Title
Philippine Suburban Development Corp. vs. Auditor General
Case
G.R. No. L-19545
Decision Date
Apr 18, 1975
PSDC sought a refund of real estate tax paid under protest, claiming ownership transferred to PHHC upon deed execution. SC ruled in favor, stating ownership transferred upon deed execution and possession, exempting PSDC from tax liability.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-18390)

Factual Background

The dispute arose from the sale by PHILIPPINE SUBURBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION of two parcels of the Sapang Palay Estate to the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC). The President authorized acquisition of the estate for resettlement of squatters and flood victims and approved financing through bonds to be absorbed by the Government Service Insurance System. The PHHC took possession of the property as early as the first week of June, 1960, with petitioner's consent, to commence development and resettlement works. The parties executed a public instrument titled "Deed of Absolute Sale" on December 29, 1960. The deed recited a purchase price of P3,386,223.00 and contained provisions governing payment, retention of funds to clear liens, guarantee to defend title, and allocation of registration costs. The deed was not registered until March 14, 1961.

Procedural History

After registration, the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan sought to withhold P30,099.79 from the purchase price to cover the 1961 real property tax and petitioner paid the tax under protest. Petitioner then sought a refund from the Secretary of Finance on June 13, 1961, asserting it had ceased to be the owner as of the December 29, 1960 deed. The Secretary of Finance denied the refund by letter dated August 22, 1961, reasoning that presidential approval came only on February 1, 1961 and that registration occurred on March 14, 1961, so the vendor remained owner for tax purposes. The Auditor General, by decision dated December 11, 1961, disallowed the refund. Petitioner brought the appeal by certiorari to this Court.

Issues Presented

Whether petitioner ceased to be the owner of the property for purposes of real property taxation as of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on December 29, 1960; whether the prior approval of the Auditor General under Administrative Order No. 290 (February 3, 1959) was required for the contract; and whether registration under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) was necessary to transfer ownership as between the parties.

The Parties' Contentions

Petitioner contended that title passed upon execution of the public deed, and that constructive and actual delivery had occurred because PHHC was in possession as early as June, 1960. Petitioner relied on Articles 1496 and 1498, Civil Code, and on the rule that registration is not necessary to effect transfer between the contracting parties. Respondent argued that the sale required prior approval by the Auditor General under Administrative Order No. 290, and that, because the land is registered under the Torrens system, the vendor remained owner until actual registration; therefore petitioner remained liable for the 1961 real property tax.

Ruling of the Court

The Court reversed the Auditor General's decision and ordered refund of the real property tax paid under protest by PHILIPPINE SUBURBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, in the amount of P30,460.90. The Court made no pronouncement as to costs.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court first held that the sale was effected to implement a specific Presidential directive and that the transaction already bore Presidential approval. The Court applied its precedent in Federation of the United NAMARCO Distributors v. National Marketing Corporation to conclude that the Auditor General's prior approval under Administrative Order No. 290 was not necessary where the President had already approved the contract entered into to meet a special situation implementing a Presidential directive. The Court then examined modes of delivery under civil law. It noted that delivery may be actual or constructive and that, per Article 1498, Civil Code, execution of a public instrument of sale is equivalent to delivery unless the instrument or circumstances clearly show the contrary. The Court found no express stipulation in the deed that title would remain with the vendor until payment of the balance, nor any other indication that the parties intended to postpone transfer of ownership. The Court emphasized that material possession had been in the PHHC as early as June, 1960, predating the deed, and that possession coupled with the public instrument consummated the transfer. The Court rejected respondent's argument that registration under the Torrens system was required to transfer ownership between the parties, citing a long line of precedents holding that registration is not necessary to make a conveyance valid and effective as between contracting parties because actual notice equals registration, and noting Section 50, Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) which provides that a deed purporting to convey registered land operates as a contract between the parties eve

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