G.R. No. L-31822 - Quimpo vs. Dela Victoria

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-31822)

Parties and Setting

On 2 May 1968, respondents filed Civil Case No. 6005 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I against petitioner, seeking quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages over a parcel of land. On 28 June 1968, respondents filed a separate complaint for forcible entry in the City Court of Davao City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1299-B, involving the same parcel of land and the same parties. The dispute arose from petitioner’s alleged forcible invasion and occupation of respondents’ property in March 1968, which respondents attributed to petitioner’s asserted pasture permit from the Bureau of Forestry, even while respondents claimed protection under a prior Torrens title.

Factual Background Underlying the Forcible Entry and Quieting of Title Actions

In the forcible entry case, respondents prayed that petitioner be ordered to vacate the premises and deliver possession to them, and that petitioner pay P500.00 a month as rental commencing from the later part of March 1968, until possession would be delivered, plus attorney’s fees. Petitioner moved to dismiss the forcible entry complaint, contending that Civil Case No. 6005 was pending over the same subject matter. The City Court denied the motion on 29 November 1968, holding that there was no identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, and that a judgment in the other action would not amount to res adjudicata in the forcible entry case.

The City Court set the matter for hearing. When petitioner failed to file an answer, he was declared in default on 12 December 1968, and respondents’ evidence was received the next day. On 16 January 1969, the City Court rendered judgment ordering petitioner (1) to vacate and deliver possession, (2) to pay P500.00 a month as rental from March 1968 until delivery of possession, and (3) to pay costs.

Procedural Developments in the City Court and Court of First Instance

Petitioner sought reconsideration of both the earlier order denying his motion to dismiss and the judgment itself. The City Court denied reconsideration on 4 March 1969. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of First Instance, where the appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 6437. On 5 July 1969, he reiterated his arguments for dismissal based on pendency of the earlier action.

In parallel, respondents moved for the issuance of immediate execution of the City Court decision. On 29 July 1969, the court a quo (Court of First Instance, Branch II) denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit and simultaneously granted the motion for immediate execution of the City Court judgment. Petitioner moved for reconsideration again, but the court denied it on 16 August 1969. Finally, on 12 November 1969, the court dismissed petitioner’s appeal from the City Court judgment. Petitioner then elevated the matter for review, assigning multiple errors.

Issues Raised by Petitioner

Petitioner advanced five principal assignments of error. First, he argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the verification of the forcible entry complaint was void for non-compliance with Section 6, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. Second, he contended that the forcible entry case should have been dismissed because it was filed about a month after the quieting of title and recovery of possession case, involving the same cause of action, same subject matter, and same parties. Third, he asserted that immediate execution should not have been ordered before resolving the pendency issue between the same parties over the same subject matter. Fourth, he challenged the award of P500.00 monthly rental without evidence, especially in light of his claim that rental should have been P300.00 based on the quieting of title action. Fifth, he argued that the dismissal of his appeal was erroneous because he was declared in default while raising legal issues regarding the denial of his motion to dismiss.

The Court’s Discussion on Verification and Alleged Jurisdictional Defect

The Court examined petitioner’s contention that the verification in the forcible entry complaint was defective. The verification stated that Catalino de la Victoria read the allegations and alleged that they were “true and correct,” but omitted the explicit statement that the affiant arrived at that conclusion of his own knowledge, as described in Section 6, Rule 7. The Court recognized that the wording did not explicitly contain the “true of his own knowledge” formula. However, it treated the omission as insufficient to render the complaint and proceedings void.

The Court relied on its prior rulings that defects or insufficiency in verification were not jurisdictional, but merely formal. It invoked Villasanta vs. Bautista (L-30874, 26 November 1970, 36 SCRA 160, 170–171), which explained that the purpose of verification is to ensure good faith and veracity of material averments, and that absence or defect of verification does not necessarily defeat jurisdiction in meritorious cases. The Court also cited Oshita vs. Republic (L-21180, 31 March 1967, 19 SCRA 700), emphasizing that even if a pleading was not properly verified, jurisdiction of the court was not affected.

The Court further held that petitioner raised the jurisdictional question only later. It applied the principle in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy (L-21450, 15 April 1968, 23 SCRA 29), ruling that a party cannot invoke jurisdiction to secure relief and later repudiate it when the outcome is adverse. The Court characterized petitioner’s conduct as voluntary submission to the City Court and to the Court of First Instance, through his motions for dismissal and reconsideration. Having submitted to the courts’ authority and failed to secure relief, petitioner could no longer question jurisdiction.

The Court’s Ruling on Pendency of Another Action and the Grounds for Dismissal

The Court addressed the second assignment of error under Rule 16 (motion to dismiss based on pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause). The Court reiterated the requisites for this ground: there must be (1) identity of parties or representation of the same interest, (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for founded on the same facts, and (3) such identity that any judgment in the other case would amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration.

Applying these requisites, the Court acknowledged that there could be identity of parties and subject matter, since the forcible entry case and Civil Case No. 6005 involved the same land. Yet it held that the rights asserted and relief prayed for were not the same. In the forcible entry case, the legal right claimed was possession. In the quieting of title action, the legal right asserted was ownership.

The Court declined to adopt petitioner’s theory that the issue of ownership necessarily made the forcible entry case dependent on the ownership suit. It explained that, while the alleged trigger for both actions was petitioner’s forcible invasion in March 1968, the causes of action differed. In the quieting of title case, the central issue was whether petitioner’s asserted pasture permit could include property already covered by respondents’ Torrens title, as reflected in O. C. T. No. P-2385 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao Province issued to respondents. In the forcible entry case, the issue was whether, even assuming the pasture permit’s validity, petitioner had the right to forcibly eject the prior occupants and destroy their improvements.

The Court framed the distinction as one of law and order: a possessor claimed to be an owner could not take the law into his own hands, and the forcible entry case focused on the wrongful act of forcibly ousting respondents rather than on ultimate title. Thus, the City Court and the Court of First Instance did not err in refusing to dismiss the forcible entry complaint on the ground of pendency of the earlier quieting of title case.

Immediate Execution of the Forcible Entry Judgment

On the third assignment of error, petitioner argued that immediate execution was improper pending resolution of the pendency issue. The Court rejected this argument as meritless. It cited Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, which authorizes and requires immediate execution of judgments in forcible entry cases in favor of the plaintiff. The Court described the rule as mandatory, subject only to an exception when the delay is due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.

The Court stated that the purpose of immediate execution was to prevent further damages to the plaintiff caused by loss of possession. It then noted the mechanisms for a defendant to stay execution: (a) by perfecting the appeal and filing a superse

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-31822)

The case arose from a petition to review orders of the Court of First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District, Branch II, in a forcible entry controversy initially filed in the City Court of Davao City.
The petition sought review of three related orders in Civil Case No. 6473, namely an order denying a motion to dismiss and granting immediate execution, a subsequent order denying reconsideration, and a final order dismissing the appeal from the City Court judgment.
The petition challenged the City Court’s and the trial court’s actions on issues of jurisdiction, pendency of another action, immediate execution, and the rental award.

Parties and Procedural Posture

The petitioner was Jose Salcedo Quimpo, and the respondents were Catalino de la Victoria and Francisca O. de la Victoria.
The City Court case was a forcible entry action docketed as Civil Case No. 1299-B, while the separate quieting of title and recovery case was Civil Case No. 6005.
The forcible entry matter ended in a City Court decision on 16 January 1969, followed by denial of motions in the City Court and later proceedings in the Court of First Instance.
The petitioner’s appeal from the City Court judgment was ultimately dismissed by the trial court through the order of 12 November 1969.
The Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s orders that (a) denied dismissal and (b) sustained immediate execution of the City Court decision, and (c) dismissed the petitioner’s appeal.

Key Factual Allegations

The respondents filed a complaint on 2 May 1968 for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, docketed as Civil Case No. 6005.
After that, the respondents filed a separate forcible entry complaint on 28 June 1968 in the City Court of Davao City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1299-B, concerning the same parcel of land.
In the forcible entry case, the respondents prayed that the petitioner be ordered to vacate, deliver possession, pay P500.00 a month as rental, and pay attorney’s fees, with rental to begin from the later part of March 1968 until delivery of possession.
The petitioner moved to dismiss the forcible entry complaint on 13 July 1968, alleging pendency of Civil Case No. 6005 as a bar.
The City Court denied the motion to dismiss on 29 November 1968, and set the case for hearing on 12 December 1968.
On 12 December 1968, the petitioner was declared in default for failure to file an answer.
On 16 January 1969, the City Court ordered the petitioner to vacate, deliver possession, pay P500.00 a month as rental starting March 1968 until possession was delivered, and pay costs.
The petitioner filed motions for reconsideration that were denied, and the appeal to the Court of First Instance was likewise dismissed.
The petitioner also challenged the City Court’s imposition of rental and the trial court’s handling of the procedural issue of another pending case.

Verification Defect Argument

The petitioner argued that the City Court failed to acquire jurisdiction because the complaint’s verification was void for alleged non-compliance with Section 6, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The contested verification stated that Catalino de la Victoria “allege[d]” he had read the complaint’s allegations and that they were “true and correct,” without expressly stating that the truth was based on his own knowledge.
The Supreme Court held that the absence of the explicit phrase “true of his own knowledge” could be logically inferred because the affiant was a party, and there was no indication he verified on information and belief.
The Court further held that if the petitioner doubted the nature of the verification, the proper remedy would have been to ask that the verification be made more definite.
Even assuming the verification was defective, the Supreme Court held that defective verification did not render the forcible entry complaint, or subsequent proceedings, void, because the requirement was treated as non-jurisdictional and formal.

Jurisprudential Rules on Verification

The Supreme Court relied on Villasanta vs. Bautista, L-30874, 26 November 1970, 36 SCRA 160, to hold that insufficiency or defective verification does not automatically defeat jurisdiction when the pleading substantially fulfills the rule’s purpose of good faith and veracity.
The Court explained that the phrase “true of his own knowledge” was not treated as a talismanic formula, and that what mattered was whether the court could properly act on the case.
The Court also cited Oshita vs. Republic, L-21180, 31 March 1967, 19 SCRA 700, for the proposition that the absence of proper verification did not affect the lower court’s jurisdiction where the pleading had been subscribed and sworn to.
The Court held that the City Court’s jurisdiction was not affected by the verification defect, and that any correction should have been pursued through a directive to verify before hearing rather than by dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Laches and Waiver of Jurisdiction

The petitioner raised the jurisdiction question for the first time on appeal, and the Supreme Court held that he was therefore barred by laches.
The Supreme Court applied Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, 15 April 1968, 23 SCRA