G.R. No. 233365 - Perez, Jr. vs. Perez-Senerpida

Case Summary (G.R. No. 233365)

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

Decision date: December 6, 1927.
Lower court: Court of First Instance of Manila — judgment for plaintiff awarding P10,248.84 (no costs).
Appeal: Insular Collector of Customs appealed, assigning errors challenging the lower court’s holding that the Government could not collect the wharfage duty where goods were loaded from a private wharf. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court.

Applicable Law and Statutory Texts at Issue

Customs Tariff (Nov. 15, 1901), §16: levied $0.75 per gross ton (1,000 kilos) upon goods exported through ports of entry “as a charge for wharfage and for harbor dues.”
Act of Congress (Mar. 3, 1905) and amendment (Feb. 26, 1906): reenactments of earlier tariff provisions.
Philippine Tariff Act of Aug. 5, 1909, §14 (“Wharfage”): levied $1.00 per gross ton on Philippine products exported through ports of entry or shipped to the United States “as a charge for wharfage,” omitting the earlier phrase “and for harbor dues.” (Exemption for Government use of goods.)

Stipulated Facts

The sugar was exported through Pulupandan, a port of entry.
Sugar was loaded from a wharf built, owned and maintained solely by Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. (private).
Collector of Customs assessed and collected wharfage at P2 per thousand kilos (total P10,248.84).
Plaintiff paid under protest; administrative protests were denied; dispute was submitted to the court on the agreed facts.

Central Legal Issue

Whether the Government of the Philippine Islands could lawfully levy and collect the statutory duty of $1 (P2) per gross ton “as a charge for wharfage” on goods exported through a port of entry where the cargo was loaded from a privately owned wharf rather than a government wharf.

Majority Opinion — Statutory Meaning and Historical Context

The majority (JOHNS, J.) focused on construing “as a charge for wharfage” in §14 of the 1909 Tariff Act in light of: (a) prior tariff statutes (1901, 1905), (b) the historical conditions at enactment (notably the lack of government‑owned wharves in 1901), and (c) the long administrative construction and consistent collection of the charge since 1901. The court noted that lexicographical and judicial definitions separate “wharfage” (a charge for use of wharves or services related to loading/unloading) from a “duty on tonnage” (a tax on a vessel for the privilege of entering a port). The omission in 1909 of the words “and for harbor dues” from the 1901 language was taken as significant: the 1909 Act was framed as permitting a charge described as wharfage rather than a tonnage duty.

Majority Opinion — Administrative Practice, Purpose, and Trust Concept

The majority emphasized the longstanding administrative practice: the duty had been levied and collected continuously since 1901 and was acquiesced in for many years, during which the government used revenues to construct wharves and piers at principal ports (the opinion cites substantial government expenditures, including a high‑cost pier in Manila and appropriations for Pulupandan). This contemporaneous administrative construction was given substantial weight, and the court inferred that Congress intended the revenue to function effectively as a trust fund to finance government wharf and harbor improvements. Given that construction, history, and the public purpose served (acquisition and construction of wharves and harbor improvements), the majority concluded that the Government was entitled to levy and collect the duty even when the particular export was loaded from a private wharf.

Majority Holding and Remedy

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of First Instance and held that the Government was entitled to retain the collected amount (P10,248.84). The court ordered reversal with costs.

Dissent — Core Objections and Legal Reasoning

Justice JOHNSON dissented. He accepted the stipulated facts and framed the single legal question narrowly: whether the Government may collect the statutory “wharfage” charge when the goods were loaded from a private wharf. The dissent stressed (a) the traditional definition of “wharfage” as a charge by a wharf owner for use of the wharf or for services rendered, (b) the difficulty of applying a wharfage charge against the owner of the wharf for cargo loaded from his own wharf, and (c) the absence in the record of evidence that the tax had been historically collected in the manner asserted by the majority or that the Government lacked wharves at the time of the statute’s enactment.

Dissent — Precedents and Policy Concerns

The dissent cited authorities (both federal and state) holding that wharfage presupposes provision of landing or wharf facilities and that wharfage cannot be levied where no such facilities or services are furnished by the collec

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 233365)

Statement of Case and Stipulated Facts

The parties submitted the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila upon an agreed statement of facts.
Stipulation I: The plaintiff always acted as representative and attorney-in-fact of the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.
Stipulation II: In May, 1926 the plaintiff shipped at Pulupandan, Occidental Negros, on the steamship Hannover 5,124,416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar consigned to the United States.
Stipulation III: The sugar was laden through a wharf built, owned and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Company, a domestic corporation, on a foreshore public land at Pulupandan, leased to it by the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Stipulation IV: The collector of customs of the collection district of Iloilo assessed and collected wharfage dues on the sugar at P2 per thousand gross kilos, totaling P10,248.84.
Stipulation V: The plaintiff paid P10,248.84 under protest; the protest was overruled by the defendant.
Stipulation VI: Pulupandan was at the time of shipment, and is now, a port of entry of the Philippine Islands, declared such by Act No. 3106.
Trial court judgment: Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for P10,248.84, without costs.

Procedural History

Trial and submission on agreed facts occurred in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The lower court (Judge Simplicio del Rosario) decided the law did not permit collection of wharfage dues on products loaded from private wharves, revoked the Insular Collector’s decision, and ordered return of the money collected.
The Insular Collector of Customs appealed to the Supreme Court, assigning three errors.
Majority opinion authored by JOHNS, J.; a dissenting opinion by JOHNSON, J.
Final disposition by the Supreme Court: the judgment of the lower court was reversed, with costs. Concurrence by Avancena, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, and Villa-Real, JJ.

Issues Presented on Appeal (Assigned Errors)

Error I (as framed by appellant): Whether the plaintiff was bound to pay a duty as a charge for wharfage on goods exported through Pulupandan — a port of entry — where the wharf used did not belong to the Government.
Error II: Whether the lower court erred in ordering the defendant to return P10,248.84 instead of dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
Error III: Whether the lower court erred in not granting a new trial.

Statutory Provisions Invoked and Their Textual History

Customs Tariff of November 15, 1901, section 16 (original): "There shall be levied and collected upon goods of all kinds exported through the ports of entry of the Philippine Islands a duty of seventy-five cents ($0.75) per gross ton of 1,000 kilos, as a charge for wharfage and for harbor dues, whatever be the port of destination or nationality of the exporting vessel."
Act of Congress of March 3, 1905: Reenacted the 1901 provision in section 16.
Act of Congress of February 26, 1906: Amendment to the 1905 Act (as referenced).
Philippine Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, section 14 ("Wharfage"): "That there shall be levied and collected upon all articles, goods, wares, or merchandise, except coal, timber and cement, the product of the Philippine Islands, exported through ports of entry of the Philippine Islands, or shipped therefrom to the United States or any of its possessions, a duty of one dollar per gross ton of one thousand kilos, as a charge for wharfage, whatever be the port of destination or nationality of the exporting vessel: Provided, That articles, goods, wares, or merchandise imported, exported, or shipped in transit for the use of the Government of the United States, or of that of the Philippine Islands, shall be exempt from the charges prescribed in this section."
Noted change between 1901 and 1909 laws: duty rose from $0.75 to $1 per gross ton; the phrase "and for harbor dues" was omitted in 1909, leaving "as a charge for wharfage."

Definitions and Distinctions in the Opinion (Wharfage; Tonnage)

Wharfage defined (citing Words and Phrases, vol. 8):
- "Wharfage is a charge or rent for the temporary use of a wharf."
- "Wharfage is the fee paid for tying vessels to a wharf, or for loading goods on a wharf or shipping them therefrom."
- "Wharfage is money due or money actually paid for the privilege of landing goods upon or loading a vessel, while moored, from a wharf."
- "Wharfage or keyage is a toll or duty for the pitching or lodging of goods upon a wharf, or pay for taking goods into a boat and from thence."
Tonnage defined (citing same source):
- "Tonnage" — the cubical contents or burden of a ship in tons, or the amount of weight which one or several ships will carry.
- "A 'duty on tonnage' is a duty or tax or burden imposed under the authority of the state, which is, by the law imposing it, to be measured by the capacity of the vessel, and is in its essence contribution claimed for the privilege of arriving and departing from a port of the United States."
- Distinction emphasized: "A duty on tonnage is a duty on a vessel for the privilege of entering a port, and does not prohibit wharfage... A 'duty of tonnage' is a charge, tax, or duty on a vessel for the privilege of entering a port; and though usually levied according to tonnage... it does not include a charge for wharfage."

Precedents and Authorities Relied Upon by the Majority

United States Supreme Court authorities and rules cited and discussed as binding or persuasive on distinctions between wharfage and tonnage, and on local regulation of wharves:
- Cincinnati, Portsmouth, Big Sandy and Pomeroy Packet Company v. Board of Trustees of the Town of Catlettsburg (syllabus and excerpts): cities/towns may build/own wharves and exact reasonable compensation; such compensation is not a tonnage tax; regulations prescribing landing places and a wharfmaster are valid until Congress acts.
- Parkersburg and Ohio River Transportation Company v. City of Parkersburg (syllabus and excerpts): wharfage is a charge for the use of a wharf; tonnage is a charge for entering the port; local regulation of wharves belongs to States absent Congressional regulation.
- Packet Co. v. Keokuk, Cannon v. New Orleans