Title
Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 104639
Decision Date
Jul 14, 1995
Tito Dato, appointed as Assistant Provincial Warden on a temporary basis due to lack of eligibility, was suspended pending criminal charges. Though later acquitted, the Supreme Court ruled his temporary status barred entitlement to full backwages.
employment status
civil service eligibility
backwages

Case Summary (G.R. No. 104639)

Parties, Procedural History, and Issues on Review

On January 1, 1960, Tito Dato was appointed by the then Governor of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza, as Private Agent. On October 12, 1972, he was promoted and appointed Assistant Provincial Warden by then Governor Felix Alfelor, Sr. On January 1, 1974, Governor Alfelor approved a change in Dato’s employment status from temporary to permanent, based on Dato’s representation that he passed the civil service examination for supervising security guards. However, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) did not favorably act on the change, since Dato was found not to possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office. As a result, his appointment remained temporary.

On March 16, 1976, Governor Alfelor indefinitely suspended Dato after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard for alleged connivance and/or consent to the evasion of sentence of detention prisoners who escaped. Dato was later acquitted of the charges, then sought reinstatement and backwages, which were refused. He then filed an action for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31. On May 31, 1991, the trial court ordered the province to appropriate and pay Dato back salaries equivalent to five (5) years without qualification or deduction, plus P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs.

On February 20, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. It deleted the attorney’s fees award, but ordered payment of backwages for the entire period of suspension with attendant rights and privileges as a regular employee reaching the age of sixty-five (65) in the government service. The petitioner came to the Supreme Court, primarily arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the finding that Dato was a permanent employee at the time of his suspension, and in extending backwages for the entire suspension period.

Appointment Status and the Absence of Proper Eligibility at the Time of Appointment

The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner that Dato was not a permanent employee when he was suspended on March 16, 1976. The Court noted that Dato did not dispute that, when he was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden effective January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified in an appropriate civil service examination for that position. The absence of civil service eligibility meant his appointment was temporary, not permanent. Such a temporary appointment lacked the fixed and definite term of permanent status and depended on the pleasure of the appointing power.

The Supreme Court also held that Dato’s later acquisition of civil service eligibility did not automatically convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. The Court emphasized that permanent appointment is not a mere continuation of a temporary appointment. The conversion of status requires a new appointment by the appointing authority, since the acts are distinct.

The Administrative Steps and the Role of the CSC

In the facts relied upon by Dato, a key element was an administrative communication allegedly affecting his status. Dato rested his claim on a letter dated March 19, 1976 from Mr. Lope B. Rama, identified as head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the CSC. The letter stated that Dato’s Supervising Security Guard eligibility, previously treated as pending validation, was released on June 11, 1974, and that the appointment effective January 1, 1974 had been approved anew: as temporary up to June 10, 1974, and as permanent effective June 11, 1974, subject to a physical and medical examination for insurability. The letter further stated that the CSC had validated the eligibility and that the CSC records were amended accordingly.

The Supreme Court rejected the probative value and legal effect of the CSC letter as proof that Dato had become permanent by the time of his suspension. The Court explained that the CSC’s authority in the appointment process is limited to the functions of attesting and inquiring into eligibility, not to making or compelling changes in employment status. The Court relied on doctrinal statements in Luego v. Civil Service Commission, explaining that CSC may approve or disapprove an appointment presented to it. It does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change an employee’s employment status. Thus, CSC’s duty ends once it has discharged its attestation function; any later encroachment on the appointing authority’s discretion is impermissible.

Applying this doctrine, the Supreme Court reasoned that CSC should have ended its participation on January 1, 1974, when it confirmed Dato’s temporary status due to the lack of proper eligibility. When CSC later issued the March 19, 1976 communication purporting to change Dato’s status retroactively, it stepped into a power reserved to the appointing authority and thereby encroached upon discretion vested solely in that authority. The Supreme Court further stated that it was not prepared to accord the letter any probative value because it was merely a purported photocopy of the alleged communication, it was initialled and not even signed by the proper CSC officer.

Indefinite Suspension, Acquittal, and the Limited Entitlement of a Temporary Employee

The Supreme Court addressed Dato’s attempt to link his later acquittal to an entitlement to reinstatement and backwages covering the suspension period. It held that since Dato was only a temporary employee at the time of suspension, he was not entitled to the relief sought, including backwages for the entire period of his suspension. The Court’s reasoning rested on the threshold premise that temporary employees do not acquire permanent tenure rights by the mere later validation of eligibility absent a proper new appointment in accordance with the appointing authority’s discretion.

The Supreme Court’s Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ challenged decision. It dismissed the mandamus petition filed by Tito B. Dato. The effect of the reversal was to deny Dato’s claims for reinstatement and the corresponding monetary relief sought through mandamus, because the Court found that he remained a temporary employee when suspended on March 16, 1976.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The decision anchored its ruling on civil service appointment doctrine. It treated the lack of civil service eligibility

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