Republic vs. Court of Appeals

Factual Background

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony in Pasay City before Judge Pablo M. Malvar. The marriage contract recited that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in Pasig on June 24, 1970. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. The parties did not immediately cohabit; in March 1971 Castro discovered she was pregnant and thereafter the couple lived together for about four months before separating. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth; the child was later adopted by Castro's brother and is now in the United States.

Procedural History in the Trial Court

On February 19, 1987, Castro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground that no marriage license had been issued prior to solemnization. Defendant Edwin F. Cardenas was served but did not answer and was declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence. Castro offered testimony and presented a certification from the Civil Registrar of Pasig dated February 20, 1987 stating that after diligent search marriage license no. 3196182 could not be located in the Pasig records. The trial court denied the petition on June 30, 1987, finding the certification inadequate to prove nonissuance of the license.

Court of Appeals Decision

On appeal, Angelina M. Castro contended that the civil registrar's certification sufficiently established that no marriage license had been issued. The Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, reversed the trial court on November 27, 1991. It declared the marriage null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the marriage contract.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The central issue presented was whether the documentary and testimonial evidence offered by private respondent were sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage. Ancillary issues included whether the certification of inability to locate a record under Section 29, Rule 132, Rules of Court and the uncorroborated testimony of Castro could overcome the presumption of regularity attached to the solemnizing officer’s attestation in the marriage contract.

Parties' Contentions

The Republic of the Philippines argued that the civil registrar’s certification of inability to find the license was inadequate proof of nonissuance and that Castro’s testimony was self-serving and uncorroborated. Petitioner further contended that the presumption of regularity in the acts of the solemnizing officer, Judge Malvar, who attested that the license was presented, should prevail absent stronger proof to the contrary.

Evidence and Findings Below

Castro testified that she did not apply for or sign any application for a marriage license and that she only signed the marriage contract on June 24, 1970. She produced the Pasig civil registrar’s certification stating that after diligent search no record of marriage license no. 3196182 existed in the registrar’s office. Cardenas did not participate in the proceedings and offered no evidence. There was no evidence of collusion between the spouses.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Supreme Court

The Court applied Articles 53(4) and 58 of the New Civil Code, which require a marriage license as a requisite to a valid marriage, and Article 80(3), which renders a marriage void ab initio when essential requisites are absent. The Court held that a certificate of due search and inability to find, issued by an officer having custody of the records, is admissible and probative under Section 29, Rule 132, Rules of Court, as a statement that, after diligent search, no specified record exists in the office. The Court observed that civil registrars are custodians of marriage license records under Article 70, New Civil Code, and that their certification that a searched-for license is not found enjoys probative value. The Court rejected the contention that the certificate standing alone was insufficient, citing the statutory allowance for proof of lack of record. The Court also found Castro’s uncorroborated testimony acceptable under the facts. The mar