G.R. No. 97805 - Raymundo vs. Court of Appeals

Case Summary (G.R. No. 97805)

Factual Background

On July 5, 1989, the administrator of the Galleria de Magallanes Condominium discovered that petitioner made an unauthorized installation of glasses at the balcony of his unit. The administrator found the act to be in violation of Article IV, Section 3(d) of the condominium’s Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions, which prohibits any act that would impair structural strength or alter the original architecture, appearance, and specifications of the building, including the external facade.

The administrator reported the violation to the Board of Directors of Galeria de Magallanes Association, Inc. during a special meeting on July 8, 1989. The administrator then sent a letter dated July 12, 1989 demanding petitioner remove the allegedly illegal installation. Petitioner refused. As a result, the condominium association filed on February 21, 1990 a complaint for mandatory injunction against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, in Civil Case No. 90-490.

Trial Court Proceedings

After the complaint was filed, petitioner sought procedural relief, filing a Motion for extension of time to file an Answer and a Motion for production of document, which the trial court granted in an Order dated March 16, 1990. Instead of filing an Answer, petitioner filed on March 23, 1990 a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the trial court had no jurisdiction because an action for mandatory injunction allegedly fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss in its Order dated June 1, 1990. It ruled that the suit was for mandatory injunction and, pursuant to Section 21 of B.P. 129, as amended, the RTC had the competence to issue such relief. The trial court further characterized the action as essentially falling under its jurisdiction and, therefore, denied the motion for lack of merit.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. In its Order dated June 29, 1990, the trial court likewise denied reconsideration. It emphasized that the action, as denominated and as substantiated by the allegations in the complaint, was one for mandatory injunction, and that Section 21 of B.P. 129 governed. It also held that the claim for attorney’s fees was merely incidental to the principal action for mandatory injunction, as the complaint sought removal of the unauthorized glass installation within five (5) days from receipt of the order, and the attorney’s fees did not affect the court’s legal competence.

Petitioner’s Jurisdictional Theory on Appeal

On elevation by petitioner to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order and preliminary injunction, the petition was dismissed on March 11, 1991. In the present Supreme Court petition, petitioner renewed the jurisdictional challenge, arguing that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the complaint because the association’s sole pecuniary claim was P10,000.00 attorney’s fees, which petitioner characterized as within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court under Section 33 of B.P. 129.

Legal Issue and Doctrinal Framework Applied

The Supreme Court held that petitioner’s contention did not warrant relief. The Court reasoned that the association’s complaint was not primarily a suit for the recovery of a money claim. It was an action to compel the removal of an illegal and unauthorized installation of glasses that petitioner allegedly placed in violation of the condominium restrictions. The Court thus treated the subject of litigation as incapable of pecuniary estimation, rendering Section 33 of B.P. 129 inapplicable.

Instead, the Court invoked Section 19(1) and Section 21(1) of B.P. 129, which confer exclusive original jurisdiction on the RTC over civil actions where the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and over the issuance of injunctions enforceable within the region. The Court reiterated the controlling criterion for jurisdiction: first ascertain the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If the principal relief is recovery of a sum of money, the claim is capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction depends on the amount. Conversely, where the basic issue is something other than recovery of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to the principal relief, the action is treated as one whose subject may not be estimated in terms of money and is cognizable by courts with jurisdiction over cases incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the controversy required resolution of whether petitioner violated the condominium Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions and, if so, whether petitioner must remove the glass installation at Unit AB-122. The Court declared that such an issue was clearly incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Attorney’s Fees as an Incidental Claim

The Supreme Court also addressed the effect of the requested attorney’s fees. It held that the claim for P10,000.00 attorney’s fees was only incidental to the principal cause of action for removal of the unauthorized installation. Hence, the amount sought for attorney’s fees was not determinative of jurisdiction.

At the same time, the Court corrected the trial court’s characterization. It stated that the trial court had erroneously considered the complaint as one for mandatory injunction, presumably because of the complaint’s caption. The Court then clarified the nature of a writ for mandatory injunction as a provisional remedy. It explained that such a writ is provisional because it functions as a temporary measure pending resolution of the main action, and it is ancillary because it is dependent upon the outcome of the primary case.

Despite the trial court’s mislabeling, the Supreme Court sustained the jurisdictional outcome. The Court concluded that the RTC still possessed competence over the relief sought under the relevant prov

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 97805)

The case arose from a petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order and preliminary injunction challenging a Court of Appeals dismissal of petitioner’s earlier certiorari and prohibition.
The challenge targeted the RTC, Br. 133, Makati Orders dated June 1, 1990 and June 29, 1990 that denied petitioner’s motions assailing the trial court’s jurisdiction over a complaint for mandatory injunction.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Nilo H. Raymundo appeared as the petitioner, an owner/occupant of Unit AB-122 in Galleria de Magallanes Condominium.
Hon. Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, together with Hon. Judge, RTC, Br. 133, Makati, Metro Manila, appeared as respondents in their capacity in the proceedings below.
Galeria de Magallanes Association, Inc. appeared as the private respondent and the plaintiff in the underlying civil case.
The private respondent filed its complaint in the RTC of Makati, Branch 133 as Civil Case No. 90-490 for mandatory injunction.
After the RTC denied petitioner’s jurisdictional motions, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appellate petition on March 11, 1991, prompting the present Supreme Court petition.

Key Factual Allegations

The case began when the condominium administrator discovered on July 5, 1989 that petitioner installed unauthorized glasses at the balcony of his unit.
The alleged installation was said to violate Article IV, Section 3 paragraph (d) of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions.
The violated restriction prohibited acts or placements in units or common areas that would impair structural strength or alter the building’s original architecture, appearance, and specifications, including the external facade.
The administrator reported the violation to the condominium’s Board of Directors in a special meeting held on July 8, 1989.
The administrator sent a letter dated July 12, 1989 demanding removal of the unauthorized installation.
Petitioner refused to remove the installation, and the private respondent then filed a complaint seeking a judicial order compelling removal.
The complaint’s central relief required petitioner to remove the illegal and unauthorized glasses within a specified period.

Jurisdictional Challenge Raised

Petitioner insisted that the RTC lacked jurisdiction because a complaint for mandatory injunction was allegedly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioner grounded the argument on the view that the complaint’s pecuniary aspect placed it under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioner relied on the private respondent’s stated attorney’s fees claim of P10,000.00 in Civil Case No. 90-490.
Petitioner contended that under Section 33 of B.P. 129 the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction due to the claimed amount of the attorney’s fees.

RTC and Court of Appeals Rulings

The RTC denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated June 1, 1990.
The RTC reasoned that the suit was for mandatory injunction and that under Sec. 21 of B.P. 129, as amended, the RTC had legal competence to issue the remedy.
The RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in an Order dated June 29, 1990.
The RTC ruled that the action, as denominated and as shown by the allegations and prayer, was a case for mandatory injunction and that Sec. 21 of B.P. 129 governed.
The RTC also held that the attorney’s fees demand was incidental to mandatory injunction and did not affect the