Title
Republic vs. Imperial
Case
G.R. No. L-8684
Decision Date
Mar 31, 1955
The Supreme Court upheld the terms of COMELEC Commissioners Imperial and Perez, ruling successors inherit only the unexpired portion of predecessors' terms to preserve the constitutional rotation system.
legality
continuance
office
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 88226)

Factual Background

The Solicitor General alleged that the first commissioners under the constitutional amendment were appointed and qualified July 12, 1945 with staggered terms: chairman Jose Lopez Vito for nine years, a member for six years, and a member for three years. Following the death of Chairman Lopez Vito, a series of appointments and promotions occurred, including the elevation of Vicente de Vera to Chairman and the later appointments of Domingo Imperial and Rodrigo Perez. The Solicitor General maintained that, by operation of the constitutional rotation scheme and earlier decisions of the Court, successors could only serve the unexpired portion of the original terms and that respondents Imperial and Perez had ceased to hold valid title to their offices.

Procedural History

The Solicitor General filed the present petition for quo warranto seeking declaration of vacancy as to the offices occupied by respondents. Both respondents filed separate answers denying the petition and asserting alternative computations of the commencement and duration of the original and succeeding terms. The Court considered prior decisions construing the same constitutional provision and the constitutional and statutory history before issuing its opinion on March 31, 1955.

Issues Presented

The issues were whether successors to the first commissioners serve only for the unexpired portion of the original staggered terms or for a new full nine-year term, when the terms of the first commissioners should be deemed to have commenced for purposes of the rotation scheme, and whether the respondents retained valid title to their offices under the constitutional scheme.

The Parties’ Contentions

The Solicitor General contended that the first commissioners’ terms should be reckoned from July 12, 1945 and that successors are limited to the unexpired portion of those original terms; under that computation respondent Imperial’s and respondent Perez’s legal terms had expired and their offices were vacant. Respondent Imperial asserted that Chairman Lopez Vito’s first appointment dated May 12 or May 13, 1941 fixed the commencement of his nine-year term from that earlier date, that Lopez Vito’s later appointment in 1945 did not restart the term, and that Imperial therefore occupied a valid nine-year term beginning after the lawful expiration of Lopez Vito’s term. Respondent Perez maintained that the terms should begin May 13, 1941 so as to preserve the three-year staggering between expirations; he argued that, having been appointed after his predecessor’s lawful six-year term had expired, he was entitled to a full nine-year term.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court undertook a re-examination of Article X, sec. 1, emphasizing that the constitutional design plainly contemplated a regular rotation so that one position would become vacant every three years. The Court identified two indispensable conditions for the rotation plan to operate: that the terms of the first three commissioners commence at a common instant, and that vacancies occurring before the expiration of a term be filled only for the unexpired balance of that term. The Court explained that the nine-year term must be read in the context of the staggered nine-, six-, and three-year initial periods and that permitting successors to serve fresh nine-year terms upon every premature vacancy would frustrate the constitutional purpose of regular three-year intervals. The Court supported its conclusion with prior Philippine decisions construing the constitutional scheme and with foreign authorities applying the same principle in analogous staggered board contexts, and it reasoned that the rule that a successor fills only the unexpired term is fundamental and need not be expressly stated in the Constitution.

Choice of Commencement Date

The Court held that the common commencement of the first commissioners’ terms may be deemed to have occurred at the organization of the constitutional Commission under C. A. 657 on June 21, 1941, because that act implemented and completed the organization required by the constitutional amendment. The Court therefore rejected constructions that would tie the commencement to later individual appointment or qualification dates and held that any belated qualification is to be counted against the appointee.

Application to the Present Appointments

Applying these principles, the Court computed the legal terms as follows: Chairman Jose Lopez Vito’s nine-year term ran from June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1950; Member Francisco Enage’s six-year term ran from June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1947; the initial three-year term ran from June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1944 and was not filled at that time. The appointment of Vicente de Vera on July 12, 1945 was therefore deemed to be for the nine-year term beginning June 21, 1944, to expire June 20, 1953. The vacancy created by the expiration of Enage’s term in June 1947 permitted respondent Rodrigo Perez to be appointed for a nine-year term beginning June 21, 1947 and expiring June 20, 1956. The death of Chairman Lopez Vito on May 7, 1947 produced only the unexpired portion of his term; hence de Vera’s service as Chairman filled Lopez Vito’s term only until June 20, 1950. The appointment of Commissioner Leopoldo Rovira to fill Vera’s seat was limited to the unexpired balance of Vera’s term until June 20, 1953. The

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