Title
Regalado vs. Yulo
Case
G.R. No. 42935
Decision Date
Feb 15, 1935
Felipe Regalado, justice of the peace, contested removal at age 65 under Act No. 3899. Supreme Court ruled law applied only to those 65+ at enactment, reinstating Regalado.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 42935)

Factual Background

The petitioner, Felipe Regalado, had qualified as justice of the peace of Malinao on April 12, 1906. Upon attaining the age of sixty-five on September 13, 1934, Regalado was thereafter relieved when the Judge of First Instance of Albay, acting pursuant to instructions from Jose Yulo, Secretary of Justice, designated Esteban T. Villar to act as justice of the peace of Malinao. Regalado surrendered the office under protest. Villar subsequently qualified on December 17, 1934, and entered upon the duties of the office.

Procedural History

The matter was presented to the Court by way of quo warranto to determine the rightful occupant of the office of justice of the peace of Malinao. The Court heard argument on the construction and effect of the proviso added to Sec. 203 of the Administrative Code by Act No. 3899, and thereafter rendered judgment granting the writ, ousting Esteban T. Villar, and placing Felipe Regalado in possession of the office. The Court made no special pronouncement as to costs.

Issue Presented

The controlling issue was whether, under Sec. 203 as amended by Act No. 3899, justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act who reached the age of sixty-five years after the Act took effect were required to cease to hold office upon reaching that age.

Statutory Text and Language

The Court recognized that the Spanish text of Sec. 203, as enacted, must prevail and that the English text could be consulted only to explain the Spanish. The Spanish proviso employed the phrase “al tiempo de la vigencia de esta Ley” and stated that the actuales jueces de paz y jueces de paz auxiliares que al tiempo de la vigencia de esta Ley hayan cumplido sesenta y cinco anos de edad, cesardn el primero de enero de mil novecientos treinta y tres en sus cargos; the English compilation rendered this as “at the time this Act takes effect” and added the word “automatically,” a term not present in the Spanish. The Court noted also that the compiled English text omitted the word “office” after “hold” in one place.

Parties’ Contentions

The petitioner maintained that the proviso was clear and required no interpretation, and that only those incumbents who had completed sixty-five years of age on or before November 16, 1931 (the date Act No. 3899 took effect) were subject to cessation. The Solicitor-General, representing the respondents, conceded that the proviso was not specific but urged that the legislative intent was to require all justices and auxiliary justices, whether appointed before or after the Act, who had completed sixty-five years at the time of approval and those who would complete that age thereafter, to cease holding office — the former group on January 1, 1933 and the latter upon attaining sixty-five. The Solicitor-General relied on the legislative history and on the Secretary of Justice’s consistent administrative construction.

Legislative History and Precedents

The Court recited antecedent legislation and decisions. Act No. 2347 had previously imposed an age limit of sixty-five for judges of the Courts of First Instance and required present incumbents to vacate upon the law’s taking effect; that law was upheld in Chanco vs. Imperial. Sec. 203 had earlier been amended by Act No. 3107 to provide that justices of the peace “shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years,” and the Court had held that amendment prospective only in Segovia vs. Noel. The Court observed that a Senate bill had at one point proposed the use of the word “automaticamente” to effect retroactivity, but that the enacted version omitted “automaticamente” and instead specified the date “el primero de enero de mil novecientos treinta y tres.”

Statutory Construction and Judicial Principles

The Court affirmed that the search for legislative intent must begin and end with the statute’s language, and that judges may not rewrite a statute by inserting words or meanings not expressed. The Court acknowledged that administrative construction by the department charged with enforcement is entitled to weight, but it is not binding and yields where the statute’s meaning is not doubtful. The Court therefore confined itself to the natural and ordinary meaning of the Spanish text of Act No. 3899.

Court’s Reasoning Applied to the Facts

Applying the statutory language, the Court held that “al tiempo de la vigencia de esta Ley” bore its ordinary sense of “at the time this Act takes effect,” namely November 16, 1931. The clause “hayan cumplido sesenta y cinco anos de edad” was in the past tense and did not contemplate future attainment of the age; the specified date “el primero de enero de mil novecientos treinta y tres” was fixed in the past with respect to the Act’s effective date. On November 16, 1931, the petitioner had not completed sixty-five years. Because Regalado did not attain sixty-five until September 13, 1934

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