Title
Purisima vs. Carpio-Morales
Case
G.R. No. 219501
Decision Date
Jul 26, 2017
PNP entered MOA with WER FAST for courier services without public bidding; Ombudsman suspended Purisima for alleged graft, upheld by SC as non-moot and justified.
preventive suspension
irregular accreditation
courier service provider

Case Summary (G.R. No. 219501)

Factual Background: The MOA and the Accreditation of WER FAST

In 2011, the PNP entered into the MOA with WER FAST without public bidding. The MOA required the PNP to allow WER FAST to provide courier services for delivering firearm licenses to gun owners. In return, WER FAST committed to donate equipment for an online application system for renewal of firearms licenses. The MOA was signed on behalf of the PNP by Estilles, and the signing approval was reflected as of August 24, 2011.

Before Purisima became PNP Chief, the PNP’s Legal Service had been instructed to review the signed MOA vis-à-vis a proposed revised MOA. In an opinion memorandum dated August 7, 2012, the Legal Service suggested that the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) should first formulate rules for accreditation to evaluate courier service providers offering such services, including the qualifications of applicants, scope of services, confidentiality provisions, disclaimer provisions, and grounds to terminate accreditation.

Accordingly, an accreditation body was constituted on November 19, 2012 through the FEO Courier Services Accreditation Board (Accreditation Board). The accreditation criteria and procedure were set in a document entitled “Policy on Accreditation of FEO Courier Service” (Accreditation Policy). Among the conditions, the policy required, inter alia, that the applicant be a local entity with appropriate permits and SEC registration; it must have completed SEC reportorial requirements; it must have updated permits from its principal LGU; it must have paid its income taxes certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; it must have secured clearances from the Directorate for Intelligence (DI); it must have an extensive network across the Philippines; and the application must be made in the company’s name by its President or authorized key directors.

After Purisima’s appointment as PNP Chief on December 18, 2012, Meneses Memo was issued on February 12, 2013, addressed to Purisima. The memo stated that the CSG had accredited WER FAST as a courier service to deliver approved firearms license cards. It further recommended that courier delivery of license cards be made mandatory to monitor and control firearms in the hands of gun owners. Purisima approved this recommendation on February 17, 2013.

After this approval, on April 1, 2013, the Accreditation Board issued Resolution Number 2013-027, accrediting WER FAST as a courier services provider for all FEO clients related to firearms licensing.

Ombudsman Complaints and the Preventive Suspension Order

In 2014, two complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Purisima, WER FAST, and other PNP officials. The first complaint was filed by a private complainant on April 16, 2014 and docketed as OMB-P-14-0259 and OMB-P-A-14-0333. It accused Purisima, Estilles, and WER FAST of violating RA 6713, RA 3019, RA 7080, and RA 9184, among others. The complainant alleged, in substance, that the MOA was not procured through competitive bidding; the MOA was executed before WER FAST obtained its SEC certificate of registration; WER FAST was not authorized by the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) to deliver mails or parcels to the public; Purisima had close personal ties with WER FAST’s incorporator and senior officer; Purisima made the courier delivery of license delivery mandatory in favor of WER FAST; and WER FAST was allegedly inefficient in delivering license cards. The complainant also filed a manifestation and motion with a joint affidavit identifying Purisima as the person who directed FEO-CSG to accommodate WER FAST as the sole courier delivery service for firearms license cards.

Purisima filed his counter-affidavit on July 25, 2014. Meanwhile, on October 9, 2014, the second complaint was filed by FFIB - Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO). That complaint focused on the MOA’s execution and WER FAST’s accreditation. It attached certifications from multiple government agencies intended to show that WER FAST failed to meet qualifications under the Accreditation Policy. As to Purisima, the complaint prayed that he be administratively charged for gross negligence and/or gross neglect of duty, with a prayer for preventive suspension. Specifically, it alleged that Purisima was administratively liable for approving Meneses’s recommendation without verifying or checking WER FAST’s records and capability.

Purisima requested additional time to file his counter-affidavit, and was granted an inextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of the order dated December 1, 2014.

Nevertheless, on December 3, 2014, without awaiting the filing of Purisima’s counter-affidavit, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order preventively suspending Purisima and other PNP officers without pay for six (6) months. The order invoked the Ombudsman’s authority under Section 24 of RA 6770 and provided that the suspension would last during the pendency of the case, but not beyond six months.

Purisima and another PNP official filed petitions for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138296 and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722, which were consolidated by resolution dated January 30, 2015. During the pendency of the cases before the Court of Appeals, Purisima resigned as PNP Chief, and the preventive suspension period had already lapsed.

Court of Appeals Ruling

In its Decision dated July 29, 2015, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions, holding that they were moot due to the lapse of the six-month period of preventive suspension. It found that Purisima received the Ombudsman’s order on December 4, 2014, and calculated that the preventive suspension period lapsed on June 4, 2015.

Despite this procedural determination, the Court of Appeals also addressed the merits. It held that under Section 24 of RA 6770, the Ombudsman could preventively suspend without pay any officer or employee during the pendency of an investigation, and that the power to issue the preventive suspension order was part of the Ombudsman’s investigatory and disciplinary authority.

On the substantive question, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in suspending Purisima for allegedly irregularly accrediting WER FAST as a courier service provider. It found that the requisites for a valid preventive suspension order were present. First, it determined that the Ombudsman made a prior finding that evidence of guilt was strong, based on documentary submissions and surrounding circumstances. The Court of Appeals referred to, among others, a BIR certificate, a DI certificate, and a certification from the DOST Postal Regulation Committee. It highlighted that WER FAST was accredited despite alleged non-payment of taxes for 2011 to 2013, as indicated by the BIR certification. It also noted the DI certification stating it had not given clearances to WER FAST, and it observed that WER FAST’s business permits showed “consultancy” as its business, while its articles of incorporation indicated its primary purpose was consultancy and assistance in documentation and registration rather than courier operations. Further, it relied on DOST’s certification that WER FAST had not been accredited as a courier service provider and stressed WER FAST’s alleged lack of a proven track record in courier services, its alleged lack of capacity to deliver firearms licenses, and its alleged failure to satisfy DOTC paid-up capital requirements. The Court of Appeals also underscored that WER FAST was accredited nationwide despite a paid-up capital of only P65,000.00.

Second, the Court of Appeals treated the charge against Purisima as Gross Negligence and/or Gross Neglect of Duty, which, if proven, would constitute a ground for removal from public office. It concluded that the concurrence of these elements supported the validity of the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order.

Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court addressed two issues: first, whether the case had been rendered moot and academic by the lapse of the preventive suspension period; and second, if not moot, whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the preventive suspension order.

Legal Basis and Reasoning on Mootness

The Supreme Court denied the petitions. It relied on Ombudsman v. Capulong (G.R. No. 201643, March 12, 2014) to rule that a case questioning the validity of a preventive suspension order is not necessarily mooted by the subsequent lifting of the suspension. The Court explained that such review remains within the Court’s expanded judicial power to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction attended the Ombudsman’s issuance of the order. It further reasoned that a finding of grave abuse of discretion renders the issuance null and void from its very inception, producing no legal effects. Consequently, an improperly preventively suspended public officer should be restored to his original position and should have earned salaries as if he had not been preventively suspended.

The Court also discussed that a case is moot and academic only when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy due to supervening events such that adjudication would be of no practical value. It recognized the general rule that courts decline jurisdiction over moot cases, subject to recognized exceptions. In the present case, the Court held that the propriety or impropriety of Purisima’s preventive suspension would determine his entitlement to back salaries during the period of suspension. That practical consequence preserved justiciable value even after the lapse of the suspension term.

Legal Basis and Reasoning on Validity of Preventive Suspension

The Supreme Court then ruled on the merits by applying Section 24 of RA 6770. It held that preventive suspension by th

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