Case Summary (G.R. No. L-33448)
Factual Background
In a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila on January 9, 1966 in Civil Case No. 59355, petitioner was sentenced to pay private respondent P50,000.00 as moral damages. Petitioner timely brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. In the Court of Appeals, petitioner’s counsel indicated No. 402 Trinity Bldg., T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila as his address of record, the same address he used in the lower court and where both petitioner and counsel held office. When required to file the printed record on appeal, counsel complied using the same address of record.
Subsequently, counsel transferred his law office to the 8th floor of the PLDT Building, Makati, but did not file any formal notice with the Court of Appeals of the change of address so that future notices could be sent to the new address. On January 21, 1970, the Court of Appeals sent by registered mail a notice to petitioner at counsel’s address of record, requiring the filing of the appellant’s brief within 45 days from receipt. The notice was not claimed. The period for filing the brief lapsed without counsel having filed the brief or having explained the failure.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal through a Resolution dated June 27, 1970 and entered final judgment. Notices of judgment were also sent to counsel’s address of record, but they too were unclaimed. The record was remanded to the lower court on October 8, 1970, and on motion of private respondent, the lower court issued the corresponding writ for execution. On March 1, 1971, a copy of the writ was served on petitioner at the 8th Floor, PLDT Building, Makati, the address where counsel had transferred his office and where he was traced. Petitioner then promptly filed a motion to lift the order of dismissal, set aside entry of judgment, and reinstate the appeal, but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its Resolution of March 30, 1971.
The Special Civil Action and Petitioner’s Position
After the denial, petitioner instituted the present special civil action for certiorari. Petitioner’s counsel argued that certain incidental pleadings filed before the Court of Appeals contained references to his residence or new office address, and that these filings constituted sufficient, or at least substantial, compliance with the rules requiring notice of a change of address of record. Counsel specifically contended that when he vacated his old office and moved to the 8th Floor, PLDT Building, Makati, he filed an extension of time to file a comment on March 14, 1969 and a comment filed on April 15, 1969, in which he indicated the 8th Floor, PLDT Building, Makati as his address. He maintained that these pleadings should have put both the Court and adverse counsel on notice of his new address.
Counsel also insisted that the Court of Appeals could have ordered that the notice to file the appellant’s brief be delivered to his residence because the Court had already become aware of his residence address when counsel filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Printed Record on Appeal, where his address of residence at 114 Scout Fernandez, Quezon City was used.
The Parties’ Submissions on Compliance and Notice
The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s contentions. It emphasized that notices to counsel must be properly sent to the counsel’s address of record absent due notice to the court of a change of address. The Court relied on its prior rulings, including Lopez vs. de los Reyes, where it had been held that the use of a different address in later pleadings “should not be taken as notice to the court of either a change of address or of another address in addition to that which was already of record.” Applying that principle, the Court found that petitioner’s counsel could not treat later uses of different addresses in pleadings as superseding the recorded address of record.
The Court further held that petitioner’s counsel could not presume that the Court of Appeals would take cognizance of other addresses that he used in his pleadings, or assume that any address appearing in filings was his residence. Unless counsel files a formal notice of change of address, his official address remains the address of record. The Court underscored that an address stated in pleadings may be temporary or may represent only one of the offices maintained by counsel, and it does not replace the recorded address. The Court stated that, at most, such an indication merely shows where a pleading was prepared and mailed from, which does not supersede counsel’s address of record.
The Court also stressed that court process notices are ordinarily handled by court personnel guided by addresses of record. It reasoned that requiring the court and its personnel to continuously check the record and the multiple addresses from which pleadings might have been filed would sow confusion and impose an intolerable administrative burden, which the Rules of Court do not permit.
Legal Standards Applied by the Court
The Court noted that the dismissal resulted from counsel’s failure to file the appellant’s brief within the reglementary period and the fact that the required notice was sent to the address of record. It recognized that under Rule 13, section 9 of the Rules of Court, service by sending notices is deemed completed upon expiration of five days counted from the date of the first notice of the postmaster. Since the registered mail notice sent to counsel’s address of record was unclaimed, the prescribed rule on deemed completion of service operated and the Court considered the procedural consequences as having validly followed.
In evaluating petitioner’s request for liberal treatment, the Court rejected the call for relaxation. It held that counsel’s failure to file the brief was of his own doing because he transferred his law office without giving the proper notice or making arrangements to ensure that notices sent to his old address would reach the new one. The Court also pointed to counsel’s failure to exercise prudence by periodically checking the status of the case pending in the Court of Appeals.
The Court reiterated the admonition in Juane vs. Garcia, emphasizing that members of the Bar have the inescapable duty to make of record their correct address in cases where they represent a party, because litigations could be delayed and litigants could lose their cases due to counsel’s negligence in receiving notices. The Court underscored the particul
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-33448)
Parties and Procedural Posture
- Philippine Suburban Development Corporation (petitioner) sought certiorari to nullify an order of the Court of Appeals and to undo the dismissal of its appeal and the entry of judgment.
- The respondents were the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII (Hon. Jesus Morfe, Presiding Judge), the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and Protasio Amonoy (Heirs of Protasio Amonoy) (private respondents).
- The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion to lift a prior resolution that had dismissed the appeal for failure to file the appellant’s brief within the reglementary period.
- The Court sustained the Court of Appeals action and found no grave abuse of discretion in refusing to set aside the dismissal and entry of judgment.
- The dismissal occurred after petitioner’s counsel failed to file the appellant’s brief, and the petition for certiorari was filed only after execution had moved forward.
Key Factual Allegations
- In Civil Case No. 59355, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision on January 9, 1966 sentencing petitioner to pay private respondent P50,000.00 as moral damages.
- Petitioner timely appealed to the Court of Appeals, and in that appellate phase counsel listed No. 402 Trinity Bldg., T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila as counsel’s address of record.
- Counsel complied with a requirement to file the printed record on appeal using the same address of record.
- Counsel later transferred his law office to the 8th floor of the PLDT Building, Makati, but did not file any formal notice with the Court of Appeals of the change of address.
- On January 21, 1970, the Court sent a registered-mail notice to counsel’s address of record requiring petitioner to file its brief within 45 days from receipt, but the notice was not claimed.
- Petitioner’s counsel neither filed the appellant’s brief within the period nor explained the failure to do so, resulting in dismissal by Resolution of June 27, 1970 and the entry of final judgment.
- Notices of the judgment were likewise sent to the address of record but were unclaimed.
- The record was remanded to the lower court on October 8, 1970, and on motion of private respondent the lower court issued a writ for execution.
- On March 1, 1971, a copy of the writ of execution was served to petitioner at the 8th floor, PLDT Building, Makati, the address where counsel had transferred.
- Petitioner promptly moved to lift the dismissal order, set aside entry of judgment, and reinstate the appeal, but the lower court denied the motion in a Resolution of March 30, 1971.
Issues Presented
- The case turned on whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s request to reinstate the appeal after dismissal for failure to file the appellant’s brief.
- The dispute required determination of whether counsel’s failure to receive the notice to file brief excused the missed filing period due to counsel’s asserted partial or incidental compliance with notice requirements.
- The matter also required application of the rule on service of notices and the effect of counsel’s failure to properly notify the court of a change of address of record.
Statutory And Rule-Based Framework
- The decision applied Rule 13, section 9 of the Rules of Court, under which service of the notices was deemed completed upon expiration of five days counted from the date of first notice of the postmaster.
- The Court treated notices to counsel as properly served when sent to the address of record, absent due notice to the court of a change of address.
- The decision referenced Rule 7, section 5, and Rule 13, section 5, in support of the principle governing how notices and processes should be handled.
- The Court anchored the controlling procedural expectation on strict compliance with the requirement that counsel must notify the Court upon changing address.
Arguments Of Petitioner
- Petitioner argued that the dismissal should be lifted because counsel’s incidental pleadings showed his residence and later his new office address, and that such conduct constituted sufficient or at least substantial compliance.
- Counsel maintained that when he vacated his old office and moved to the PLDT Building, he filed pleadings, including an extension of time to file comment on March 14, 1969 and a comment filed on April 15, 1969, where he indicated the new office address.
- Counsel contended tha