Title
Republic vs. Deang
Case
G.R. No. 236279
Decision Date
Mar 25, 2019
Marriage nullity petition denied; insufficient evidence of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as behaviors stemmed from immaturity, not grave incapacity.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 236279)

Marriage and Events Leading to the Petition

The records showed that Cheryl and Emilio met in March 1992 and soon entered into a romantic relationship. After they lived together for about two months, Emilio quit his job and engaged in gambling. Cheryl became pregnant in April 1993. Emilio proposed an abortion abroad, which did not materialize. Cheryl later sought comfort from Emilio’s friend, with whom she became intimate once. When Emilio discovered this, he allegedly became jealous and physically abused her. Cheryl testified that Emilio boxed her on the stomach during her second month of pregnancy and forced her to resign from work. They eventually married after Cheryl’s parents arranged the wedding.

After marriage, they lived in an apartment in Quezon City rented by Cheryl’s family. Cheryl asserted that despite the marriage, Emilio continued to bring up her alleged affair. In January 1994, Cheryl and Emilio returned to Butuan City so Cheryl could give birth with the assistance of her parents. Barely a week after returning, Emilio decided to go to Manila for work. Cheryl later visited Emilio in Manila in August 1994, but Emilio chose to have them live separately. Cheryl recounted that one morning she surprised Emilio in his rented room and found him with a towel while his mistress locked herself in the bathroom. Emilio then sent her away, and Cheryl went back to Butuan City in December 1994 and never saw Emilio again.

Filing of the Petition and Emilio’s Failure to Contest

On February 11, 2013, Cheryl filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC. She alleged that Emilio was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Cheryl claimed that Emilio did not provide support for her and their son and that she knew Emilio was living with another woman, with whom he had two children.

Emilio did not file an answer and did not appear during trial despite service of summons. The RTC therefore proceeded with the evidence presented by Cheryl.

Trial Evidence on Essential Marital Obligations

During trial, Cheryl testified that she and Emilio lived together as husband and wife for only about a year and a month. She described Emilio as emotionally immature, irresponsible, a gambler, and someone who did not give financial support. Cheryl also presented Dr. Yolanda Y. Lara, a clinical psychologist, who submitted a Psychological Evaluation Report dated October 28, 2013 and testified after interviewing Cheryl, Cheryl’s sister, and Emilio’s cousin.

Dr. Lara concluded that Cheryl showed signs of Dependent Personality Disorder (DPD), while Emilio manifested symptoms of Anti-Social Personality Disorder (APD). The psychologist opined that these disorders caused dysfunction in the relationship and led to their separation. However, Dr. Lara also admitted that she merely talked to Emilio’s cousin by phone and that the information obtained from the cousin was not significant, so she based her findings mostly on Cheryl’s narration.

RTC Ruling on Psychological Incapacity

In a Decision dated July 2, 2014, the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. The RTC gave full weight to Dr. Lara’s findings and held that Emilio was psychologically incapacitated due to his inability to understand his obligations as a married man. It also commiserated with Cheryl’s situation and concluded there was no sufficient reason to deny the relief sought.

After the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in an Order dated February 16, 2015, petitioner appealed to the CA.

CA Ruling Affirming the Void Marriage

In a Decision dated May 30, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC. It held that even aside from Dr. Lara’s findings, Cheryl’s narrative and the evidence established at trial pointed to Emilio’s psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. The CA highlighted that Emilio: (a) failed to provide financial support to their son; (b) engaged in an extra-marital affair; (c) was irritable and aggressive when things did not go his way; and (d) was impulsive in a manner that prevented him from planning ahead.

The CA also found that Cheryl likewise suffered from psychological incapacity, relying on Dr. Lara’s diagnosis of DPD. The CA emphasized that the trial court’s findings on psychological incapacity should be final and binding so long as they were supported by the facts and evidence presented.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated December 12, 2017, prompting the petition for review on certiorari.

The Issue Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court was tasked to resolve whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC ruling declaring the marriage void under Article 36 on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Legal Framework Applied by the Supreme Court

The Court granted the petition. It reiterated the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and to treat marriage as the foundation of the family, legally protected from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Against that backdrop, the Court restated its consistent jurisprudence that psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 must refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders demonstrating utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The Court stressed that it must be a mental, not merely physical, incapacity that renders a party truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that the parties must assume and discharge, including the obligations under Article 68 of the Family Code to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support.

The Court synthesized the required characteristics of psychological incapacity, drawn from earlier rulings: gravity, meaning the incapacity must be grave and serious so the party is incapable of carrying out ordinary marital duties; juridical antecedence, meaning the condition must be rooted in the person’s history prior to the marriage, though the manifestations may emerge after solemnization; and incurability, meaning the condition must be incurable or beyond the means of the affected party.

The Court further reaffirmed that behaviors such as emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, sexual promiscuity, and other similar conduct do not, by themselves, establish psychological incapacity. Such acts may reflect difficulty, refusal, or neglect to undertake marital obligations instead of a psychological illness addressed by Article 36.

Supreme Court’s Appraisal of the Evidence and Defects in Proof

Applying these standards, the Court held that the CA and RTC had erred because the alleged acts indicating incapacity were not proven to have existed prior to, or at least at the time of, the marriage as required by jurisprudence. The Court acknowledged possible wrongdoing and marital failures: Emilio may have had an extra-marital affair, gambled, failed to support his family, acted irritable and aggressive, and abandoned Cheryl and the child. Cheryl may have married Emilio out of obedience to her parents and may have needed ongoing parental care and support. Nonetheless, the Court held that these circumstances alone did not prove that either spouse suffered from a grave and serious psychological condition that truly rendered them incapable of performing essential marital duties.

The Court invoked Toring v. Toring to underscore that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, and the like do not automatically warrant a finding of psychological incapacity. They may instead show a party’s difficulty or neglect that is not rooted in a psychological illness contemplated by Article 36.

The Court also conducted a scrutiny of Dr. Lara’s psychological report, emphasizing that it failed to establish the qualities of juridical antecedence and incurability, and did not sufficiently show a clear causal link between the alleged disorders and the inability to perform essential marital obligations. The Court pointed out that, aside from enumerating behaviors during marriage based on DSM-5 symptom descriptions, the report did not identify any specific disabling factor from childhood or adolescent years that could explain the conduct during the marriage. The Court stressed that there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person—an adverse integral element in personality structure—that effectively incapacitates the person from truly accepting and complying with essential marital obligations, and that this must be linked to the manifestations relied upon for psychological incapacity.

Although expert testimony need not be based on the persona

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