G.R. No. 151912 - Philippine Savings Bank vs. Spouses Bermoy

Case Summary (G.R. No. 151912)

Applicable Law and Rules Cited

1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 21 (prohibition against double jeopardy).
Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (as reiterated in Revised Rules; elements for double jeopardy).
Rule 118 (Pre-Trial) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure (requirements regarding pre-trial orders and stipulations).
Section 15, Rule 119 (Demurrer to Evidence) of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (ground and effect of demurrer to evidence).

Criminal Charge and Allegations (Factual Core)

The Information charged the Bermoys with estafa through falsification of a public document. The prosecution alleged that the Bermoys prepared and used a forged owner’s copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 207434 over a Malate, Manila parcel, simulated signatures of public officials, and presented the forged title to PSBank as collateral to obtain a P1,000,000 loan, which they then misappropriated. The Information specifically alleged the existence of a prior mortgage and ownership by spouses Edgar and Elvira Alamo, and that the owner’s duplicate TCT was in their possession, rendering the Bermoys’ title an outright forgery.

Arraignment, Plea and Pre-Trial Proceedings

Respondent spouses pleaded "not guilty" at arraignment. The RTC set pre-trial for 11 June 1997 and issued an order summarizing the hearing: counsel admitted jurisdiction of the court and the identities of the accused, and, by joint agreement of counsels, initial hearing on reception of prosecution evidence was set for 18 June 1997. The hearing minutes (signed by the Bermoys) bore a handwritten remark: "Postponed. Upon joint agreement of counsels." The one-page minutes did not recite any signed stipulation by the accused admitting their identities.

Prosecution’s Presentation at Trial

On 18 June 1997 and 3 September 1997, PSBank presented two witnesses: Felisa Crisostomo (branch manager) who testified that the Bermoys applied for the loan in February 1994, presented TCT No. 207434 in their names, and executed a real estate mortgage; and Hermenigildo Caluag (PSBank employee) who testified about the bank’s attempted registration of the certificate of sale and the Register of Deeds’ refusal because the Malate lot had been mortgaged and sold to the Alamos. After these testimonies, the prosecution rested.

Defense Motion: Demurrer to Evidence and Ground

With leave of court, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence arguing insufficiency because the prosecution failed to identify the accused as the persons who obtained the loan and executed the documents at the bank. The prosecution opposed, asserting identification by Crisostomo and Caluag and reliance on the 11 June 1997 pre-trial order as a stipulation of identity.

RTC Ruling: Grant of Demurrer and Dismissal (21 April 1998 Order)

The trial court granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence, thereby acquitting the Bermoys. The RTC found no indication in the trial transcript that the prosecution witnesses identified the accused in open court as the persons who obtained the loan. The RTC emphasized that admissions affecting substantial rights—such as identity—require the accused’s express concurrence, preferably manifested by signing the pre-trial order. The court found no such signed stipulation and concluded the prosecution failed to establish identity.

Trial Court’s Denial of Reconsideration

The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC (Order of 28 May 1998), leaving the dismissal and acquittal intact.

Court of Appeals Decision (14 November 2001)

The CA denied petitioner’s petition for certiorari. It agreed that the prosecution’s testimony only proved that a couple representing themselves as the Bermoys obtained the loan, but the witnesses were not asked to identify the accused in open court; thus identity was not properly established. The CA held that pre-trial stipulations of identity must be in writing and signed by the accused and counsel under Rule 118; the 11 June 1997 order and minutes did not satisfy those requirements. The CA further held that review of the RTC’s acquittal by certiorari would violate the Bermoys’ protection against double jeopardy unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction were shown—an allegation petitioner failed to establish.

CA Resolution on Reconsideration (24 January 2002) and Pre-Trial Signature Duty

On reconsideration, the CA explained that Rule 118 does not require the trial court to obtain signatures on the pre-trial order for every pre-trial action, but it does require that any agreements or admissions be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel if they are to be used against the accused. The CA concluded that the failure to produce a signed stipulation was a lapse for which the private prosecutor and counsel were responsible, not a jurisdictional defect of the RTC. The CA reiterated that absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the acquittal could not be reviewed.

Legal Issue Presented to the Supreme Court

Petitioner urged that the CA erred by (a) holding that the trial court was not duty-bound to require the accused to sign the pre-trial order; (b) failing to treat the 11 June 1997 pre-trial order as a binding stipulation of identity; (c) refusing to accept that the prosecution sufficiently identified the Bermoys at trial; and (d) holding that double jeopardy had attached. The Solicitor General joined petitioner and argued that the RTC’s dismissal was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, thereby rendering the acquittal reviewable.

Supreme Court’s Analysis on Double Jeopardy and Its Elements

The Supreme Court affirmed that under Section 7, Rule 117, double jeopardy attaches when: (a) the formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (b) the court had jurisdiction; (c) the accused had been arraigned and pleaded; and (d) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed without his express consent. The Court found all four elements present: the Information was sufficient; the RTC had jurisdiction; the Bermoys were arraigned and pleaded not guilty; and the case was dismisse

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 151912)

The Nature of the Case

Petition for review of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 14 November 2001 denying the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank, and of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated 24 January 2002 denying reconsideration.
Petition raises questions of (a) sufficiency of identification of the accused at trial, (b) the effect and binding nature of pre-trial stipulations and the pre-trial order/minutes, (c) whether the trial court or counsel had the duty to secure signatures on pre-trial admissions, and (d) applicability of double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court opinion was penned by Justice Carpio and issued on 26 September 2005 (G.R. No. 151912), with the Court denying the petition and affirming the Court of Appeals.

Essential Factual Allegations (as alleged in the Information)

Information filed in Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 38, docketed Criminal Case No. 96-154193, charged respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy with estafa through falsification of a public document.
Alleged acts occurred on or about May 11, 1994 and for some time prior and subsequent thereto in the City of Manila.
Accused allegedly forged or caused to be forged an owner's copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434 (TCT No. 207434), an imitation of the TCT issued by the Register of Deeds for the City of Manila, by typing in blank spaces the title number, description (350 square meters in Malate, Manila), the names of the accused as registered owners, and simulating signatures and entries (including signatures of "ALICIA D. GANZON", "EDGARDO C. CASTRO" and mortgage annotations).
The forged document was presented to petitioner Philippine Savings Bank as collateral to obtain a loan of P1,000,000.00, which the accused allegedly converted for personal use to the damage and prejudice of the bank.
The Information alleged that, contrary to the forged owner’s copy, the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 207434 was in the possession of spouses Edgar and Elvira Alamo due to a prior mortgage and subsequent sale.

Arraignment, Plea, and Pre-trial Proceedings

Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded "not guilty."
Pre-trial scheduled for 11 June 1997; the trial court issued an Order on that date summarizing what transpired at the hearing: counsel (private prosecutor and defense) admitted jurisdiction of the Court and the identities of the accused “upon their stipulation,” and the initial hearing for prosecution evidence was set for 18 June 1997.
The minutes of the 11 June 1997 hearing, signed by respondent spouses, contained a handwritten notation under “remarks”: “Postponed. Upon joint agreement of counsels.” The minutes did not state that any of the accused personally made any stipulation or admission nor did they reflect the accused's express concurrence to any stipulation.

Prosecution Evidence at Trial

Prosecution presented testimony of:
- Felisa Crisostomo, manager of petitioner’s Libertad Manila Branch: testified respondents applied for a loan in February 1994; respondents presented TCT No. 207434 in their names and executed a real estate mortgage of the Malate lot in favor of petitioner as security for the loan.
- Hermenigildo Caluag, petitioner employee: tasked to register petitioner’s certificate of sale over the Malate lot with the Register of Deeds of Manila, but registration was refused because the Malate lot had been mortgaged and sold to spouses Edgar and Elvira Alamo.
After presentation of Crisostomo and Caluag, the prosecution rested.

Defense Motion: Demurrer to Evidence

Defense filed, with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution rested, on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify respondents as the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-154193.
The prosecution (private prosecutor) opposed, arguing the witnesses identified the respondents and further contending that respondents had stipulated to their identities at pre-trial as reflected in the 11 June 1997 Order.

Trial Court Ruling (Order dated 21 April 1998)

The trial court granted the demurrer to evidence, dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for insufficiency of evidence, and acquitted respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy.
Trial court reasoning and findings:
- Considered whether prosecution witnesses identified the accused as perpetrators and whether the accused admitted their identities.
- Found nothing in the transcripts indicating witnesses identified the accused as the persons who obtained the loan; explained accepted modes of in-court identification (pointing, stepping down and tapping shoulder, use of photographs, etc.).
- Held that identification of the accused as perpetrators is essential; a negative plea denies commission and the accused cannot be compelled to give his name at arraignment.
- Regarding the alleged stipulation at pre-trial, the court found that the 11 June 1997 Order did not show that the accused were asked to, or did, expressly concur in the stipulation; observed that admissions affecting substantial rights require the accused’s express concurrence manifested by signature on the pre-trial order.
- Noted the minutes only reflected counsel’s signatures and a handwritten remark of postponement; concluded nothing in the record hinted a stipulation of facts took place.
- Resulted in dismissal for insufficiency of evidence and acquittal with costs de oficio.

Trial Court Denial of Reconsideration and Petition to Court of Appeals

The prosecution sought reconsideration of the 21 April 1998 Order; the trial court denied reconsideration in an Order dated 28 May 1998.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari