Title
Republic vs. Peralta
Case
G.R. No. 150327
Decision Date
Jun 18, 2003
Heirs claimed ownership of land; government encroached, citing forest reserve. SC reversed CA, reopened case for evidence, prioritizing public interest over procedural lapses.
trial reopening
property claim
national park

Case Summary (G.R. No. 164703)

Factual Background

On September 26, 1994, the respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of real property in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 13, against the Republic of the Philippines, the DENR Regional Executive Director of Region XI, and the DENR Conservation Officer.

The respondents alleged that they were the heirs of Benedicto B. Alonday, who applied for and was granted Homestead Patent No. V-11244 by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources over Lot 3561 with an area of 237,898 square meters. They asserted that the lot was a portion of Lot 2988 of the Guiang Cadastre in Guiang, Davao City. Based on the patent, Original Certificate of Title No. P-275 was allegedly issued to Benedicto Alonday by the Register of Deeds. The respondents further claimed that they purchased the property from their father and were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-134231 on April 25, 1988.

The respondents maintained that the property was alienable and disposable land under Project 1-B, certified on January 13, 1931 as shown by LC Map No. 1412, as confirmed by a letter from the DENR Regional Director dated February 15, 1994. They also claimed continuous possession “as owner” since November 1965. They alleged that officers of the Bureau of Forest Development sought permission in 1969 to use a portion of the land of about five hectares, and that a large concrete building was constructed on that portion. Benedicto’s lawyer allegedly demanded in a letter dated June 28, 1971 that the building be vacated, but the demand was ignored.

The respondents alleged that on February 24, 1979, Forest Conservation Officer Marion Abundio, Sr. sought permission to allow installation of a small generator unit on a portion of the property of about twenty-five square meters to provide electricity to the building and the compound of the Philippine Eagles Acclimatization and Breeding Center. They claimed Benedicto did not consent. They alleged that despite the lack of assent, government officials proceeded with the construction and installation. When respondents demanded vacation on July 14, 1994, the defendants allegedly refused.

The respondents sought judgment ordering the defendants to vacate the property and to pay damages and litigation expenses.

Defendants’ Answer and Core Defenses

In their answer, the defendants—through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)—raised several affirmative and special defenses: first, that the complaint stated no cause of action; second, that the building was within the perimeter of Mt. Apo National Park, a forest reserve under Proclamation No. 59, as amended, and thus not on the respondents’ property; third, that the installation of the generator unit did not proceed as alleged; fourth, that Project 1-B, which allegedly declassified the subject property as alienable and disposable land via Land Classification Map No. 1412, should not prevail over Proclamation No. 59, as amended; fifth, that the suit was against the State and could not prosper without consent; and sixth, that the respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit.

Pre-Trial Measures and the Relocation Survey

After pre-trial briefs were filed, the trial court issued an August 29, 1995 order constituting a panel of commissioners consisting of Engineer Roderick R. Calapardo as team leader, and Gregorio Cenabre and Engineer Rogelio Zantua as members, to conduct a relocation survey to determine whether the respondents’ property was part of the Mt. Apo National Park.

The commissioners reported on November 7, 1995 that “the land in case is 92,216 square meters within the certified Alienable and Disposable (A & D) Lands while the remaining portion of 145,682 square meters is within the Mt. Apo National Park Reservation.” In their respective comments, the respondents alleged that the survey team altered the boundary line of their property and failed to account for Project 1-B under LC Map No. 1412. The defendants countered that the boundary line was not altered and that Project 1-B and LC Map No. 1412 were considered.

With the conformity of both parties and upon motion of the respondents, the trial court on March 7, 1997 declared no factual issues remained and stated it would decide based on the pleadings and memoranda and the commissioners’ report.

RTC Decision on Ownership and Possession

On May 6, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment for the respondents. It found and declared that the property occupied by the defendants was part of the respondents’ property under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-134231. The trial court ordered the defendants to vacate the portion covered by the transfer certificate, restore possession to the respondents, and remove improvements introduced by the defendants.

In its reasoning, the trial court stated that the commissioners’ report did not take into account Property 1-B for LC Map 1412, and thus lacked probative weight. It held that the respondents’ Torrens title prevailed over the relocation survey and that the Director of Forestry had declassified the respondents’ property pursuant to Section 1827 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code.

Procedural Missteps on the Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal

On May 30, 1997, five days before the period to appeal expired, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration via registered mail. On June 11, 1997, the RTC issued an ex parte order expunging the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was a “mere scrap of paper” for failure to include the notice of hearing required under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Unaware of the June 11 order, the defendants filed on July 14, 1997 a manifestation with notice of hearing for the May 30 motion, including a notice of hearing dated July 7, 1997. The defendants received the June 11, 1997 order on July 18, 1997. On July 22, 1997, they filed their notice of appeal.

The respondents moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the May 30 motion was a “mere scrap of paper” and therefore did not toll the period to appeal, resulting in a belated appeal. The RTC received the notice of appeal on August 11, 1997. Meanwhile, the branch judge retired and the branch remained vacant for a time.

On January 28, 1999, the RTC, through a newly-appointed judge, gave due course to the appeal and ruled that the defendants still had five days from July 18, 1997 or until July 23, 1997 to perfect the appeal from the June 11 order. It further ruled that, although the motion for reconsideration was defective, the rules should be liberally construed.

Yet, on February 5, 1999, the RTC issued an ex parte order dismissing the defendants’ appeal, finding that the jurisprudence then considered by the trial court showed the appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period. After receiving this order, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration set for hearing on February 19, 1999. On February 8, 1999, the RTC declared that the February 19 hearing was mooted.

The respondents then moved for execution on February 10, 1999, asserting finality. On February 18, 1999, the RTC granted execution and directed issuance of a writ. The defendants later filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 5 dismissal and opposition to execution on February 26, 1999, unaware that execution had already been granted. On May 6, 1999, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration of the February 5 order and simultaneously denied the respondents’ motion for execution on the ground that public policy prohibited execution against the government, and it recalled the writ.

CA Proceedings and Rulings

On the basis of these events, the defendants—now petitioners—filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals, seeking nullification of the RTC orders dated February 5, 1999 and May 6, 1999, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On April 27, 2001, the Court of Appeals denied due course and dismissed the petition for certiorari. The CA ruled that the defendants’ May 30, 1997 motion for reconsideration did not comply with Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court and thus was a “mere scrap of paper” that did not toll the period to appeal. Consequently, the RTC decision had become final and executory. The CA held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal.

The CA further held that any failure to perfect the appeal within time resulted from the negligence of the OSG, and thus did not justify certiorari relief. It added that to nullify the respondents’ title, the petitioners should have filed a petition for reversion, not a Rule 65 petition.

Issues Raised by the Petitioners

The petitioners faulted the CA for concluding that they failed to perfect their appeal within the reglementary period. They also argued that the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s dismissal of their appeal despite the allegedly strong evidence that the property formed part of the public forest and thus remained inalienable. Petitioners invoked the Court’s power to suspend procedural rules on grounds of equity and substantial justice, insisting that otherwise the Republic would be deprived of at least 145,682 square meters of the Mt. Apo National Park. They relied on Republic v. Court of Appeals.

Supreme Court’s Ruling on Procedural Due Process and the Motion’s Defectiveness

The Supreme Court agreed with the CA that the OSG was negligent in filing the defective motion for reconsideration on May 30, 1997. It cited Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court and the notice requirements under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15. It emphasized that these requirements were not merely technical. They were described as vital elements of procedural due process because, without a fixed period set by the rules for an adverse party’s reply or opposition, the trial court could not know whether the adverse party objected and re

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