Title
Prime White Cement Corp. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case
G.R. No. 68555
Decision Date
Mar 19, 1993
Prime White Cement Corp. breached a dealership agreement with Alejandro Te, who sued for damages. The Supreme Court ruled the contract void due to Te's conflict of interest as a self-dealing director, reversing lower court decisions and denying damages.
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Case Summary (G.R. No. 68555)

Subsequent Correspondence and Supplier’s Conditions

When respondent Te informed the corporation of preparations to open the letter of credit, the corporation allegedly replied through its corporate secretary that the board had imposed new conditions: that delivery would commence at the end of November 1970, that only 8,000 bags per month would be delivered for three months, that the price would be P13.30 per bag and subject to unilateral readjustment, that delivery place would be Asturias, that the letter of credit must be opened with a specific bank (Prudential Bank, Makati Branch), and that payment would be made in advance to be used as a guaranty for a foreign L/C for procurement costs.

Trial Court Ruling and Appellate Affirmation

After trial the trial court awarded respondent Te P3,302,400.00 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed that judgment in toto, reasoning that the dealership agreement was signed by corporate officers (President and Chairman) who, on the face of the contract, appeared to be duly authorized and that the estoppel principle prevented the corporation from denying its validity.

Issue Presented

The sole legal issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the dealership agreement signed by the President and Chairman constituted a valid and enforceable contract binding the corporation.

Governing Principles on Corporate Authority and Ratification

The Court reiterated fundamental corporate-law principles: corporate powers are exercised by the board of directors except as otherwise provided or expressly delegated; absent express delegation, a president’s contract may bind the corporation if the board ratifies it expressly or impliedly (by silence, acquiescence, acts indicating approval, or by accepting benefits). Additionally, a president may bind the corporation by contract made in the ordinary course of business if reasonable under the circumstances. These are general but flexible rules that apply especially to transactions with third persons.

Special Rule for Directors’ Self-Dealing

The Court emphasized that a different and more exacting standard applies where the contracting party is a director or officer dealing with his own corporation. A director occupies a fiduciary position and owes a duty of loyalty; where the director’s interests conflict with the corporation’s, he cannot sacrifice corporate interests for personal gain. The Court cited Pepper v. Litton and Philippine jurisprudence to underscore that fiduciaries cannot use corporate power to advantage themselves to the detriment of stockholders or creditors. The Court also discussed Section 32 of the Corporation Code, which sets conditions under which contracts between a corporation and its directors or officers are voidable unless all statutory safeguards (absence of necessity for quorum or vote, fairness of the contract, and prior board authorization for officers) are met; if board approval conditions are absent, stockholder ratification with full disclosure and requisite majorities is required.

Application to the Dealership Agreement — Authority and Fairness

Applying these principles, the Court found the dealership agreement unenforceable because (1) the other party to the contract, respondent Te, was a director and auditor of the corporation (a self-dealing director), and (2) the contract was not fair and reasonable under the circumstances. The agreement fixed the price at P9.70 per bag for five years, despite foreseeable and actual substantial market price increases before the start of deliveries and thereafter (evidence showed market prices of P14.50 per bag in September 1970 and P37.50 by mid-1975). The Court observed that Te himself, when contracting with downstream dealers shortly after the dealership agreement, included price-protection clauses (a floor not less than P14.00 per bag), demonstrating that he appreciated market volatility and could have protected the corporation similarly.

Finding of Disloyalty and Lack of Ratification

The Court concluded that Te’s conduct evidenced disloyalty: by entering into a long-term fixed-price contract without protecting the corporation from foreseeable market increases, and by failing to secure board authorization or stockholder ratification with full disclosure, he attempted effectively to enrich himself at the corporation’s expense. There was no showing

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