Title
Republic vs. Local Superior of the Institute of the Sisters of the Sacred Heart of Jesus of Ragusa
Case
G.R. No. 185603
Decision Date
Feb 10, 2016
Religious institution seeks land registration, claiming possession since 1943; SC remands for proof of land's alienability and disposability.
registration of title
possession
alienable and disposable
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 185603)

Factual Background

Respondent, a religious institution organized under Philippine law, applied for registration of title over a specific parcel of land. Respondent alleged that it acquired the property by purchase through a Deed of Sale dated September 19, 2005, and that since that date it had been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and in the concept of an owner’s possession. Respondent further alleged that its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land in the same manner as early as 1940, for more than fifty years, and that the parcel was not occupied by any other person or entity. As part of the application, respondent alleged the names and addresses of the adjoining lot owners, and complied with the jurisdictional requirements so that the application was set for hearing.

Opposition and Trial Court Disposition

The petitioner opposed the application through the Office of the Solicitor General, invoking multiple grounds. First, it asserted that neither respondent nor its predecessors-in-interest had been in the required open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for a period of not less than thirty years. Second, it contended that the offered tax declarations and tax payments were not reliable muniments of title because they were of recent vintage. Third, it argued that respondent’s claim based on a Spanish title or grant could no longer be availed of because of respondent’s failure to file an appropriate registration within the six-month period from February 16, 1976, as required by P.D. No. 892. Fourth, it alleged that the parcel formed a portion of the public domain belonging to the petitioner and was therefore not subject to appropriation.

After hearing, the trial court granted the application for registration. The trial court found that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest—specifically Andres Velando and Juana Velando—had exercised absolute ownership and possession over the subject property since 1948 until 2005, or for fifty-seven (57) years, or from time immemorial. It also took judicial notice that tax declarations on file at the Municipal Assessor’s Office of Silang started only in 1948, while Andres Velando had been issued Tax Declaration No. 2078 (Exh. “K”) and had paid realty taxes under subsequent declarations. The trial court considered that after Andres’s death, Juana caused the transfer of the realty assessment to her name and continuously declared the property for taxation purposes up to 2005. It then tacked the predecessors’ possession with respondent’s one-year possession for taxation purposes, concluding that the consolidated possession totaled fifty-seven (57) years. The trial court therefore approved respondent’s title.

Appellate Review and the CA’s Rationale

The petitioner appealed to the CA, maintaining that the DENR certification showed the land was declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982. It argued that because the application was filed on March 2, 2006, less than thirty years later, confirmation of title was erroneous since the statutory period should be reckoned only from the time the lot was declared alienable and disposable.

On December 4, 2008, the CA affirmed the trial court. The CA anchored its conclusion on evidence and testimony establishing possession dating back to 1943. The CA relied on the testimony of Romulo Gonzales, a former possessor, who testified that he first learned of the property when he was ten years old in 1943, and that his grandfather, Andres Velando, was already recognized as the owner, based on the fact that improvements had already been introduced. The CA found Gonzales’s testimony credible and held that it was sufficient to establish possession in the concept of an owner. The CA also referenced decisions such as Republic of the Philippines v. Bibonia and Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Naguit case), emphasizing that once the State has classified the land as alienable and disposable, the classification indicates the State does not intend to keep the land as its own, and that what matters is that at the time of filing, the land had already been declared alienable. It reasoned that the petitioner’s contrary theory would negate the effect of classification as alienable and would prevent registration even after the State had relinquished its claim.

Issue Raised in the Supreme Court

The petitioner raised a single legal issue: that the CA seriously erred on a question of law in ruling that respondent’s period of possession was sufficient to warrant registration of title in respondent’s name.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Supreme Court

In resolving the petition, the Court examined the legal basis invoked by respondent in its application. It observed that respondent’s Application for Registration was based on Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, and not on prescription. Section 14(1) authorizes applications by those who, by themselves or through predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The Court identified three requisites under Section 14(1): (a) the land must be alienable and disposable public land; (b) the applicant and predecessors must have been in the requisite possession and occupation; and (c) such possession must have been under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

With respect to possession “on or before June 12, 1945,” respondent presented witnesses, including Gonzales. Gonzales executed a judicial affidavit and underwent direct and cross-examination during trial. The Court noted that Gonzales, born on September 5, 1933, was ten years old in 1943. Gonzales testified that during that time the property was owned by his grandfather, Andres Belando, and that improvements existed, including cultivation such as palay, pineapple, papaya, and coconut trees. He also testified that Andres was succeeded by Juana Belando and that Juana maintained the improvements. He further testified about the presence of fencing, first kakwate and sarasa, and later a partly concrete and partly stake fence with barbed wire.

The Court held that Gonzales’s age and testimony supported a conclusion that he could perceive the grandfather’s possession and improvements during the relevant period. It also held that the trial court’s and CA’s reliance on the fact that the earliest tax declaration was dated 1948 was not controlling, because belated tax declarations do not necessarily negate earlier possession if the testimony supporting the required period is credible. The Court cited the principle in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals that credible testimony is sufficient even when tax declarations are later than the claimed start of possession. It further emphasized that the trial court took judicial notice that tax declarations kept intact began only in 1948.

The petitioner’s argument that the thirty-year statutory requirement should be computed only from the date the land was declared alienable and disposable was rejected by applying the Court’s settled interpretation of Section 14(1) in Naguit. The Court reiterated that Naguit held the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it requires the property to be already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is filed. Unlike Section 14(2), which explicitly refers to prescription under existing law, Section 14(1) did not impose a similar requirement. The Court further noted that later cases affirmed Naguit in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Rep. of the Phils., Republic of the Philippines v. Iglesia ni Cristo, and related decisions, while underscoring the alignment of the approach with the policy of encouraging distribution of alienable public lands and social justice.

Applying these doctrines, the Court held that petitioner’s theory to exclude periods of possession prior to the land’s classification as alienable and disposable was irrelevant under Section 14(1). Such an approach would shift the application outside the proper framework of Section 14(1) and wrongly place it under Section 14(2), which involves an entirely different concept.

The Court then turned to the remaining matter that still required further proof: respondent’s compliance with the requirement that the land is alienable and disposable public land at the time of filing. Respondent attempted to establish this through a certification from the DENR-CENRO stating that the subject land was verified to be within the alienable and disposable land per a specific land classification map, approved

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