Title
Re: COMELEC No. 2521
Case
A.M. No. 92-12-916-RTC
Decision Date
Jul 8, 1994
Judge Pinon overstepped COMELEC's exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation disputes, coercing a proclamation and imposing damages, leading to a Supreme Court ruling of gross ignorance of the law and a P35,000 fine.
illegal orders
administrative liability
fine
A

Case Summary (A.M. No. 92-12-916-RTC)

Factual Background

After the May 1992 elections, Akmad J. Sana, Harkin Que, Hadji Otong Ayub, and Samuel Bani filed a petition with the COMELEC, docketed as COMELEC Case No. UND 92-245, seeking official proclamation as vice-mayor and councilors of Bongao, Tawi-Tawi. They alleged, among others, that notwithstanding their electoral victory, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongao failed to proclaim them as the duly elected vice-mayor and municipal councilors. Subsequently, on July 6, 1992, Harkin Que filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court, Branch V, docketed as CV Case No. 18-5, to compel the Municipal Board of Canvassers to declare him as a duly elected councilor. He claimed that he placed number eight (8) among the winning candidates for councilors, while the Board had already proclaimed only the first five (5) winning candidates.

On July 22, 1992, other councilor candidates, including Idlana Mangona and Erong Udjid, moved to dismiss the mandamus case, asserting that the issue raised was a pre-proclamation controversy already taken cognizance of by the COMELEC. Despite this position, respondent Judge issued an order on September 22, 1992 directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers to convene within five (5) days and to proclaim Harkin S. Que as the number eight (8) councilor. The same order required all respondents to jointly and severally pay Harkin S. Que moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, totaling P145,000.00.

Thereafter, on September 28, 1992, a further petition was filed with the COMELEC by Amilajed Idjirani, Saipada Sangkula, Manuel Magbanua, and Bantela Abubakar, docketed as SPA 92-353. That petition alleged a failure of elections in Precinct Nos. 44 and 43-A in Bongao affecting, among others, the vice-mayor position and councilor slots for numbers six (6) to eight (8). The First Division of the COMELEC, in its resolution in UND 92-245 promulgated on September 25, 1992, advised the parties—including petitioners and intervenors/oppositors—to seek redress with the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC then scheduled a hearing for October 15, 1992.

In the course of the administrative proceedings, Harkin S. Que filed an opposition in SPA 92-353 on October 14, 1992, arguing that there was no report of any untoward incident warranting a declaration of failure of election in the referenced precincts. Meanwhile, the mandamus case proceeded in parallel. A motion for contempt was filed against the Board of Canvassers for failing to proclaim Harkin S. Que. Atty. Wynne Asdala of the COMELEC, assigned to represent the Board, sought reconsideration of the contempt order. The motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an order dated October 27, 1992, where the Board members were declared in contempt for alleged defiance of the September 22, 1992 order. Concurrently, respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against the Board members and ordered their commitment to the municipal jail until they proclaimed Harkin S. Que as number eight (8) councilor and paid the P145,000.00 in damages.

As a direct consequence of the arrest, the Board members were prevented from boarding a plane for Manila to attend the COMELEC En Banc hearings in SPA Nos. 92-410 and 92-353. On October 29, 1992, respondent Judge issued another order stating that Idlana Mangona and Abdulnasser Hadjiula (from the cited contempt adjudications) had complied with the September 22, 1992 order by submitting a duplicate original copy of the proclamation paper en banc of Harkin S. Que as the no. 8 councilor, and had also acknowledged receipt of the P145,000.00 as damages. The order ordered the release of those persons from custody and lifted the cited contempt orders.

Proceedings Before the COMELEC and the Administrative Referral

In the aftermath of these events, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2521, expressing the view that respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The resolution identified several grounds: first, the alleged denial of reconsideration and subsequent incarceration of the Board members under circumstances described as detention continuing because they were detained and had purportedly only prepared and submitted under duress a duplicate proclamation and paid an “exorbitant” damages sum on the basis of an illegal court order; second, the taking cognizance of a pre-proclamation controversy case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Sec. 3, par. c, Art. IX, Constitution as cited in the text; and third, the alleged violation of an election offense provision on coercion of election officials and employees, attributed to Section 281, par. (f), Article XXII, including the quoted rule against coercion through threats, intimidation, terror, or coercion in the performance of election functions.

In compliance with this Court’s requirement, respondent Judge filed a comment stating that the case was not a pre-proclamation controversy because a proclamation of winners of the 1991 municipal elections had allegedly been made on May 24, 1992 by the Board, leaving out only the vice-mayor and councilors who obtained votes ranking from sixth to eighth highest. He also contended that the proclamation by the Board triggered a ministerial duty to proclaim all winning candidates after the canvass was completed.

The Parties’ Contentions on Jurisdiction and Nature of the Controversy

The central dispute in the administrative case was whether Special Civil Action No. 18-5 for mandamus effectively sought redress for a dispute falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation controversy, or whether it was a matter that could properly be pursued in the Regional Trial Court through mandamus.

Respondent Judge insisted that the controversy was not a pre-proclamation issue, emphasizing that at least a partial proclamation of winners had been made on May 24, 1992 by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. He reasoned that once a proclamation had been made, the Board owed a ministerial obligation to complete the proclamation of all winning candidates after the canvass.

The Court, applying the standards for pre-proclamation controversies, rejected the characterization urged by respondent Judge.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court held that the crucial fact was respondent Judge’s lack of dispute that the May 24, 1992 proclamation by the Board did not include the candidates who obtained the 6th to 8th highest number of votes, among whom were the petitioners in COMELEC Case RTC UND 92-245. The Court thus viewed the May 24, 1992 proclamation as only a partial proclamation authorized by Section 247 of the Omnibus Election Code. Under that provision, the COMELEC could, motu proprio or upon verified petition and after due notice and hearing, order the proclamation of other winning candidates whose election would not be affected by the outcome of the controversy. The Court reasoned that Harkin Que, the petitioner who had sought contempt sanctions in mandamus, was never actually proclaimed by the Board, and that no ministerial duty compelled the Board to proclaim him prior to a resolution of the petitions pending before the COMELEC.

On the Court’s reading of the statutory definition, the controversy brought before respondent Judge was a pre-proclamation controversy. It cited Sec. 241 defining pre-proclamation controversy as any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers, raisable before the board or directly with the COMELEC, or any matters raised under the cited provisions relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of election returns. The Court further noted that the referenced inclusions covered, among others, possible discrepancies in election returns, delay, loss, destruction, material defects, tampering, falsification, and the presence or absence of discrepancies. Since allegations existed that possible discrepancies in election returns in Precinct No. 45 could affect the election results, the Court held that the Board’s actions were within its authority under Sec. 241 of B.P. 881, and that controversies of the type involved fell within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

The Court treated the COMELEC’s constitutional grant of power as fundamental. It reasoned that such a grant was designed to avoid precisely the kind of jurisdictional conflict presented. The Court stressed that, in election cases involving pre-proclamation controversies, the COMELEC was mandated by law to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all such disputes. It relied on the doctrine in Zaldivar vs. Estenzo that a Regional Trial Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over a case involving enforcement of the Election Code “is at war with the plain constitutional command” and its implementing statutory provisions, and that the grant of authority was clear and unmistakable in recent decisions.

Applying the foregoing principles, the Court held that respondent Judge could not plausibly issue the assailed orders in Special Civil Action No. 18-5 under the color of existing law. The Court characterized respondent Judge’s actions—interfering with the Board’s proceedings in SPA Nos. 92-410 and 92-353, issuing a warrant of arrest to prevent the Board from boarding their plane to attend COMELEC En Banc proceedings, and ordering the Board to proclaim Harkin S. Que—as actions made without or in excess of jurisdiction.

The Court then turned to administrative liability. It held that while malice or deliberate intent had not been alleged, a judge could still be held liable for rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or order through inexcusable negligence or ignorance. The Court required clear showing that, despite acting without malice, respondent Judge failed to observe the diligence, prudence, and care required of a public official. The Court emphasized that a judge is char

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