Title
Quisay vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 216920
Decision Date
Jan 13, 2016
Petitioner challenged the validity of an Information filed against her, arguing lack of authority by the filing officer. The Supreme Court ruled the Information defective due to insufficient proof of prior written authority, quashing it and dismissing the case.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-20089)

Relevant Dates and Procedural History

  • December 28, 2012: OCP-Makati issued a resolution finding probable cause.
  • January 11, 2013: Information was filed before the RTC.
  • April 12, 2013: Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information for lack of authority in filing.
  • May 8, 2013: RTC denied the motion to quash.
  • July 10, 2013: RTC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
  • October 10, 2014: Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed RTC’s denial of the motion to quash.
  • January 30, 2015: CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
  • January 13, 2016: Supreme Court decision granting the petition.

Applicable Law

  • 1987 Philippine Constitution (as decision dated post-1990).
  • Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, requiring prior written authority for filing complaints or informations.
  • Section 3(d), Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, allowing quashal if the officer who filed the Information lacked authority.
  • Republic Act No. 7610 – the substantive law for the offense charged.
  • Republic Act No. 10071 ("Prosecution Service Act of 2010"), Section 9, granting City Prosecutor authority and allowing delegation.
  • OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, which delegates authority to review prosecutors to approve resolutions and file informations.

Issue Before the Court

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the denial of the motion to quash filed by petitioner on the grounds that the Information was filed without the necessary prior written approval from an authorized prosecutorial officer.

Summary of Facts and Arguments

The OCP-Makati issued a resolution finding probable cause against the petitioner. The resolution was approved by a designated review prosecutor, SACP Hirang. However, the Information filed before the RTC was signed solely by Assistant City Prosecutor De La Cruz, who included a Certification stating that the filing of the Information was with prior written authority of the City Prosecutor. Petitioner argued that the Information was defective as it did not bear the actual prior written approval of the City Prosecutor or any authorized personnel as mandated under the Rules of Court.

The prosecution contended that, pursuant to RA 10071 and the Office Order, approval authority was properly delegated to SACP Hirang and other review prosecutors, and that the Certification attached to the Information sufficiently established prior written approval from the City Prosecutor.

Lower Courts’ Findings

The RTC and the CA held that the Certification in the Information sufficed to meet the requirement of prior written authority. They relied on the delegation under RA 10071 and Office Order No. 32, and accorded the Certification the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.

Supreme Court’s Legal Analysis

The Court emphasized the explicit procedural requirements of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which mandates prior written authority or approval from the provincial/city prosecutor or their deputies before filing an Information. Filing without such authority is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, as established in People v. Garfin, and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

The Court acknowledged that Section 9 of RA 10071 validly empowers the City Prosecutor to delegate authority, and OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 properly designated certain prosecutors, including SACP Hirang, to approve resolutions and filings. The Court found no issue with the delegation per se.

Nevertheless, the critical defect was that the Information was filed by ACP De La Cruz without any demonstrated authority, delegation, or prior written approval by the City Prosecutor or any authorized review prosecutor under the Office Order. The signature-certification alone, stating that prior written authority existed, was insufficient to prove that such authority was indeed granted. This type of certification was likened to those rejected in previous rulings (People v. Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin, Tolentino v. Paqueo), which held that a bare and conclusory certification does not cure the lack of actual prior writ

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