Republic vs. Dayot

Factual Background

The parties contracted marriage at Pasay City Hall on 24 November 1986, solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed an affidavit dated the same day stating that both had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that they desired to marry. Jose alleged that his consent was procured by fraud, that no marriage ceremony occurred, and that he did not sign the affidavit voluntarily. He stated that he met Felisa in early 1986, moved in as a boarder in June 1986, accompanied her to Pasay City Hall under pretext to collect a package, and was induced to sign three folded papers. Jose claimed that he discovered a copy of the marriage contract only in February 1987. Felisa denied fraud, maintained that the parties had lived as man and wife earlier in the 1980s, and asserted the validity of their marriage. Jose later contracted marriage with Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990; Felisa filed a criminal complaint for bigamy and an administrative complaint which resulted in Jose’s suspension from public service.

Trial Court Proceedings

Jose filed his Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity in 1993. The RTC dismissed the Complaint on 26 July 2000, finding the marriage valid. The RTC rejected Jose’s account as implausible, relied on documentary evidence and testimony showing Jose had acknowledged Felisa as his wife in a notarized statement of assets and liabilities dated 12 May 1988, written reference in his company identification card, and his sister’s testimony that she signed as witness to the marriage certificate. The RTC further held that, even if fraud had occurred, Jose’s action was barred by prescription under Article 87 of the Civil Code, because he discovered the marriage in February 1987 but filed suit only in July 1993.

Court of Appeals Decision

On appeal the Court of Appeals initially affirmed the RTC in a Decision dated 11 August 2005. The appellate court applied the Civil Code, found that the circumstances enumerated in Article 86 did not exist, and agreed that the action for annulment on grounds of fraud had prescribed. The Court of Appeals also upheld application of Article 76 as an exception to the marriage license requirement, concluding that the falsity in the affidavit regarding five years’ cohabitation did not necessarily invalidate the marriage where the solemnizing officer acted in good faith. The appellate court noted Rev. Atienza’s affidavit that he ascertained qualifications and found no impediment.

Motion for Reconsideration and Amended Decision

On reconsideration the Court of Appeals reversed itself and, in an Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006, declared the marriage void ab initio. The court relied on this Court’s jurisprudence in Ninal v. Bayadog and held that the five‑year cohabitation requirement in Article 76 is measured immediately prior to the marriage and must be continuous and exclusive. Finding that the parties had not satisfied the five‑year minimum, the Court of Appeals concluded that the exception to the license requirement did not apply and directed that the Amended Decision be furnished to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.

Petitions to the Supreme Court

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 in G.R. No. 175581 seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision and a declaration that the marriage was valid and subsisting. Felisa Tecson‑Dayot filed a separate Petition for Review in G.R. No. 179474 likewise assailing the Amended Decision. The Supreme Court consolidated the petitions on 1 August 2007 for uniform resolution.

Issues Presented

The central issue was whether the falsity of the affidavit executed under Article 76—specifically the failure to have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years—rendered the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. Ancillary questions were whether the presumption favoring validity of marriage or the parties’ documentary acts could cure the defect, whether Jose’s alleged unclean hands should bar relief, and whether estoppel or prescription prevented his challenge.

Parties' Contentions

The Republic of the Philippines argued that the marriage should be sustained on the presumption of validity and on the ground that the solemnizing officer reasonably relied on the affidavit; the Republic submitted documentary indicia of marital status, including Jose’s statement of assets and liabilities, a barangay certification, and his company I.D. The Republic further urged estoppel and unclean hands, asserting fraud by Jose in procuring the affidavit. Felisa Tecson‑Dayot contended that the Court of Appeals misapplied Ninal v. Bayadog, that her factual circumstances differed from those in Ninal, and that Jose sought nullity only to escape criminal or administrative liability.

Supreme Court Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petitions and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision declaring the marriage between Jose and Felisa void ab initio. The Court held that the falsity of the affidavit concerning the five‑year cohabitation requirement defeated the exception to the marriage license requirement and that the marriage was therefore void from the beginning. The Court noted that the declaration was without prejudice to any criminal liability the parties might incur and ordered no costs.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the marriage was solemnized on 24 November 1986, thus the Civil Code governed the union. It reiterated that Article 53 sets the essential requisites of marriage and that Article 58 and Article 80(3) make clear that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void, save for exceptions enumerated in Chapter 2, Title III of the Civil Code. The Court applied the rule of strict but reasonable construction to exceptions and held that Article 76’s five‑year cohabitation requirement is mandatory and material. The Court found that the record established cohabitation only from June 1986 and that the parties therefore fell short of the minimum five years. The Court emphasized that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by the record, bind the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The Court rejected the Republic’s contention that the f