Title
Ponce vs. Philippine Army
Case
G.R. No. L-15471
Decision Date
Apr 29, 1966
Reserve officer challenged separation under EO 302, claiming RA 1382 protected him. SC ruled RA 1382 applies only to reversion, not discharge; upheld Board's authority to investigate.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-15471)

Procedural Background

On November 13, 1958, Ponce opted to file a petition in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. He sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Board from proceeding with its investigation and requested a declaration that the Executive Order No. 302, enacted on May 5, 1958, along with Circular No. 7 dated August 29, 1958, were null and void on the grounds that they contravened Republic Act No. 1382. The lower court granted a writ of preliminary injunction, and upon conclusion of the trial, ruled in favor of Ponce, asserting that the Board acted without jurisdiction to separate him from service.

Relevant Laws

The National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1) stipulates under Section 22 (f) that the President holds discretion to discharge any reserve officer at any time. Conversely, the separation process for regular officers is governed by Republic Act No. 291, which became effective on June 18, 1948. Section 7(f) specifies the protocol for deferred officers concerning their consideration by selection boards and subsequent consequences if they are not recommended for promotion.

Executive Orders Affecting Separation Procedure

Significant to the case, Executive Order No. 260, issued on July 24, 1957, expanded the provisions of Republic Act No. 291, Section 7(f) to encompass the procedure applicable to reserve officers. Following this, Executive Order No. 302 was established to create the Efficiency and Separation Boards, tasked with evaluating the efficiency of officers who had been bypassed for promotion twice. This was the context in which the respondent initiated action against Ponce.

Petitioner’s Argument on Discharge Authority

Ponce's primary argument centered on the assertion that the discretion granted to the President in Section 22(f) of Commonwealth Act No. 1 had been effectively repealed by Republic Act No. 1382, which mandates that reserve officers with a minimum of ten years of active service may only be discharged "for cause" after a proper court-martial proceeding or upon their own request. Ponce contended that the Board’s non-compliance with such procedural requirements rendered their actions unauthorized.

Jurisprudential Considerations

Judicial precedent from the case of Constante v. Alzate, underscores that Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1382 pertains specifically to the reversion of reserve officers to inactive status rather than their outright separation from military service. The distinction between these two actions is critical; reversion does not equate to dismissal. This differentiation was confirmed in De la Paz v. Alcaraz, which clarified that reversion to inactive status does not carry the same implications as dismissal or discharge.

Legal Interpretation and Conclusion

In determining the applicability of Republic Act No. 1382 relative to the President's discharge powers,

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