Title
Re: Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness and Undertime in the 1st Semester of 2017
Case
A.M. No. 2017-11-SC
Decision Date
Jul 27, 2020
Three SC employees penalized for habitual tardiness, one for undertime; suspensions and reprimands imposed despite personal justifications.

Case Summary (A.M. No. 2017-11-SC)

Procedural Origin and Referral Process

On 8 August 2017, the Leave Division of the OAS referred to Atty. Simeon V. Brigola, Jr. (Atty. Brigola, Jr.), Chief of Complaints and Investigation Division (CID) of the same office, the list of Court employees who incurred habitual tardiness during the first semester of 2017. The report identified three employees as having been habitually tardy, which was treated as a violation of CSC MC No. 04, series of 1991, and CSC MC No. 17, series of 2010. The records reflected the following number of times tardy in the months of January to June: Ms. Jhunine Ann T. Gamolo (Utility Worker II, Publication Division Public Information Office) had ten in January, eleven in February, eleven in March, and twelve in April; Ms. Genevieve Victoria Maria B. Zuniga (Court Stenographer IV, Office of DCA Adecoa-Delorino, Office of the Court Administrator) had ten in January, fourteen in February, and ten in March; and Ms. Nicole Angela Regina C. Benbinuto (Former Judicial Staff Assistant II, Academic Affairs Office, Philippine Judicial Academy) had eleven in January, ten in February, eleven in March, and twelve in April.

On 9 August 2017, the Leave Division referred to the same CID head the list of undertimes for the first semester of 2017 incurred by one employee in violation of CSC MC No. 16, series of 2010. The report showed that Ms. Ivy B. Silva (Accountant III, Accounting Division Fiscal Management and Budget Office) incurred five undertimes in January, seven in February, ten in March, four in April, three in May, and ten in June.

Employee Responses and Stated Justifications

The OAS records showed that, except for Ms. Benbinuto, the concerned employees were directed to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against them. Ms. Benbinuto submitted a resignation letter dated 27 June 2017 addressed to Honorable Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, explaining that she was resigning due to unforeseen illness. As summarized by the OAS, the remaining employees’ explanations fell into distinct categories.

For Ms. Gamolo, the OAS noted a prior record of habitual tardiness in the second semester of 2016, docketed as A.M. No. 2017-02-SC (Re: Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the 2nd Semester of 2016), which was then pending before the Court En Banc. In her letter dated 17 August 2017, she attributed her tardiness to family circumstances as a single mother, stating that she had difficulty caring for her child because she could not find someone to look after the child until March 2017. She also described health problems, including abdominal cramps, migraine, pelvic pain due to abnormal menstruation, and a diagnosis of Polycystic Ovarian Syndrome around July 2017, for which she attached an ultrasonographic report. She expressed remorse, acknowledged her failure to monitor late arrivals, and promised to adjust her schedule.

For Ms. Zuniga, in her letter dated 14 August 2017, she explained that during the period of habitual tardiness, she was awaiting results of the 2016 Bar Examinations, and that she was in an unhealthy mental state characterized by anxiety and depression. She described her status as a single mother of three and her emotional distress arising from her separation and the continued verbal abuse by her husband. She stated that, despite her circumstances, she endeavored to meet her duties efficiently. She asked for understanding and assured the infraction would not recur.

For Ms. Silva, in her letter dated 22 August 2017, she admitted violating the policy on undertime and asked for apology, stating that she had no good excuse. She described that during the first week of March 2017 she went home early despite not feeling well, and that similar occurrences happened on March 22 to 24, 2017. She also attributed certain undertimes in late March to her part-time nanny leaving home for personal matters. She added that in June 2017, her youngest son began occupational therapy for a communication disorder, and that most undertime were to catch up with her sons teacher’s feedback and to follow up on the therapy at home. She described that it was her first offense and requested consideration, while promising not to repeat.

Office of Administrative Services Evaluation and Recommended Penalties

On 10 January 2018, Atty. Candelaria submitted a memorandum to the Court through the Clerk of Court, recommending penalties. In the pertinent portion quoted in the record, she invoked the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust and emphasized that judicial employees must strictly observe official time. She reasoned that habitual tardiness and undertime compromise efficiency and hamper public service. She further discussed the interplay between the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017 RACCS) and the governing administrative framework for the period involved. She noted that the 2017 RACCS classified habitual tardiness in reporting for duty as a grave offense punishable by suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. However, she recommended the application of the light offense classification because there was no proof that the tardiness qualified as habitual in a manner that caused prejudice to the operations of the office, and she explained that the 2017 RACCS was promulgated on 3 July 2017 and took effect on 17 August 2017, such that the RRACCS would still be applied to offenses incurred before that effectivity.

Citing Section 46(F)(4), Rule 10 under the applicable rules as discussed in the record, habitual tardiness as a light offense would be punished as first offense: reprimand, second offense: suspension for one (1) to thirty (30) days, and third offense: dismissal. The OAS concluded that the employees incurred habitual tardiness and violated the policy on undertime and that their explanations were unacceptable.

Accordingly, Atty. Candelaria recommended: (a) for Ms. Gamolo, as a second-time habitual tardiness offender, suspension for five (5) days without pay, with warning that repetition would be dealt with more severely; (b) for Ms. Zuniga, as a first-time offender, reprimand, with the same warning; (c) for Ms. Benbinuto, in lieu of reprimand because she resigned on 1 July 2017 prior to the Leave Division report, the attachment of the record of her first offense to her 201 File for future reference; and (d) for Ms. Silva, she be held liable for simple misconduct for violating the policy on undertime, with suspension for five (5) days without pay, after considering mitigating circumstances of thirteen (13) years of service, acknowledgment of infraction, and remorse, also with warning that repetition would be dealt with more severely.

The Court’s Ruling on Administrative Liability

The Court adopted the evaluation of the OAS. It emphasized that the 1987 Constitution recognizes public office as a public trust, which requires public officials and employees to comply with the Civil Service Law and Rules. The Court stressed that observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every moment of public service are necessary to recompense the government and, ultimately, the people. It further reiterated that, to inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials and employees must strictly observe official time. The Court relied on its prior administrative directives through Administrative Circular No. 1-99 and Administrative Circular No. 2-99, which stressed that punctuality is a virtue and that absenteeism and tardiness must be dealt with severely even if they do not qualify as habitual or frequent under CSC MC No. 4, series of 1991.

The Court recognized that there was no dispute that Ms. Gamolo and Ms. Zuniga incurred habitual tardiness, as evidenced by their explanations filed in response to the directive to show cause. It then treated their explanations as falling under categories of illness or poor health, moral obligation to family, and domestic concerns, but the Court held that these reasons could not be countenanced because the infraction seriously compromises efficiency and hampers public service.

In this connection, the Court cited Basco v. Gregorio to stress that the stringent standards imposed upon judicial personnel reflect the premium placed on the image of the court of justice and that such image must be mirrored in the conduct of the men and women who work there. The Court underscored the “imperative and sacred duty” of everyone charged with the dispensation of justice to maintain the courts good name and standing, above suspicion, and to exemplify integrity, probity, uprightness, honesty, and diligence.

Classification Under the 2017 RACCS and Application of Penalties

The Court then discussed the classification of offenses under the 2017 RACCS. It stated that administrative offenses are classified into grave, less grave, and light depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on government service. It noted that Section 50(F), Rule 10 considers habitual tardiness as a light offense, punishable by first offense: reprimand, second offense: suspension for one (1) to thirty (30) days, and third offense: dismissal.

For Ms. Gamolo, the Court considered that the case was her second offense, with her first offense docketed as A.M. No. 2017-02-SC concerning habitual tardiness in the second semester of 2016. Thus, her penalty was aligned with Section 50(F)(4), Rule 10, which would require a suspension within the statutory range for a second offense.

For Ms. Zuniga, the Court treated the offense as a first offense in relation to her status as an employee of the High Court, and it held that reprimand was appropriate, subject to the warning that repetition would be dealt with more severely under the 2017 RACCS.

As to Ms. Benbinuto, the Court found it unnecessary to impose a penalty because she had resigned from office on 1 July

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