Title
Republic vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 179800
Decision Date
Feb 4, 2010
PAL claimed a refund for 10% OCT paid on overseas calls, citing tax exemption under P.D. No. 1590. SC ruled in favor, affirming PAL's exemption and refund entitlement.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 179800)

Factual Background

PAL availed of PLDT’s communication services for its daily business operations. For the taxable period covering January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002, PAL allegedly paid PLDT the 10% OCT on its overseas telephone calls, totaling P134,431.95. On February 24, 2004, PAL, through its AVP-Financial Planning and Analysis Ma. Stella L. Diaz, filed with the CIR a claim for refund of P134,431.95, citing Section 13 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1590 and BIR Ruling No. 97-94 dated April 13, 1994, as legal bases. Because of the CIR’s inaction, PAL appealed to the CTA on April 22, 2004.

Proceedings Before the CTA Second Division

The CTA Second Division rendered a decision dated November 13, 2006. It held that PAL was not required to pay the 10% OCT and, consequently, was not barred from seeking a refund under its franchise tax structure, though it granted the refund only in the reduced amount of P93,424.67. The CTA disallowed P2,424.16 for lack of verification and disallowed P38,583.12 due to prescription. The CTA reasoned that PAL’s franchise under Section 13 of P.D. No. 1590 required PAL, to be exempt from “all other taxes,” to choose between two alternatives: (a) the basic corporate income tax or (b) a franchise tax of two percent (2%) of gross revenues. The CTA found that PAL had chosen the first option, and it emphasized that the “in lieu of all taxes” arrangement depended on PAL’s selection of the alternative, not on the existence of actual tax payments. It further reasoned that PAL incurred zero tax liability for the relevant period and, therefore, it was not required to pay the 2% franchise tax before availing itself of the franchise tax exemption mechanism.

Review by the CTA En Banc

The CIR’s motion for partial reconsideration was denied on February 7, 2007, prompting the CIR to file a petition for review before the CTA En Banc. The CTA En Banc affirmed the Second Division. It underscored that when PAL chose the basic corporate income tax option, it could still avail itself of the exemption from “all other taxes” even if it incurred negative taxable income and consequently paid no income tax. The CTA En Banc held that the “operative act” for purposes of the “in lieu of all other taxes” clause was PAL’s actual exercise of the option to pay either the basic corporate income tax or the 2% franchise tax, and that actual payment of the chosen tax alternative was not required for exemption to attach.

Issues Raised Before the Supreme Court

The CIR then filed a Rule 45 petition assailing the CTA En Banc’s August 9, 2007 Decision. The sole issue presented for the Court’s consideration was whether PAL was exempt from the payment of the 10% OCT under its franchise—P.D. No. 1590—and therefore entitled to the refund sought.

Legal Basis: Section 13 of P.D. No. 1590 and the “In Lieu of All Other Taxes” Clause

The Court focused on Section 13 of P.D. No. 1590, which provided that, in consideration of the franchise and rights granted, the grantee shall pay to the government during the life of the franchise whichever of two alternatives results in a lower tax: (a) the basic corporate income tax based on annual net taxable income computed under the NIRC; or (b) a franchise tax of two percent (2%) of gross revenues. It further provided that the tax paid under either alternative would be “in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license, and other fees and charges” imposed by any governmental authority, now or in the future, including those “of any kind, nature, or description.” The Court observed that the OCT, by its nature as within the ambit of “all other taxes” contemplated by the decree, could fall within the exemption’s coverage.

Parties’ Contentions

The CIR argued that the statutory language was mandatory and required payment: the words “shall pay… whichever… will result in a lower tax” were said to compel actual payment of either the basic corporate income tax or the 2% franchise tax. The CIR maintained that because PAL had incurred losses resulting in no income tax payment during the fiscal years covered, PAL could not claim exemption from paying the OCT under the “in lieu of all taxes” provision, and therefore could not be entitled to a refund. The CIR also posited that PAL, to avoid liability for other taxes, should pay the 2% franchise tax, given that it allegedly did not pay any amount as basic corporate income tax.

PAL, as supported by the CTA’s findings, took the position that it had complied with Section 13 of P.D. No. 1590 by choosing the alternative under its franchise structure, and that exemption from “all other taxes” depended on the exercise of the option, not on actual payment where taxable income produced zero tax liability under the chosen option.

Court’s Ruling and Reasoning

The Court denied the petition and affirmed the CTA En Banc. It held that the controversy had been settled in a materially similar case involving PAL: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 160528, October 9, 2006. In that case, PAL sought refund of P2,241,527.22 representing 20% final withholding tax allegedly withheld by various banks for March 1995 to February 1997, relying on the same “in lieu of all taxes” provision in Section 13 of P.D. No. 1590. The CIR there had argued that the “in lieu of all other taxes” proviso applied only when PAL actually paid something under the franchise alternatives. The Court rejected that interpretation and clarified that PAL’s franchise under P.D. 1590 granted it an option to pay either the basic corporate income tax or the 2% franchise tax. It stated that availment of either alternative would exempt the airline from the payment of other taxes, including withholding tax on bank deposits. Importantly, the Court declared that the CIR’s attempt to treat the proviso as an incentive dependent on actual payment was untenable. The Court in that earlier case ruled that it was not the fact of tax payment that exempted PAL but the exercise of its option. It also reasoned that no substantial distinction existed between a zero tax and a one-peso tax liability for purposes of the exemption.

In the present case, the Court found no cogent reason to depart from that ruling. It reiterated the doctrinal premise that under the first option of Section 13—the basic corporate income tax option—the tax base was PAL’s annual net taxable income. P.D. 1590 necessarily recognized that taxable income could be negative, which would translate into zero tax liability. Where PAL operated at a loss, no income tax was due, and thus the first option resulted in a lower tax liability than the second option. The Court further treated the CIR’s reliance on the absence of an express requirement for payment beyond the statutory option as irrelevant in light of the earlier controlling construction of Section 13. It also rejected the CIR’s argument on strict construction of franchise exemptions against the taxpayer by invoking the earlier decision’s statement that Section 13 left no room for interpretation: the franchise exempted PAL from paying any tax other than the option it chose, either the basic corporate income tax or the two percent gross revenue tax. Whether that exemption was wise or advantageous was deemed beyond judicial power, as it was left to legislative discre

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