this presumption by incontrovertible evidence. (Citing Republic v. Naguiat.)
Respondent’s documentary evidence: two DENR certifications — (1) 3 June 1997 CENRO, Batangas City certification stating Lot 10705, Cad-424 (area 596,116 sq.m.) falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified 31 Dec. 1925; (2) memorandum by Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services‑DENR, stating the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified 31 Dec. 1925 per LC No. 582.
Supreme Court’s analysis of DENR certifications’ insufficiency: DAO No. 20 (30 May 1988) and DAO No. 38 (19 April 1990) delineate DENR offices’ authorities; CENRO issues certificates for areas below 50 hectares, PENRO issues for lands over 50 hectares. Lot 10705-B (564,007 sq.m. = over 50 hectares) was thus beyond CENRO authority under DAO No. 38.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS‑DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification status; the enumerated functions of that office under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 do not include is