A.C. No. 10699 - Caballero vs. Sampana

Case Summary (A.C. No. 10699)

Disbarment and First Attempt at Reconsideration

On 12 November 1987, the Court issued a Decision disbarring respondent Benjamin M. Grecia after finding that he had “proven himself unfit to continue in the pursuit of his profession.” Respondent sought reconsideration on 14 December 1987, but the Court denied it in a resolution dated 12 January 1988, holding that the issues had already been duly considered and passed upon.

Subsequent Pleadings Treated as Improper or Repetitive

On 10 February 1988, respondent filed a “Petition for Redress and Exoneration and for Voluntary Inhibition,” praying that the disbarment decision of 12 November 1987 and the denial resolution of 12 January 1988 be set aside and that a new one be issued dismissing the administrative complaint and exonerating him. The Court denied that plea in a resolution dated 15 March 1988, reasoning that it was, in substance, a second Motion for Reconsideration filed without leave of court, and that the first motion for reconsideration had already been denied with finality.

Respondent later filed an additional motion seeking an extension of time to file yet another motion for reconsideration, and simultaneously requested that the Bar Confidant furnish him a certified true copy of the Solicitor General’s Report and Recommendation. The Court denied those requests in a resolution dated 5 May 1988.

Petition for Reinstatement and Denial

After a substantial lapse of time, respondent, through counsel, filed on 29 December 1988 a “Petition for Reinstatement as a Member of the Bar.” The petition asked for “justice, leniency, understanding and mercy,” and respondent emphasized his appeal for clemency by invoking examples of lawyers previously disbarred who had been reinstated.

The Court denied the petition in a resolution dated 15 June 1989. The Court characterized the petition as substantially a repetition of the earlier motion for reconsideration of the disbarment decision dated 12 November 1987, which had already been denied with finality in the resolution of 12 January 1988.

Testimonial Submissions and Renewed Motions

Respondent filed on 11 May 1989 a motion for leave to file testimonials to support his petition for reinstatement. The Court noted the testimonials in a resolution dated 30 May 1989. Unrelenting, respondent filed on 13 July 1989 a motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying reinstatement.

In that motion, respondent altered the tenor of his submissions. He apologized for repeating in his petition for reinstatement what he had already alleged in his earlier motion for reconsideration. He attributed the repetition to a “confused state of mind” caused by the impact of the denial of his motion for reconsideration. He expressly requested that the Court ignore the repeated content and treat the reinstatement petition as predicated mainly on his plea for leniency and judicial mercy. The Court denied that motion with finality in a resolution dated 19 October 1989, finding no compelling reason to reconsider.

Continued Attempts to Obtain Permission and Further Communications

On 24 November 1989, respondent filed a “Motion for Permission to Reiterate his Petition for Reinstatement,” again praying for forgiveness and emphasizing that disbarment had punished him for two years, that it was his first offense, that he had fully realized his mistake and offense, and that he had repented and purged himself. The Court denied this motion with finality in a resolution dated 21 December 1989.

On 21 May 1990, Mrs. Maria Luisa B. Grecia, respondent’s wife, wrote the Chief Justice and Associate Justices. She asked the Court to forgive her husband and allow him to practice his profession, pointing out the suffering caused by disbarment not only to him but also to their children and herself, and stating that disbarment had deprived the family of a means of support. She asserted that her husband had deeply repented and had reformed, and she pleaded for reinstatement.

The Court noted her letter for the time being in a resolution dated 28 June 1990.

Thereafter, on 17 October 1990, the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar, through the Bar Confidant, submitted Resolution No. 90-057 adopted on 9 October 1990. The submission urged the Court to extend judicial clemency and reinstate respondent, reasoning that he had been sufficiently punished, had reformed, and could again be entrusted with the practice of law.

In a letter dated 21 November 1990, respondent also pleaded again that, if reinstated, he would “unreservedly bind” himself to act carefully as a worthy member of the Bar.

Standards Governing Reinstatement After Disbarment

In addressing reinstatement, the Court invoked guiding principles and criteria drawn from prior jurisprudence and secondary authority. It stated that the sole objective of the Court upon an application for reinstatement by a previously disbarred lawyer was to determine, through positive evidence, whether the applicant’s rehabilitation efforts had succeeded so that he could again be re-admitted to a profession understood as an office of trust. The Court cited In Re: Rusiana, Adm. Case No. 270, 29 March 1974, 56 SCRA 240 for that articulation.

The Court further restated that reinstatement generally rested in sound discretion, guided by whether the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice would be conserved by the applicant’s participation as attorney and counselor. It emphasized that the applicant must, like a candidate for admission, satisfy the Court of good moral character, and that the Court would consider factors including the applicant’s character and standing before disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct after disbarment, and the time elapsed between disbarment and the application for reinstatement. The Court referred to In Re: Juan T. Publico, February 20, 1981, 102 SCRA 721, and it also cited 5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443 as the source of the quoted criterion.

The Court also reminded that the power to discipline, particularly when it amounts to disbarment, should be exercised on a preservative, not a vindictive principle, citing In Re: Juan T. Publico.

Evaluation of Respondent’s Rehabilitation and the Court’s Determination

The Court treated respondent’s ultimate plea for reinstatement as worthy of approval. It found persuasive respondent’s expiation after disbarment, his realization of the mistake and gravity of the offense, and the presence of testimonials from prominent members of the Bar attesting to his rehabilitation and his fitness to resume practice. The Court also considered respondent’s solemn pledge to abide by the ideals, canons, and ethics of the legal profession if his disbarment was lifted.

The testimonials submitted in respondent’s favor were identified in the record as coming from well-respected figures in the legal community, including former Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, former Senator Ambrosio Padilla, former Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Lourdes Paredes San Diego, former Supreme Court Justice Ruperto Martin, Sena

Case Syllabus (A.C. No. 10699)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Prudential Bank appeared as the petitioner in the caption, while Benjamin M. Grecia appeared as the respondent.
The Court resolved an application for readmission to the practice of law by Benjamin M. Grecia after his prior disbarment.
The Court had previously issued a Decision dated 12 November 1987 disbarring respondent.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the disbarment decision on 14 December 1987, and the Court denied it on 12 January 1988 for lack of merit.
Respondent then filed a subsequent “Petition for Redress and Exoneration and for Voluntary Inhibition” on 10 February 1988, which the Court denied on 15 March 1988 as an impermissible second Motion for Reconsideration filed without leave of court, and also because the first reconsideration had been denied with finality.
Respondent later filed a request for extension of time to file another motion for reconsideration, together with a prayer for a certified true copy of the Solicitor General’s Report and Recommendation, but the Court denied those requests on 5 May 1988.
On 29 December 1988, respondent filed a “Petition for Reinstatement as a Member of the Bar,” which the Court denied in a Resolution dated 15 June 1989 for being substantially a repetition of matters already denied with finality on 12 January 1988.
Respondent filed a “Motion for Leave to File Testimonials to Support Petition for Reinstatement” on 11 May 1989, which the Court noted in its Resolution dated 30 May 1989.
On 13 July 1989, respondent filed a “Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution Denying Petition for Reinstatement,” which the Court denied with finality on 19 October 1989.
On 24 November 1989, respondent filed a “Motion for Permission to Reiterate his Petition for Reinstatement,” and the Court denied it with finality on 21 December 1989.
On 21 May 1990, Mrs. Maria Luisa B. Grecia, respondent’s wife, wrote to the Court pleading for forgiveness and reinstatement; the Court noted the letter in its Resolution dated 28 June 1990.
On 17 October 1990, the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar submitted a resolution praying for reinstatement, and the matter was submitted to the Bar Confidant for the Court’s consideration.
On 21 November 1990, respondent again pleaded for reinstatement and invoked reinstatement criteria and prior jurisprudence, supported by testimonials.
The Court ultimately granted readmission and ordered respondent reinstated to membership in the Bar.

Key Factual Background

Respondent was disbarred by the Court in a Decision dated 12 November 1987, after the Court found that he had “proven himself unfit to continue in the pursuit of his profession.”
Respondent persistently sought reconsideration and later reinstatement despite repeated denials based on finality and procedural restrictions.
The Court treated respondent’s later motions as repeating arguments already considered and resolved, and it characterized at least one filing as a second Motion for Reconsideration filed without leave of court.
Respondent asserted that his reinstatement plea was grounded on repentance, reformation, and judicial clemency, and he presented a sincere willingness to comply with the ideals, canons, and ethics of the profession if readmitted.
Respondent’s wife conveyed that respondent’s disbarment caused hardship to the family, including the possible disruption of their youngest daughter’s studies.
The Integrated Bar chapter cited that respondent had been sufficiently punished and had reformed and rehabilitated himself, and that he could again be entrusted with the noble profession of law.
Respondent submitted testimonials from prominent members of the legal community attesting to his good moral character and rehabilitation.
The Court assessed respondent’s post-disbarment conduct and the evidentiary value of the testimonials in deciding whether reinstatement served public interest.

Submissions and Evidence Presented

Respondent repeatedly asked for leniency, mercy, and forgiveness in various pleadings following his disbarment.
Respondent sought access to the Solicitor General’s Report and Recommendation, but the Court denied his requests associated with that matter on 5 May 1988.
In his reinstatement applications, respondent cited prior disbarment cases where reinstatement had eventually been granted.
Respondent submitted a volume of testimonials from well-respected members of the Bar and the judiciary, which the Court referenced as attesting to respondent’s good moral character and mended ways.
The Court identified the testimonia