G.R. No. 189980 - People vs. Alcuizar

Case Summary (G.R. No. 189980)

Factual Background

The informations alleged that on April 22, 1964 the accused, Romeo Doriquez, loudly uttered insulting words in the presence of many persons to Attorney Sixto Demaisip, accusing him of incompetence and of having been bribed. The defamation information quoted the defamatory utterances and provided an English translation. The discharge of firearm information alleged that on the same date the accused, armed with a revolver and without intent to kill, discharged the revolver twice at Attorney Demaisip. A separate complaint filed in the Municipal Court of Batad averred that on April 21, 1964 the accused discharged his licensed revolver once on the ground and once into the air within the town limits causing alarm to the public.

Trial Court Proceedings

Upon arraignment in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo the accused pleaded not guilty to both informations. On December 3, 1964 the accused moved to dismiss both informations on two grounds: lack of jurisdiction over the grave oral defamation count because municipal courts allegedly had exclusive original jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 3828, and double jeopardy insofar as a prior municipal complaint for alarm and scandal had allegedly been dismissed without the accused's consent. The court a quo denied the motion to dismiss on March 8, 1965 and denied a motion for reconsideration on March 20, 1965. The accused appealed from these orders to the Supreme Court.

Appealability and Interlocutory Nature of the Orders

The Supreme Court observed at the outset that the appeal was premature because orders denying motions to dismiss are interlocutory and not appealable under Rule 41, Section 2, Rules of Court. The Court reiterated its settled rule that only final judgments or orders that finally dispose of the cause may be appealed. The Court cited prior decisions to emphasize that interlocutory orders do not terminate proceedings and that permitting appeals from such orders would produce multiplicity of appeals and delay the final disposition of cases.

Alternatives and Treatment as Certiorari

The Court noted two remedies available to the accused after denial of his motion to dismiss: proceed to trial and raise the same defenses on the merits and, if adverse, appeal after final judgment; or file a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court to secure immediate review on the grounds that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion. Although the appeal was premature, the Court exercised pragmatism and treated the appeal as a petition for certiorari in order to resolve the substantive issues presented and to prevent further uncertainty.

Jurisdictional Claim Under Republic Act No. 3828 and the Judiciary Act

The accused contended that the Municipal Court of Batad had exclusive original jurisdiction over grave oral defamation because Republic Act No. 3828 enlarged the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts to include offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine not exceeding P3,000. The Supreme Court rejected this contention. It explained that sections 44(f) and 87(c) of the Judiciary Act must be harmonized so that a zone of concurrent jurisdiction exists between the Court of First Instance and municipal or city courts where the prescribed penalty is imprisonment for more than six months but not exceeding three years, or a fine of more than P200 but not exceeding P3,000. The Court relied on Esperat v. Avila and subsequent authorities to hold that grave oral defamation, punishable by prision correccional in its minimum period, falls within that concurrent jurisdictional zone and that the Court of First Instance therefore properly took cognizance of the offense.

Double Jeopardy Claim

The accused further argued that prosecution for discharge of firearm placed him in double jeopardy because a complaint for alarm and scandal had been previously filed in the municipal court based on the same facts. The Court held that double jeopardy did not attach because the accused failed to establish identity of offenses as required by Rule 117, Section 9, Rules of Court. The Court distinguished the legal nature and essential elements of the two crimes: alarm and scandal is an offense against public order whose indispensable element is conduct calculated to cause alarm or danger to the public, whereas discharge of firearm, as charged, is a crime against persons whose gravamen is the discharge of a firearm at or against a specific person without intent to kill. The Court concluded that the two of

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 189980)

Parties and Procedural Posture

The People of the Philippines prosecuted Romeo Doriquez by two informations filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
Romeo Doriquez pleaded not guilty to informations charging grave oral defamation and discharge of firearm and moved to dismiss both informations.
The trial court denied Doriquez's motion to dismiss by orders of March 8, 1965 and March 20, 1965, and Doriquez appealed from those interlocutory orders.
The Supreme Court deemed the appeal premature under Rule 41, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court but elected to treat the appeal as a petition for certiorari to decide the substantive questions presented.

Key Factual Allegations

The information for grave oral defamation charged that on April 22, 1964 in Batad, Iloilo, Doriquez spoke insulting words in the presence of many persons imputing corruption and unprofessional conduct to Attorney Sixto Demaisip.
The information for discharge of firearm charged that on April 22, 1964 in Batad, Iloilo, Doriquez discharged his revolver twice at Attorney Sixto Demaisip without intent to kill.
Doriquez alleged that a prior complaint for alarm and scandal had been filed in the municipal court of Batad and dismissed without his consent, and he claimed that prosecution for discharge of firearm would therefore subject him to double jeopardy.

Charges

The charge of grave oral defamation was alleged to arise under article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.
The charge of discharge of firearm was alleged to arise under article 258 of the Revised Penal Code.
The prior municipal complaint for alarm and scandal was alleged to arise under article 155(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

Issues Presented

Whether the Court of First Instance of Iloilo had original jurisdiction over the charge of grave oral defamation in view of the statutory enlargement of inferior courts' jurisdiction.
Whether the indictment for discharge of firearm placed Doriquez in double jeopardy because of the previously filed and dismissed municipal complaint for alarm and scandal.
Whether the appeal from the orders denying the motion to dismiss was procedurally proper under Rule 41, Sec. 2.

Contentions of Parties

Doriquez contended that exclusive original jurisdiction over grave oral defamation belonged to the municipal court under Republic Act 3328 and similar enactments enlarging inferior courts' jurisdiction.
Doriquez contended that prosecution for discharge of firearm was barred by double jeopardy because a municipal complaint for alarm and scandal had been previously filed and dismissed without his consent.
The prosecution maintained that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction concurrent with municipal courts for the alleged offenses and that the two prosecutions did not constitute the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy.

Statutory Framework

The Court analyzed section 87