Title
Ramos vs. Sarao
Case
G.R. No. 149756
Decision Date
Feb 11, 2005
A pacto de retro sale was deemed an equitable mortgage; valid tender and consignation upheld, but no damages awarded. Property returned, taxes reimbursed.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 149756)

Procedural Posture

The petition challenges the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of the RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s complaint for redemption and award of consolidation of title in favor of respondent. The RTC had consolidated two actions (the redemption suit and Sarao’s consolidation petition) and ruled for consolidation in favor of respondent; the CA affirmed. Petitioner brought a Rule 45 petition to the Supreme Court to review both factual and legal determinations.

Core Factual Chronology

On February 21, 1991 the spouses executed a document styled “Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro” conveying the conjugal house and lot to respondent Susana Sarao for P1,310,430 with a repurchase option exercisable within six months and an agreed interest rate of 4.5% per month (compounded). On July 30, 1991 petitioner tendered two manager’s checks totaling P1,633,034.20 which respondent refused as allegedly insufficient. Petitioner filed for redemption on August 8, 1991 and later consigned the two checks with the RTC (August 13, 1991). Respondent filed a petition for consolidation of ownership and paid various taxes and expenses to avert a bank auction; the related cases were consolidated and tried together.

Evidentiary Positions at Trial

Petitioner’s evidence emphasized that the transaction was a loan accommodation: the funds were borrowed to avert foreclosure by a commercial bank, the Ramos spouses remained in possession and residence of the property, petitioner sought computations from respondent’s counsel and attempted redemption after a short interval, and petitioner offered payment based on respondent’s own computation. Respondent’s evidence characterized the instrument as a bona fide pacto de retro, asserted nonpayment of the stipulated interest, presented a larger computation of the obligation that included taxes and other charges, and relied on a June 14, 1991 letter from Jonas Ramos admitting inability to repurchase as supporting consolidation.

Issues Presented to the Court

The petition raised three issues: (1) whether the deed styled as a pacto de retro was, in truth, an equitable mortgage; (2) whether petitioner validly tendered payment and validly consummated consignation; and (3) whether petitioner was entitled to moral damages and attorney’s fees.

Standard of Review and Scope of Relief

Although Rule 45 normally restricts appellate review of factual findings, the Supreme Court invoked recognized exceptions permitting re‑examination where the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked relevant and undisputed facts that would change the legal conclusion. The Court found such oversight here and proceeded to examine the factual circumstances in light of legal principles concerning pacto de retro versus equitable mortgage and the law on tender and consignation.

Legal Distinction: Pacto de Retro versus Equitable Mortgage

A pacto de retro effects an immediate transfer of ownership to the vendee‑a‑retro subject to the vendor’s right to repurchase within the agreed period; failure to repurchase vests absolute title in the vendee by operation of law (and consolidation of title for registry purposes requires judicial order). An equitable mortgage, however, is a transaction that, though expressed as a sale, in substance secures a debt; the essential element is the parties’ intention to create security rather than effect an absolute transfer. Article 1371 requires that contemporaneous and subsequent acts be considered to ascertain intent; Article 1602 lists circumstances that give rise to a presumption of equitable mortgage. Parol evidence is admissible to show real intent when the nature of the agreement is properly placed in issue.

Application of Article 1602 and the Presumption of Equitable Mortgage

Article 1602’s enumerated instances (including retention of possession by the vendor and unusually inadequate price) establish a presumption that a transaction denominated a pacto de retro is actually an equitable mortgage; the presence of even one such circumstance suffices. Here, the Ramos spouses continued to possess and reside in the subject property after the transaction — an enumerated ground under Article 1602(2). The Court concluded that this fact, together with the surrounding circumstances (transaction entered on the eve of a bank foreclosure and the written communications that characterized amounts due as a “House and Lot Loan”), supported the presumption that the deed in reality secured a loan. The evidentiary burden therefore shifted to respondent to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing proof of a bona fide pacto de retro; the Court found respondent failed to discharge that burden.

Effect of the Court’s Finding That the Instrument Was an Equitable Mortgage

Because the contract was an equitable mortgage rather than an absolute sale, respondent’s proper remedies were enforcement of the loan — by action for the amount due or foreclosure — rather than consolidation of ownership through application of a pacto de retro. The Court treated the consigned sum as payment toward the loan obligation and declared the mortgage discharged upon application of the consigned amount against the debt as of the relevant deposit date.

Tender, Consignation, and the Validity of Petitioner’s Payment

Tender of payment and consignation are governed by Articles 1256 and 1258 of the Civil Code; consignation is proper when tender is refused without just cause and requires that all interested parties be notified. The lower courts had held that petitioner failed to tender the correct amount and failed to give proper consignation notice. The Supreme Court reversed that conclusion: petitioner tendered P1,633,034.20 based on respondent’s own computation, and respondent’s later demand for P2,911,579.22 was grossly excessive because it included items not contemplated by the parties’ agreement (e.g., unrelated expenses). Petitioner’s August 1, 1991 communication sufficed as an announcement that consignation would follow; the subsequent deposit with the court produced the retroactive legal effect of payment. Accordingly, consignation was valid and produced discharge as to the loan obligation to the extent of the consigned amount.

Claims for Moral Damages and Attorney’s Fees

The Court denied petitioner’s claims for moral damages and attorney’

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.