Title
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Crispin Jeturian et al.
Case
G.R. No. L-7756
Decision Date
Jul 30, 1955
Employees sued PLDT over discontinued pension plan; Supreme Court ruled it was a binding contract, not a gratuity, and war did not terminate obligations.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-7756)

Factual Background

The petitioner’s predecessor, the Philippine Telephone and Telegraph Company, adopted on September 18, 1923, a Plan for Employees’ Pensions which the petitioner later continued. The Plan provided that male employees who had reached age fifty with twenty or more years’ service and female employees who had reached age forty-five with twenty or more years’ service might be retired at their request or at the directors’ discretion and become eligible to pensions. The pension formula was one and one-half percent of the average annual pay during the last five years preceding retirement for each year of employment, with discretionary alternatives for computing the average. Section 5 of the Plan contained conditions preserving the directors’ discretion, prohibiting assignment of pensions, permitting suspension for gross misconduct, and setting rules concerning breaks in continuity of service and temporary lay-off. The Company maintained a bookkeeping account called the “Provident Reserve” which stood at P221,074.14 on October 31, 1941.

Events During the War and After

At the outbreak of the Japanese occupation the Plan’s age-and-service conditions had not been satisfied by any of the petitioners. The Court of Industrial Relations found that Major Stevenot, the Company’s manager during the war, instructed employees to remain with the Company during the occupation on the assurance that he would return, and the employees continued to work for the Company through the occupation. After the war the petitioner did not recall the prewar employees to service when it resumed operations in 1946.

Proceedings in the Court of Industrial Relations

In 1951 the respondents filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations (Case No. 639-V) claiming monetary benefits under the 1923 pension plan and salaries due from January 1946. The Court below found as fact the existence of the Provident Reserve and that the Company’s Board of Directors on November 6, 1945, adopted a resolution discontinuing the Employees’ Pension Plan and all payments thereunder retroactive to January 1, 1942, on the ground that operations had been outside the jurisdiction of elected management and no revenue had been received. After trial the Court concluded that equitable considerations required liquidation of the Plan’s value for distribution to those who served the Company up to 1941, and it ordered pension payments apportioned in proportion to each petitioner’s age and length of service as of October 31, 1941. The Court also awarded one month’s salary as severance pay to employees not reemployed, except for those who died, secured other employment, or refused to reenter the Company’s service.

Petition to the Supreme Court

The petitioner sought review of the Court of Industrial Relations’ final decision by this Court in the present petition, G.R. No. L-7756. The Court gave the petition due course and entertained the appeal after the earlier certiorari petition, G.R. No. L-5697, filed by the petitioner against an interlocutory order, had been dismissed for lack of merit.

Petitioner’s Contentions

The petitioner asserted that the 1923 pension plan was a mere gratuity or unilateral offer which gave no vested rights to employees unless and until the age-and-service conditions were met; hence the Company retained the right to cancel the Plan before any employee had qualified. The petitioner also argued that the outbreak of war terminated the employer-employee relationship and that wartime losses excused performance of the pension obligation.

Respondents’ Contentions

The respondents maintained that the pension plan was an integral part of the employment bargain and was intended to induce continued service and loyalty; their continued employment after the Plan’s promulgation constituted implied acceptance. They contended that the Plan had ripened into a binding contract that created a valuable expectancy and that the Company could not unilaterally repudiate the contract or plead wartime losses to escape liability.

Contractual Character of the Pension Plan — Court’s Analysis

The Court held that the Plan was not a mere gratuitous promise but a contractual undertaking designed to induce and secure the employees’ continued service and efficiency. The Court found acceptance of the offer implied from the employees’ remaining in and continuing to serve the Company after the Plan was made known. The Court relied on authorities to the effect that promises which reasonably induce action or forbearance are binding where injustice can be avoided only by enforcement (Restatement on Contracts, sec. 90), and that performance of the act completes the contract even without express notice of acceptance. The Court distinguished precedents that involved express reservations permitting unilateral alteration of a plan. The Court observed that although the pension obligation was conditional and not immediately vested until attainment of age and length of service, the employees acquired a legally protected expectancy from the contract which the law will protect, and that if the promisor prevents fulfillment of the condition, the condition is deemed fulfilled (citing new Civil Code, Art. 1186 and Art. 1188).

Equity, Quantum Meruit, and Relief Ordered

Given the Company’s repudiation of the Plan by discontinuance effective retroactively from January 1, 1942, and the employees’ partial performance and reliance, the Court approved the Court of Industrial Relations’ equitable solution. The Court held that those prevented by the Company from completing conditions for pension were entitled to compensation by way of indemnity or quantum meruit rather than being left remediless. The Court cited authorities to show that a claimant who has performed part of the service and is prevented by the offeror from completing it is entitled to full or proportional reward. The Court also treated the Company’s plea of wartime losses as insufficient to extinguish a generic obligation to pay money, noting that monetary obligations are not discharged by loss or inability to raise funds (citing new

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.