Title
Republic vs. Samson-Tatad
Case
G.R. No. 187677
Decision Date
Apr 17, 2013
DPWH contested Genatos' land title in expropriation for EDSA-Quezon Flyover; SC allowed evidence to determine rightful compensation, not title nullity.
ownership dispute
expropriation
dubious origin
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 187677)

Factual Background

On 13 July 2001, the petitioner filed a Complaint against several defendants, including the Genatos, for the expropriation of parcels of land affected by the construction of the EDSA–Quezon Avenue Flyover. The Genatos were registered owners of a parcel of land, the subject property, covered by TCT No. RT-11603 (383648), with an area of 460 square meters.

During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, DPWH received a letter dated 14 June 2002 from Engr. Patrick B. Gatan, Project Manager IV of DPWH-NCR, reporting that the subject property was government land and that the Genatos’ transfer certificate of title was of dubious origin, supposedly fabricated, and encroached or overlapped on government property. In response, the petitioner filed an Amended Complaint on 24 June 2002, seeking to limit the coverage of the expropriation proceedings to the area corresponding to DPWH’s findings. The amended pleading expressly maintained that 460 square meters of the Genatos’ registered property were affected, but it sought to confine condemnation to the portion shown in DPWH’s sketch plan.

On 18 July 2002, the petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion seeking that the subject property be declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject to conflicting claims. In an Order dated 10 December 2002, the RTC admitted the Amended Complaint, deferred the release of the deposited amount of eighteen million four hundred thousand pesos (₱18,400,000) equivalent to the land’s current zonal valuation, and declared the property as subject of conflicting claims.

RTC Orders Restricting the Evidence on Title

As the petitioner presented evidence aimed at proving that the subject property belonged to the government, the Genatos objected. They argued that allowing petitioner to present such evidence would amount to a collateral attack on the validity of their Torrens title under TCT No. RT-11603 (383648). The RTC required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

After the memoranda were received, the RTC issued an Order on 12 July 2005. It ruled that the validity of the TCT could only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose and not in the ongoing expropriation proceeding. It therefore barred the petitioner from presenting evidence, reasoning that the proposed evidence would constitute a collateral attack on the title and violate Section 48 of P. D. 1529. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 4 August 2005, but it was denied in an RTC Order dated 17 November 2005.

Appellate Proceedings

On 4 January 2006, the Genatos filed a Motion for the payment of just compensation in the amount of ₱20,700,000 and for the release of the deposited ₱18,400,000 as partial payment. That motion remained pending in the RTC at the time the Supreme Court action was taken.

On 9 February 2006, the petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The CA ruled that because the subject property was covered by a Torrens title and because P. D. 1529 applied, the RTC’s invocation of Section 48 was correct. The CA dismissed the petition in a Decision dated 29 September 2008, and later denied the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated 27 April 2009. The petitioner then came to the Supreme Court with the present petition.

Issue for Resolution

The Supreme Court framed the sole issue as whether the petitioner could be barred from presenting evidence to assail the validity of the Genatos’ title under TCT No. RT-11603 (383648) within the context of the expropriation proceeding.

Parties’ Contentions

The petitioner invoked Rule 67, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, asserting that when ownership of the property to be expropriated is uncertain or subject to conflicting claims, the expropriation court may still resolve the matter within the same proceeding. The petitioner cited Republic v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, previously presided by Judge L. Pasicolan, to support the proposition that the trial court in an expropriation case could adjudicate the issue of ownership in the same proceeding.

The petitioner also argued that the Amended Complaint was filed to reflect the DPWH finding that the Genatos, while appearing as registered owners, should be considered mere claimants for purposes of compensation because the government, according to petitioner, was the true owner. It further contended that the expropriation suit is an in rem proceeding and that its prayers, including requests to transfer titles free of liens and encumbrances, rendered the expropriation case a direct proceeding rather than a collateral one.

The Genatos relied on Section 48 of P. D. 1529, insisting that a Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding. They maintained that petitioner’s intended evidence effectively collaterally attacked their Torrens title, in contravention of P. D. 1529.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner could present evidence to assert ownership over the subject property, but only for the limited purpose of determining who was entitled to just compensation.

First, the Court explained the nature of the right of eminent domain as an attribute of sovereignty grounded on the principle of jus regalia. It characterized expropriation as governed by Rule 67 to ensure due process and correct payment of just compensation. It then addressed the meaning and scope of Section 9, Rule 67, tying it to the intimate connection between ownership and indemnification.

The Court relied on its earlier interpretation in Republic that the expropriation court has authority to entertain conflicting claims of ownership of the property sought to be condemned and to adjudge the rightful owner in the same expropriation case. It quoted the reasoning that the Rules do not prevent the commencement of expropriation where title is doubtful, so long as the complaint states that the true ownership cannot be ascertained accurately. The Court likewise referenced Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc., which treated the doubt as warranting remand for the reception of evidence to establish the present owner entitled to receive just compensation.

However, the Supreme Court clarified that findings on ownership in an expropriation proceeding should be understood in the proper context. It held that such determinations are not final and binding as to ownership in the sense that they should be treated as conclusive cancellation or nullification of Torrens title. It reasoned that the condemnor merely serves notice of taking title and possession and that the defendant’s adverse claim is to obtain compensation for the taking, not to establish a conclusive adjudication of ownership for all purposes. The Court analogized the function to that in ejectment cases, where an ownership-like inquiry may be temporarily made only to determine entitlement to possession. Consequently, the consequences of Section 9, Rule 67 could not be avoided.

Second, the Court addressed the claimed conflict with Section 48 of P. D. 1529. It emphasized that Section 48 prohibits collateral attack. It used Ono v. Lim to define a collateral attack as one where, in an action seeking different relief, the attack on the decree/judgment is made only as an incident. It distinguished such collateral attacks from direct attacks that annul or set aside the decree or enjoin enforcement. The Court then examined prior holdings where a Torrens title cancellation could be treated as collateral, but where certain ownership resolutions in other special proceedings were treated as neither direct nor collateral because final partition depended on a definitive resolution of co-ownership.

Applying these principles, the Court held that the petitioner’s attempt to present evidence could not be characterized as an attack for the purpose of Section 48. It stres

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