Title
Puzon vs. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 139518
Decision Date
Mar 6, 2001
After a fire destroyed Puzon’s land titles, reconstitution was granted in 1994. Sta. Lucia challenged it, but SC ruled notices and LRA clearance unnecessary; reconstitution stands.
judicial reconstitution
destroyed titles
notices to owners
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 139518)

Factual Background

The facts established that the subject property consisted of two lots located in the District of Capitol, Quezon City, with areas of 109,038 and 66,836 square meters, corresponding respectively to the destroyed TCTs 240131 and 213611. Petitioner filed her reconstitution petition in October 1993 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80, basing the petition on the owner’s duplicate copies of the destroyed TCTs, which petitioner still possessed.

The RTC Order of October 26, 1993 served as the notice for the hearing. It was published twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette. It was also posted at the entrance of the Quezon City Hall building and on the bulletin board of the trial court at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. A copy of the petition and the hearing notice were served on the Office of the Solicitor General, the Register of Deeds for Quezon City, the Land Registration Authority, the Land Management Bureau, and the Office of the City Prosecutor for Quezon City.

When the trial began on January 17, 1994, no opposition was registered. Although a representative from the Office of the Solicitor General appeared and cross-examined petitioner, petitioner remained the sole witness. The RTC then granted the reconstitution in its February 11, 1994 decision and ordered the Register of Deeds to reconstitute the original copies of TCT Nos. 213611 and 240131 based on petitioner’s owner’s duplicate, upon payment of the prescribed legal fees.

After the RTC decision, the Register of Deeds issued to petitioner reconstituted titles, namely TCT Nos. RT-78673 (240131) and RT-78672 (213611).

Subsequent Dispute and the CA’s Annulment

In 1996, petitioner discovered that respondent was occupying a portion of the land covered by TCT No. RT-78673 (240131). Petitioner then filed an accion reinvindicatoria with damages and prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of injunction against respondent and Garsons Co. Inc. before the RTC of Quezon City (Branch 104). That case remained pending.

While the accion reinvindicatoria was still underway, respondent filed before the CA, on March 25, 1998, a Petition for Annulment of Judgment seeking to annul and set aside the RTC decision rendered by Branch 80 in the reconstitution case.

The CA annulled the RTC decision. It ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of Section 13 of RA 26, invoking Republic v. Marasigan, and concluded that notices to owners of adjoining lots and actual occupants were mandatory and jurisdictional in a judicial reconstitution of title. The CA also held that the RTC decision was issued without requiring clearance from the Land Registration Authority. Finally, the CA referred to earlier findings of the land registration commissioner and treated petitioner’s reconstituted title for TCT No. RT-78672 (213611) as fake, spurious, or otherwise untrustworthy.

Issues Raised in the Supreme Court

Petitioner assigned three main errors to the CA: first, that the CA misapplied Section 13 of RA 26 and wrongly treated notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants as mandatory and jurisdictional when the reconstitution was based on the owner’s duplicate; second, that the CA erred in holding that LRA clearance was jurisdictional; and third, that the CA erred in holding petitioner’s TCT RT-87672 (213611) covering the subject lot was fake and spurious.

Legal Reasoning on the Notice Requirement Under RA 26

The Supreme Court held that the CA and respondent’s interpretation could not stand because the language of RA 26 was clear. Respondent relied on Section 13 of RA 26, which provides for publication, posting, and, crucially, the mailing of notice to every person named whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Section 13, however, begins with an express limitation: the notice requirements therein pertained to petitions filed under the preceding section, referring to Section 12.

The Court explained that Section 12 governs petitions for reconstitution based on specified sources enumerated in Section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of RA 26. It reasoned that, therefore, Sections 12 and 13 do not apply to all petitions for judicial reconstitution, but only to those based on those particular sources. In contrast, Section 3(a) covers reconstitution from the owner’s duplicate.

The Court identified that petitioner’s reconstitution was sourced from petitioner’s owner’s duplicate TCTs. Accordingly, the applicable provision was not Sections 12 and 13, but Section 10 in relation to the sources covered by Section 10 of RA 26. Under Section 10, a registered owner or person in interest could file a petition directly with the proper court based on sources enumerated in Section 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a), provided that the court cause a notice to be published in the manner stated in Section 9 prior to hearing and granting. The Court emphasized that Section 10 contains no requirement that notices be sent to adjoining owners and actual occupants.

The Court further clarified the notice requirements by contrasting the two statutory groups. For petitions within Sections 9 and 10, the requirements were publication in two successive issues of the Official Gazette at the petitioner’s expense and posting at the main entrances of the provincial and municipal buildings, both at least thirty days prior to hearing. The notice was required to state the certificate number, the registered owner, the names of interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate, the property location, and the date for appearance and filing of claims.

For petitions in the other group under Sections 12 and 13, the mailing of notices to occupants, adjoining owners, and other persons in possession or having interests was added. Thus, mailing the notices was required only in that group and was not required for petitions based on the owner’s duplicate TCTs.

The Court held that the earlier cases cited by respondent, particularly those dealing with Sections 12 and 13 (including Republic v. Marasigan and related precedents cited by respondent), did not apply because they involved reconstitution proceedings where the statutory notice scheme under Section 13 was implicated. In reconstitution proceedings under Sections 9 and 10 sourced from the owner’s duplicate, notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants were not required.

The Court stressed that its conclusion also aligned with the nature and purpose of judicial reconstitution. Reconstitution was described as restoration of the instrument presumed lost or destroyed in its original form, not a proceeding to adjudicate ownership of the land. The Court reiterated the doctrine that a certificate of title is merely evidence of title and does not vest ownership by itself; possession of a lost certificate is not equivalent to ownership of the land.

Reasoning on LRA Clearance and Other Circular Requirements

On the second issue, the Court agreed with petitioner. It held that none of the circulars mentioned in Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 7-96 required LRA clearance for judicial reconstitution under Section 10 of RA 26. It noted that NALTDRA Circular No. 91, even if it contained the word “clearance” in its heading, concerned original land registration cases, not reconstitution. Thus, it was inapplicable.

The Court also addressed LRC Circular No. 35, which had been cited for clearance. It held that the circular did not require the reconstitution court to obtain clearance. Instead, it required reporting mechanisms involving the clerks of court and the Register of Deeds, with reports submitted to the reconstitution court on or before the initial hearing. The Court ruled that a reconstitution court was not required to wait indefinitely for such reports. It relied on Section 16 of the same Circular, which contemplated that if an order or judgment granting reconstitution issued without awaiting the report and recommendations because required processes remained pending or because there was failure to comply with requirements, a motion to set aside or to stay finality could be filed by the Land Registration Commissioner and/or the Register of Deeds through proper prosecution authorities where a valid ground to oppose existed.

Applying those rules, the Court found that the RTC’s failure to await the report and recommendations did not affect jurisdiction or divest the RTC of authority. The Court similarly observed that although LRC Circular No. 35 required notices of hearings to the Register of Deeds of the place where the property was located, the Land Registration Commissioner, and the provincial or city fiscal, it did not require notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants. Therefore, the absence of such notices did not negate the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Disposition of the “Fake TCT” Issue as Beyond the CA’s Proper Scope

On the third issue, the Court held that petitioner’s challenge had merit. It explained that respondent’s CA petition was for annulment of judgment on the limited ground of lack of

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