Title
Ramos vs. Philippine National Bank
Case
G.R. No. 178218
Decision Date
Dec 14, 2011
In 1973, Luis Ramos mortgaged land for an agricultural loan; in 1989, he secured a sugar queádán loan. Despite paying the agricultural loan, PNB refused to release the mortgage, claiming it also secured the unpaid sugar loan. The Supreme Court upheld PNB’s claim, ruling the mortgage’s dragnet clause covered future loans, and no dation in payment occurred.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 178218)

Key Dates and Transactional Milestones

Real estate mortgage executed October 23, 1973. Credit Line Agreement under PNB’s sugar quedan financing program executed March 31, 1989. Promissory notes and Contracts of Pledge for sugar quedans executed April–June 1989 (availments totaling P15,600,000.00). Authorization letter from Luis Ramos to PNB dated December 28, 1989. Agricultural loan of P160,000.00 obtained August 7, 1989 and fully paid November 2, 1990. RTC decision in favor of the Ramoses dated March 26, 1999. Court of Appeals reversal dated November 8, 2006; motion for reconsideration denied May 28, 2007. Supreme Court decision affirming the Court of Appeals dated December 14, 2011.

Applicable Law and Authorities Relied On

Governing constitutional framework: 1987 Philippine Constitution (applicable because decision date is post‑1990). Procedural rule: Rule 45, Rules of Court (petition for review on certiorari). Civil Code provisions expressly relied upon in the decisions and arguments: Article 1245 (dation in payment), Article 1371 (ascertaining contractual intention via contemporaneous and subsequent acts), Article 2087 (foreclosure and alienation of pledged property), Article 2103 (ownership of pledged thing remains with debtor unless expropriated), and Article 2115 (sale of pledged thing extinguishes principal obligation). Controlling jurisprudence cited: Prisma Construction & Development Corp. v. Menchavez, Banate v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, Prudential Bank v. Alviar, and Philippine National Bank v. Sayo, Jr.

Terms and Scope of the 1973 Real Estate Mortgage

The 1973 mortgage secured a P83,000.00 agricultural loan and expressly contained a broad “blanket” or “dragnet” clause. The mortgage provided that it would secure “loans, overdrafts and other credit accommodations” fixed at P83,000.00 and stated additionally that, in case of subsequent promissory notes, renewals, extensions, new loans or other accommodations, “this mortgage shall also stand as security” for such obligations. It further provided that it would secure “any and all other obligations of the Mortgagor to the Mortgagee of whatever kind and nature whether such obligations have been contracted before, during or after the constitution of this mortgage.” The mortgaged parcels were identified by TCT numbers recorded at the Registry of Deeds of Batangas.

The 1989 Sugar Quedan Financing and Pledge Transactions

On March 31, 1989, Luis Ramos obtained a P50,000,000.00 credit line under PNB’s sugar quedan financing program. Ramos made availments evidenced by promissory notes (notably promissory notes dated April 3, 1989 and June 6, 1989) totaling P15,600,000.00. To secure the availments he executed Contracts of Pledge covering two official warehouse receipts (quedans) for refined sugar (NASR RS‑18080 and NASR RS‑18081), which were indorsed to PNB.

Authorization Letter and Parallel Litigation Over the Quedans

On December 28, 1989, Luis Ramos executed an Authorization in which he authorized PNB “to dispose and sell all the Quedan Receipts (Warehouse Receipts) pledged to said bank, after maturity date.” The quedans became the subject of separate litigation between PNB and Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery; those proceedings and related appeals and enforcement actions elsewhere in the record affected whether the quedans could be realized upon and whether pledge remedies could be executed.

Agricultural Loan, Payment, and RTC Action for Release of Mortgage

The spouses Ramos obtained an agricultural loan of P160,000.00 on August 7, 1989 secured by the 1973 real estate mortgage. They fully paid that agricultural loan on November 2, 1990 and demanded release of the mortgage and return of the TCTs; PNB refused, asserting that the mortgage also secured the Ramoses’ sugar quedan financing obligations. The Ramoses filed a complaint for specific performance in the RTC (Civil Case No. 3241), alleging impairment of their property rights and loss of business opportunities due to PNB’s retention of the TCTs.

RTC Finding of Dation in Payment and Its Rationale

The RTC rendered judgment for the Ramoses on March 26, 1999, concluding that the December 1989 Authorization effected a transfer of ownership (dacion en pago) and novation as to the quedans: the RTC found that by authorizing PNB to dispose of the pledged quedans and by PNB’s acceptance and subsequent pursuit of rights against Noah’s Ark, the parties treated the quedans as accepted payment, thereby extinguishing the underlying obligations and requiring release of the mortgage and return of titles. The RTC invoked Article 1245 on dation in payment and characterized the transaction as an alienation of the quedans to PNB in satisfaction of debt.

Court of Appeals’ Reversal: No Dation, Mortgage Covers Future Obligations

The Court of Appeals reversed on November 8, 2006. It held that the Authorization did not transfer ownership of the quedans and thus did not constitute dation in payment; rather, it appointed PNB to sell the quedans if default occurred and to apply proceeds to the loan. The appellate court deemed the Authorization a standard pledge‑related provision consistent with Article 2087 and emphasized the presumption that doubtful transactions be treated as pledge rather than dation (pledge being the lesser transfer of rights). The Court of Appeals also interpreted the 1973 mortgage’s dragnet clause as clear and unambiguous, concluding it covered future obligations, including the 1989 sugar quedan financing loans, and therefore PNB could retain the mortgage until the quedans were appropriately realized or exhausted.

Issues Raised on Appeal to the Supreme Court

Petitioners posed three principal issues: (1) whether the general terms of the 1973 real estate mortgage leave no doubt that the mortgage did not cover the sugar quedan financing loan; (2) whether the mortgage should be understood to include the sugar quedan financing loan in addition to the agricultural loan; and (3) whether a mortgage executed in 1973 could validly and existingly secure a 1989 sugar quedan financing loan under the 1989 credit line agreement.

Petitioners’ Legal Theories and Contentions

Petitioners argued that the dragnet clause would secure a subsequent loan only if that subsequent loan was made in reliance on the original mortgage; they contended the 1989 sugar financing transactions (credit line agreement, promissory notes, contracts of pledge) made no reference to the real estate mortgage and thus demonstrated no such reliance. They further asserted that the Authorization effected a novation and dation in payment which extinguished the pledge and the sugar loan, entitling them to release of the mortgage. Petitioners also characterized the dragnet clause as a contract of adhesion violating mutuality, and they urged application of Article 1371 to judge contractual intention by contemporaneous acts.

Respondents’ Contentions and Procedural Objections

PNB maintained that the Ramoses had consented to a mortgage that expressly secured future loans and that the Ramoses had not timely raised the issue of whether the 1973 mortgage covered the sugar financing obligations in the trial court and earlier appellate proceedings; PNB therefore argued the Ramoses were estopped from raising the new theory on appeal. PNB contended the Authorization did not transfer ownership of the quedans and that pledge law and Civil Code provisions permitted PNB to hold the pledged property and sell it upon default, applying proceeds to the indebtedness.

Supreme Court’s Procedural Ruling on Late‑Raised Theory

The Supreme Court found that petitioners’ primary new theory (that the 1973 mortgage did not cover the 1989 sugar financing loan) was first advanced in their motion for reconsideration to the Court of Appeals and thus had not been presented at trial; the Court applied the general estoppel rule barring issues raised for the first time on appeal. The Court considered, but rejected, exceptions (jurisdictional questions and the Lianga Lumber exception that a party may change legal theory on appeal when no further evidence is needed), concluding neither applied because jurisdiction was not at issue and the new theory would require further evidence. Accordingly, petitioners were procedurally barred from succeeding on that new theory.

Supreme Court’s Substantive Contract Interpretation: Dragnet Clause Encompasses the Sugar Loan

On the substantive merits, the Supreme Court applied established contract interpretation principles: when contract terms are clear and leave no doubt, t

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