Title
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 93833
Decision Date
Sep 28, 1995
Petitioner secretly recorded a private conversation, violating R.A. 4200; Supreme Court ruled the law applies to participants, protecting privacy of all communications.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 93833)

Statutory Provision at Issue

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 was central: it prohibits any person, “not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word,” from secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording such communication by using enumerated devices, including tape recorders. The statute’s language was plain and explicitly included recording by tape recorder.

Procedural History

Upon arraignment in the criminal case, petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the facts did not constitute a crime under R.A. 4200 because the statute was not intended to penalize a party to a communication who records it. The trial court granted the motion to quash. The private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and held that the information did allege an offense under Section 1 and that the trial court acted in grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner sought relief in the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals’ decision.

Issue Presented

Whether R.A. 4200 proscribes the secret recording of a private communication by a person who is a participant to that communication (i.e., whether a party privy to a conversation who secretly records it without authorization of the other parties commits an offense under Section 1).

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner advanced three main contentions: (1) Section 1 of R.A. 4200 applies only to unauthorized taping by persons who are not parties to the communication; (2) the information was defective because it failed to allege the substance or content of the conversation, which petitioner argued was necessary; and (3) R.A. 4200 penalizes “private communication” but not “private conversation,” implying that the statute did not reach the kind of exchange she recorded.

Court’s Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Intent

The Court applied ordinary principles of statutory construction: when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its plain meaning. Section 1 unambiguously makes it unlawful for “any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word,” to secretly record such communication. The Court emphasized that the statute uses the broad qualifier “any,” which signals no intent to limit culpability to third parties only. The Court therefore concluded that a participant who secretly records a private communication without authorization of the other parties falls within the statute’s prohibition.

Congressional Record and Legislative Purpose

The Court relied on contemporaneous legislative debates (Senate Congressional Records) demonstrating that Congress intended a complete ban on tape-recorded conversations taken without authorization of all parties, regardless of whether the recording was by a participant or a third person. Senators’ statements reflected concern for fairness and privacy: recordings made secretly and used against a person were regarded as unjust, and the bill was described as covering recordings even where a party to the communication made the tape for purposes beyond criminal prosecutions (e.g., civil cases). These legislative materials reinforced the plain text reading that R.A. 4200 covers unauthorized recordings made by any person.

On Requirement to Allege Substance of Conversation

The Court rejected petitioner’s argument that the information must recite the substance of the recorded communication. R.A. 4200 penalizes the act of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording private communications by enumerated means; therefore, an information alleging that an accused secretly recorded a private communication by tape recorder suffices to state an offense. The substance of the conversation is immaterial to the statutory violation.

On “Private Communication” Versus “Private Conversation”

The Court addressed petitioner’s semantic argument that “private communication” is narrower than “private conversation.” It found such distinction unwarranted and absurd in light of ordinary meanings: “communication” broadly encompasses acts of imparting or sharing thoughts, including conversations. The Court noted that the bill’

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