Title
Republic vs. Ballocanag
Case
G.R. No. 163794
Decision Date
Nov 28, 2008
Danilo Reyes purchased land later found to be inalienable timberland. Despite title cancellation, SC ruled he acted in good faith, entitling him to compensation for improvements to prevent unjust enrichment.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 108000)

Republic's cause of action: cancellation of title and reversion

The Republic (through the OSG and the BFD) filed a complaint for cancellation of title and reversion, alleging that the source title (OCT P‑2388) was spurious/irregular because approximately 162,500 sq. m. of the land was part of timberland per BFD Land Classification Maps Nos. 1715 and later 2319, and was included within the 140‑hectare Agro‑Forestry Farm Lease Agreement (AFFLA) No. 175 in favor of Atty. Marte. The complaint alleged that the parcel was inalienable and not registrable.

Evidentiary showing of the Republic

The Republic presented documentary maps and witness testimony from DENR officials and a geodetic engineer. The supervising cartographer testified that plotting showed the disputed area largely inside AFFLA No. 175 and that only about two hectares were alienable and disposable. The surveyor corroborated this. The geodetic engineer pointed out the absence of a required Bureau of Forestry certification in the title carpeta, an essential requirement for issuance of title to disposable public land.

RTC finding and judgment in the reversion case

The RTC found in favor of the Republic: Free Patent No. V‑79606 and OCT P‑2388 (and derivative TCT No. 45232) were declared null and void; Reyes was ordered to surrender the owner’s duplicate and vacate; the Register of Deeds was ordered to cancel the title; the land was declared reverted to the public domain subject to AFFLA No. 175. The court also declared the roughly two‑hectare area non‑registrable for lack of Bureau of Forestry certification.

Appeals and finality of reversion judgment

Reyes appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC. His subsequent petitions to this Court were denied, making the reversion judgment final with respect to title and state ownership of the land.

Motion to remove improvements under Rule 39(10)(d)

After finality of the reversion decision, Reyes filed a motion under Rule 39, Sec. 10(d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking leave to remove his fruit‑bearing trees and to appropriate the unharvested fruits for a one‑year period to avoid unjust loss of his investment. Reyes asserted he had been in good faith possession since 1970 and had expended significant sums; he requested a reasonable period to remove improvements.

Opposition by the Republic and related proceedings

The Republic opposed the motion, invoking accession (Art. 440) and arguing the land remained public domain and not subject to disposition; it also maintained that any initial good‑faith status ceased when the reversion action was filed in 1987. Atty. Marte filed a separate complaint for injunction claiming encroachment on his leased area, which the RTC dismissed. The RTC treated the motion to remove improvements as incident to execution and, after hearing, granted Reyes a one‑year period to remove and appropriate the trees/fruits.

CA review of the RTC order on improvements

The Republic sought certiorari relief in the CA, asserting grave abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC’s order, finding no evidence that Reyes acted in bad faith in acquiring and planting the trees and, therefore, that the rules on accessions and the rights of a builder/planter in good faith (Arts. 445 and 448) were applicable.

Issues raised to the Supreme Court by the Republic

The Republic’s petition to the Supreme Court principally argued that: (1) the motion to remove improvements was barred by res judicata/prior judgment because the reversion decision was final and had not provided for removal or compensation; (2) the RTC no longer had jurisdiction to modify or vary a final judgment except as allowed by law; and (3) the issue of improvements had been disposed of in the reversion proceedings and could not be re‑litigated via an execution incident.

Reyes's position before the Supreme Court and equitable contention

Reyes maintained that his motion was an incident to execution and a proper procedural remedy under Rule 39(10)(d). He contended he had acted and invested in good faith before the reversion suit (from 1970 until notice in 1987), and that denying him relief would amount to confiscation without just compensation because the State would benefit from his improvements without indemnifying him.

Supreme Court’s assessment: finality of title versus omission on improvements

The Court acknowledged that the reversion judgment establishing State ownership had become final. However, it noted that the prior decisions did not address the rights or remedy for improvements introduced by Reyes; the reversion judgments contained no provision on allowance, removal, or indemnity for the improvements. The absence of adjudication on that specific issue left a legal vacuum as to Reyes’s claims for compensation or removal.

Determination of Reyes as a planter in good faith and applicable Civil Code protections

The Court agreed with the factual finding that Reyes was a planter in good faith from 1970 until at least the filing of the reversion suit in 1987: he relied on a registered title, tilled the land, and invested substantially. Under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, a builder or planter in good faith is entitled to reimbursement for useful improvements and may retain possession of the improvements until reimbursement is made. The Court also invoked the doctrine against unjust enrichment and Art. 22 (obligation to return benefits acquired at another’s expense) to conclude the State should not be allowed to appropriate the fruit‑bearing trees without just compensation.

Environmental constraints and limitation on removal of improvements

Notwithstanding Reyes’s entitlement to remedies for improvements, the Court recognized the land was subject to AFFLA No. 175, which imposes affirmative conservation obligations on the lessee and reflects constitutional policies to protect a balanced and healthful ecology (Art. II, Sec. 16) and to cons

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