Case Summary (G.R. No. L-1800)
Petitioner
Cipriano P. Primicias, a distinguished member of the bar, Floor Leader of the Nacionalista minority in the House of Representatives, and chief campaigner for opposition groups.
Respondent
Valeriano E. Fugoso, Mayor of Manila, vested by the 1935 Constitution and the Revised Administrative Code with authority to grant or refuse municipal permits and enforce city ordinances.
Key Dates
• November 14–15, 1947: Primicias applies for and initially receives a permit for a Sunday, November 16 meeting at Plaza Miranda.
• November 15, 1947: Mayor Fugoso revokes the permit, citing risks to peace and order.
• November 22, 1947: Primicias seeks a writ of mandamus to compel reissuance.
• January 27, 1948: Supreme Court decision granting mandamus.
Applicable Law
• 1935 Philippine Constitution – guarantees freedom of speech, peaceful assembly, and petition for redress of grievances.
• Revised Administrative Code (sections 2434(b),(m); 2444(u)) – grants the Mayor discretion to grant or refuse permits “for any good reason of general interest” and empowers the Municipal Board to regulate streets, parks, and public places.
• Revised Ordinances of Manila (sections 844, 1119) – prohibit disorderly assemblies and require mayoral permits for parades, processions, and by analogy public meetings in public places.
Factual Background
Primicias sought to hold a peaceful assembly to present election-related grievances. Although the vice-mayor initially approved, Mayor Fugoso revoked the permit upon media reports that delegates and students would attend and that “indignation” speeches might incite violence. No evidence showed prior disorder at opposition rallies beyond verbal criticisms of officials.
Legal Issue
Whether the Manila ordinance and charter empowered the Mayor to refuse a permit for a lawful public meeting, or merely to regulate its time, place, and manner to protect public convenience and order, without suppressing the constitutional right to assemble and petition.
Court’s Interpretation of the Ordinance
The Supreme Court adopted a construction limiting mayoral authority: the ordinance confers only a regulated discretion to specify the location, route, or timing of assemblies, parades, or meetings, but does not authorize outright refusal of a permit for a lawful gathering. A contrary reading would render the ordinance unconstitutional as an undue delegation of power or as a suppression of fundamental rights.
Constitutional Principles and Jurisprudence
- Freedom of speech, assembly, and petition are fundamental but subject to reasonable regulation under the police power to ensure public health, morals, safety, and welfare.
- Licensing provisions that consider only time, place, and manner of assemblies to conserve public convenience and allow proper policing are valid (Willis Cox v. New Hampshire; Cox v. State of New
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-1800)
Background
- Petition for writ of mandamus by Cipriano P. Primicias, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority Parties, against Valeriano E. Fugoso, Mayor of Manila.
- Objective: compel issuance of permit for a peaceful public meeting at Plaza Miranda on November 16, 1947.
- Claim based on constitutional freedom of speech, assembly, and petition for redress of grievances.
Facts of the Case
- On November 14, 1947, Primicias formally applied to the Mayor for a permit to hold a public meeting and use an existing platform at Plaza Miranda on November 16.
- Vice-Mayor Miraflor initially granted permission, subject to non-subversive speeches and peace-keeping guarantees.
- On November 15, Mayor Fugoso revoked the permit, citing press reports of an “indignation rally,” high post-election passions, expected attendance of provincial delegates and students, and risk of disturbing public order.
- A later letter (November 17) reaffirmed denial until official election results were announced.
Procedural History
- Due to urgency, the Supreme Court granted the mandamus petition and directed issuance of the permit on November 15, 1947, without prejudice to a full, reasoned decision.
- Oral arguments by Solicitor Ramon Diokno for petitioner and Asst. Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondent.
- Extended decision issued January 27, 1948.
Issues
- Whether the Mayor’s power under:
• Administrative Code § 2434(b),(m) (power “to grant and refuse municipal permits of all classes…for any good reason of general interest”)
• Administrative Code § 2444(u) (power of Municipal Board “to regulate the use of streets…parks and other public places”)
• Revised Ordinances § 1119 (permit requirement for parades, processions, athletic events in public places)
confers on the Mayor an absolute discretion to refuse a permit for a lawful assembly. - Whether a municipal ordinance may be interpreted by analogy to regulate public meetings where no specific provision exists.
- Extent of police power regulation vis-à-vis constitutional rights of speech and assembly.
Applicable Legal Provisions
- Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 4 (freedom of speech, peaceful assembly, petition).
- Administrative Code:
• § 2434(b),(m) – Mayor’s authorit