Title
Republic vs. Desierto
Case
G.R. No. 136506
Decision Date
Aug 23, 2001
Cojuangco et al. accused of siphoning P840M from CIDF via a 1974 MOA; Ombudsman dismissed case citing prescription, but SC ruled prescriptive period starts upon discovery, ordering reinvestigation.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 136506)

Procedural History

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019 before the Presidential Commission on Good Government on February 12, 1990; the matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman and docketed as OMB-0-90-2808. Graft Investigation Officer Manuel J. Tablada initially recommended dismissal (Dec. 29, 1997). The matter was later assigned to Graft Investigation Officer I Emora C. Pagunuran, whose Review and Recommendation dated August 6, 1998, approved by Ombudsman Desierto, dismissed the complaint for prescription; the Ombudsman denied the Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration on September 25, 1998. The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari seeking annulment of the dismissal and denial of reconsideration; the Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered the Ombudsman to proceed with preliminary investigation.

Factual Background: coco-levy framework and the MOA

In 1974 Presidential Decree No. 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance a nationwide coconut-replanting program using hybrid seednuts. Six days after P.D. No. 582, on November 20, 1974, Agricultural Investors, Inc. (AII), represented by Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., and the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), represented by Augusto Orosa, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby AII would develop a seed garden on Bugsuk Island and sell the hybrid seednuts to NIDC; NIDC would share development costs and pay AII. In 1978 P.D. No. 1468 designated the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as administrator-trustee of the CIDF. The lifting of the coconut levy on August 27, 1982 resulted in termination of the agreement effective December 31, 1982; AII sought arbitration, and on March 29, 1983 a Board of Arbitrators awarded AII substantial liquidated damages less advances.

Allegations and legal theory of the Solicitor General

The Solicitor General alleged that Cojuangco exploited his relationship with then-President Marcos to secure favorable decrees and to induce government entities to enter into terms grossly disadvantageous to the government, that AII siphoned substantial CIDF funds to private interest, and that the UCPB board members (including the named private respondents) breached fiduciary duty and participated in conspiracies in violation of R.A. No. 3019. The complaint quantified alleged siphoning and asserted violations of specific provisions of R.A. No. 3019, including paragraphs (g), (e) and (i).

Contractual provisions challenged by the Solicitor General

The Solicitor General pointed to multiple MOA provisions as evidencing a one-sided arrangement: (1) Section 9.1 and 9.3 (force majeure provisions that nonetheless preserved NIDC’s payment obligations); (2) Section 11.2 (liquidated damages payable out of CIDF for five years at a specified seednut rate); (3) Section 11.3 (asymmetric termination rights favoring AII); and (4) an imbalance between AII’s de minimis obligation to “use best efforts” to produce and NIDC’s obligation to reserve CIDF funds to insure prompt payment.

Ombudsman’s basis for dismissal

GIO Pagunuran and the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on two primary grounds: (1) prescription — calculating the ten-year prescriptive period under Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 from the date of the MOA (November 20, 1974) rendered the complaint, filed in 1990, time-barred; and (2) legislative confirmation — P.D. Nos. 961 (1976) and 1468 (1978) expressly “confirmed and ratified” the contract, which the Ombudsman construed as providing a “legislative imprimatur” insulating the transaction from criminal accountability under the Anti-Graft Law.

Solicitor General’s principal counterarguments below and on appeal

The Solicitor General advanced two principal responses: (1) the case is effectively an action to recover ill-gotten wealth (R.A. No. 1379) and therefore imprescriptible under Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution (as interpreted in Migrino), and (2) prescription should be reckoned from discovery of the unlawful nature of the transaction — in particular, discovery made only after the February 1986 EDSA Revolution — because the alleged wrongdoing was concealed by those in power, making pre-EDSA detection infeasible; additionally, the Solicitor General argued that void contracts cannot be ratified and that the P.D. confirmations did not bar prosecution.

Timeliness of the petition for certiorari

The petition for certiorari challenged the Ombudsman’s orders beyond the sixty-day period prescribed by Rule 65 as then worded, but the Supreme Court applied A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC (effective Sept. 1, 2000) and the principle that procedural amendments apply to pending and undetermined actions, thereby finding the petition timely filed despite an apparent fifteen-day delay under the earlier rule. The Court therefore reached the merits.

Legal framework governing prescription and its application

R.A. No. 3019 is a special penal statute; Act No. 3326 Section 2 governs prescription for special laws and provides that prescription begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, or if the violation was not known at the time, from discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings. While People v. Sandiganbayan had held that the date of violation may be the operative commencement when the unlawful nature was generally knowable to public officials, the Court recognized an important exceptio

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