Title
Presbitero vs. Ferdez
Case
G.R. No. L-19527
Decision Date
Mar 30, 1963
Espiridion Presbitero's estate contested the levy of sugar quotas, deemed immovable property, due to unregistered garnishment. The Supreme Court ruled the levy invalid, nullifying the auction sale.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-19527)

Procedural Background and Judgment Enforcement

After the Court of Appeals' judgment became final in 1959, efforts to settle the case amicably failed. Consequently, the trial court ordered the issuance of a partial writ of execution for P12,250. Subsequently, the sheriff levied and garnished sugar quotas allegedly owned by Espiridion Presbitero. The levy was conducted without registration of the writs with the Register of Deeds. The plaintiff moved for valuation of the property, and the trial court ordered the defendant to segregate and convey the lots under litigation, which Espiridion Presbitero failed to do. The court then allowed payment of the land value in lieu of reconveyance. The sugar quotas were auctioned, with Helen Caram Nava as the highest bidder.

Death of Espiridion Presbitero and Contestation of Levy

Espiridion Presbitero died during the proceedings, and his executor, Ricardo Presbitero, filed an urgent motion to set aside the writs of execution and halt the auction sale. He argued that the levy on the sugar quotas was invalid because no registration of the writs was made with the Register of Deeds, as required for real property, and that enforcement of money claims should be directed through estate settlement proceedings after the debtor’s death. Despite the motion, the auction proceeded.

Central Issue: Classification of Sugar Quotas as Real or Personal Property

The pivotal legal question is whether sugar quotas constitute real (immovable) or personal (movable) property. If considered real property, levy and execution procedures require strict compliance with registration formalities prescribed by the Rules of Court, including filing notices with the Register of Deeds. If personal property, such registration is unnecessary, and levy procedures differ accordingly.

Respondent's Argument for Sugar Quotas as Personal Property

Respondent Helen Caram Nava contended that sugar quotas are personal property based on the criterion that they can be transported from place to place without impairing the real property to which they are attached. She referenced the test in Manresa and Article 416(4) of the Civil Code, which defines personal property as items capable of being moved without damage to the attached real property. Evidence was presented showing that sugar quotas are often transferred separately and independently of the land, sometimes leased to other plantations. She further argued that the Sugar Quota Office does not require registration with the Register of Deeds upon transfer, and that U.S. laws and executive orders recognize quotas as transferable separate from the land.

Legal Analysis Confirms Sugar Quotas as Real Property

The Court rejected the respondent’s position, emphasizing statutory mandates. The Sugar Limitation Law (Act 4166, as amended) and Republic Act No. 1825 explicitly provide that sugar quotas allocated to parcels of land are improvements attaching to the land itself. Executive Order No. 873 further defines a plantation as a specific land area to which sugar quotas are attached. Thus, sugar quotas, while intangible, are legally considered immovable or real property by virtue of these positive statutory provisions. The Court underscored that Article 415 of the Civil Code enumerates specific immovable properties and real rights or servitudes attached thereto, and sugar quotas fall under this classification by law.

Implications of the Classification on Levy and Execution

Because sugar quotas are immovable property, the sheriff’s levy without registration with the Register of Deeds violated Section 14, Rule 39, and Section 7, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, which mandate filing of copies of orders with descriptions of the property for real estate attachments. Consequently, the levy was null and void; it was "no levy at all." This invalidity rendered the subsequent sale and certificates of sale void. The Court did not find it necessary to address the pricing or fairness of the au

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