Title
Philippine Press Institute, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 119694
Decision Date
May 22, 1995
Comelec required newspapers to provide free print space for election info; SC ruled it unconstitutional as it violated property rights and press freedom without just compensation.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 119694)

Factual Background

On March 2, 1995 the Commission on Elections promulgated Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of that Resolution provided that the Commission "shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city" for use as "Comelec Space" during specified election periods. Section 3 authorized use of the space for candidates and for dissemination of election information. Section 4 set procedures for allocation among candidates. Section 8 forbade newspapers from publishing material that "manifestly favor or oppose any candidate" by undue or repeated reference, while purporting to respect publishers' determinations of newsworthiness. On March 22, 1995 Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong sent letters to various publishers, including members of petitioner PPI, directing them to provide free print space and to accept and process raw materials from political parties and candidates.

Petition and Claims

Petitioner PPI filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. PPI alleged that Resolution No. 2772 and the March 22 letter-directives violated the Constitution by effecting a taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner further alleged that the directives, insofar as they required publishers to process and render camera-ready materials, constituted involuntary servitude in violation of Section 18(2), Article III. Finally, PPI challenged Section 8 as violative of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.

Temporary Restraining Order and Procedural Posture

On April 20, 1995 the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Comelec from enforcing Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 and from implementing the March 22, 1995 letter-directives. The Court required respondent to file a Comment. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Comment defending the Resolution as noncompulsory and merely procedural, and alternatively as a valid exercise of the police power and of Comelec's supervisory authority over media in the electoral context.

Respondent's Contentions

Respondent, through the Solicitor General, contended that Resolution No. 2772 did not impose an obligation on publishers because it contained no criminal or administrative sanction for noncompliance, and thus merely established guidelines for procurement and allocation of "Comelec Space." Respondent further argued that even if the Resolution were mandatory, it was a valid exercise of the police power and of Comelec's constitutional authority to supervise media to ensure fair and credible elections.

Oral Hearing and Comelec Clarification

At the April 28, 1995 oral hearing Comelec Chairman Bernardo Pardo told the Court that Resolution No. 2772 and the March 22 letters were not intended to compel publishers to provide free space but to solicit voluntary donations similar to those given in the 1992 elections. The Chairman promised an amending or clarifying resolution. On May 4, 1995 Comelec adopted Resolution No. 2772-A, which clarified that Section 2 "shall not be construed to mean as requiring publishers ... to provide print space under pain of prosecution" and that Section 8 "shall not be construed to mean as constituting prior restraint" on publishers, citing the absence of sanctions in the Resolution and in Section 90 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Justiciability and Judicial Choice to Address the Merits

The Court observed that the case might have become moot by virtue of the clarifying resolution but elected to decide the principal constitutional question concerning Section 2 in order to prevent recurrence. The Court thus determined it would resolve whether Section 2, as written and as applied in the March 22 letters, was constitutionally permissible.

Ruling on Section 2: Taking of Private Property Without Just Compensation

The Court held that Section 2, as interpreted and applied by the March 22, 1995 letters, was susceptible of a construction that compelled publishers to donate defined amounts of print space. The Court explained that an official written directive by a constitutional agency to supply free print space carries coercive effect regardless of the presence or absence of explicit sanctions. The Court concluded that to compel print media enterprises to donate space of the dimensions specified amounted to a "taking" of private property for public use within the meaning of Article III, Section 9, and that Comelec had not shown the two threshold requisites for a lawful taking: necessity and legal authority to effect such a taking. The Court noted that Comelec had not shown that publishers were unwilling to sell space at normal rates or that purchase was impracticable. The Court observed that eminent domain or similar authority had not been shown to have been conferred upon Comelec by the Constitution or by statute, and that the attempt to avoid payment of just compensation could not be sustained. The Court also rejected the Solicitor General's alternative contention that the taking was sustainable under the police power because there was no showing that Congress had delegated such legislative power to Comelec or that the requisites of a lawful police-power taking were met. The Court emphasized that the economic burden of informing the electorate ordinarily fell upon public funds rather than being imposed upon a single sector. The Court therefore set aside and nullified Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 as well as the March 22 letter-directives and made the Temporary Restraining Order permanent.

Ruling on Section 8: Freedom of the Press and Ripeness

With respect to Section 8, the Court declined to reach the merits. The Court observed that Section 8 appeared intended to implement the distinction recognized in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections between paid political advertising and news reporting or commentary protected by freedom of the press. The Court explained that the line between paid advertisements and protected news or commentary can be drawn only in concrete cases on a case-by-case basis with specific facts. Because petitioner PPI did not allege any affirmative enforcement action under Section 8 nor demonstrate actual or imminent injury resulting from Comelec action under that provision, the Court found the constitutional challenge to Section 8 unripe. The Court therefore dismissed the petition insofar as it related to Se

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