Title
Re: Initial Reports on the Grenade Incident that Occurred at about 6:40 a.m. on December 6, 1999
Case
A.M. No. 99-12-03-SC
Decision Date
Oct 10, 2001
A live grenade threat by a dismissed chauffeur in the Supreme Court, exposing security lapses and illicit relationships, led to penalties for misconduct and immorality.
grenade incident
chauffeur
court attorney
A

Case Summary (A.M. No. 99-12-03-SC)

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

  • December 6, 1999: grenade incident occurred; DCA ElepaAo sent memorandum the same day.
  • December 7, 1999: Supreme Court resolved to docket the matter as an administrative complaint against Joselito Guisando and Atty. Marina Ching and referred it for investigation.
  • February 28, 2000 onward: notices issued; motion for inhibition filed by Atty. Ching; investigative steps taken.
  • July 17, 2000: case referred to Associate Justice Remedios Salazar‑Fernando for investigation, report and recommendation.
  • November 28, 2000: Investigating Justice submitted final report and recommendations.
  • March 3, 2003 (En Banc decision): Supreme Court issued its per curiam resolution adjudicating the administrative complaints.
  • Constitutional basis: the decision was rendered after 1990 and therefore applies the 1987 Constitution as the governing constitutional framework for the Court’s supervisory and disciplinary authority.

Factual Narrative of the Incident

DCA ElepaAo’s memorandum reported that at about 6:40 a.m. on December 6, 1999 a man identified as Joselito Guisando entered the Office of the DCA, first without a weapon and then, a few minutes later, returned holding what proved to be a live grenade. According to eyewitnesses, Guisando grabbed Atty. Marina Ching, held the grenade close to her head, and ordered others to leave. Ching and staff fled; Guisando briefly escaped after a scuffle with the Saleses. The grenade was later located inside a striped plastic bag beside a steel filing cabinet; the Bomb Disposal Unit confirmed it was live and capable of exploding. The memorandum also recounted prior threats and a reported earlier incident in which Guisando allegedly tried to scare Ching with a toy gun.

Witness Testimony and Conflicting Accounts

  • Joselito Guisando admitted bringing the grenade into the office, claimed he intended only to scare Atty. Ching, and asserted he had kept the device since 1997. He also admitted to a purported four‑year romantic relationship with Atty. Ching, which he said caused jealousy motivating his acts.
  • Atty. Marina Ching denied the alleged illicit romantic relationship, insisted she was a victim during the grenade incident, and explained Guisando had been a friend and occasional driver.
  • Raymundo (Roy) Sales and Vicente Sales corroborated the account that Guisando returned holding a grenade, threatened and physically restrained Atty. Ching, and caused immediate fear and flight among those present. Vicente Sales reported the incident to building security but encountered inadequate immediate response.
  • Other staff (Buena Silang, Edna Conde, Angelina Urriza, and others) provided testimony about prior threats or statements consistent with an intimate and problematic relationship between Guisando and Atty. Ching, or about Guisando’s conduct.
  • Several witnesses presented by Atty. Ching attested to her good reputation and character but were not able to directly refute Guisando’s detailed accounts concerning his presence in her household or the nature of their interactions.

Forensic and Bomb Disposal Findings

The Western Police District Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team examined the device and certified it as a PRB‑423 fragmentation hand grenade, Belgium made. The EOD’s certification indicated a “hang fire” condition—i.e., the grenade was live and ready to explode at any time. The pull ring was detached and the striker exhibited corrosion but remained capable of initiating detonation; the three major components (body, filler, fuze assembly) were intact. The EOD’s assessment underscored that the device posed a real and immediate threat to life and property.

Findings and Reasoning of the Investigating Justice

Investigating Justice Salazar‑Fernando found: (1) Guisando admitted bringing the live grenade into the office and that jealousy motivated his actions; (2) the EOD certification established the device was live and dangerous; (3) the eyewitness reactions demonstrated the perceived and actual danger posed to staff; and (4) evidence collected during the inquiry supported the probability of an illicit relationship between Guisando and Atty. Ching. The Investigating Justice concluded Guisando’s actions constituted grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, recommended dismissal, and further recommended that Atty. Ching be charged with immorality and acts unbecoming a public servant while noting her indefinite suspension pending investigation. She also noted security lapses at the Court and recommended disciplinary action against security personnel.

Supreme Court’s Assessment and Final Holdings

  • Joselito Guisando: The Court agreed with the Investigating Justice that Guisando committed grave misconduct by knowingly bringing and leaving a live explosive device within the Supreme Court premises and by threatening colleagues with it. The Court dismissed Guisando from the service, ordered forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and imposed a bar to re‑employment in any government branch or GOCC.
  • Atty. Marina Ching: The Court concluded that while she could not be regarded as entirely faultless and that her conduct reflected impropriety and immorality in violation of the standards expected of judicial personnel, a separate immorality charge was unnecessary because the matter was the subject of the Court’s original referral and subsequent investigation. The Court imposed a one‑year suspension without pay for disgraceful conduct and immorality. Because she had already been under indefinite suspension for a period exceeding one year, the Court deemed that penalty served and ordered her reinstatement, but denied back salaries for the interim suspension beyond the one‑year penalty.
  • Security Division: The Court directed the Security Division to improve vigilance and responsiveness, noting serious security lapses that permitted an explosive to be brought into the Court and that impeded prompt apprehension of the perpetrator.

Legal Basis and Standards Applied

  • Constitutional and supervisory authority: The Court exercised its supervisory duty over the Judiciary pursuant to the 1987 Constitution (applicable because the decision was rendered after 1990).
  • Ethical and disciplinary standards: The Court applied the Code of Judicial Ethics’ demand that judicial personnel avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety; it treated the conduct of Court employees as subject to high standards of probity and public trust.
  • Civil Service and Administrative Code provisions: Disgraceful or immoral conduct was evaluated under Section 23(o) of Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, which classifies such conduct as a grave offense subject to suspension or dismissal. The Court referenced its prior dispositions imposing suspension for immorality to calibrate the appropriate penalty.

Rationale for Penalties Imposed

  • Guisando’s dismissal: The Court emphasized that bringing and placing a live grenade in the Court personally endangered lives and demonstrated blatant disregard for authority and institutional safety; his admitted actions, together with EOD findings, established grave misconduct that warranted dismissal and forfeiture of benefits.
  • Ching’s suspension and reinstatement without back pay: The Court found sufficient indic

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