Title
Philippine National Bank vs. Deang Marketing Corp.
Case
G.R. No. 177931
Decision Date
Dec 8, 2008
PNB declared in default for filing late motion, misrepresenting summons receipt; SC upheld CA, emphasizing strict procedural compliance over leniency.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 177931)

Petitioner and Respondents — Roles and Claims

Respondents sued PNB for reformation of contract and specific performance, alleging an agreement (a dacion en pago) that extinguished their obligation by delivery of certain properties. PNB denied the existence of such dacion en pago and maintained the Consolidation and Restructuring Agreement as the operative written agreement.

Key Dates and Procedural Milestones

  • Process server’s return indicates summons served on PNB: April 20, 2006.
  • Reglementary 15‑day period to file an answer expired on May 5, 2006 (counting from April 20).
  • PNB’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer dated May 5, 2006 was transmitted via private courier and received by the RTC on May 15, 2006.
  • Respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default on May 15, 2006 and set it for hearing on May 24, 2006.
  • RTC issued Order on May 16, 2006 denying respondents’ motion and granting PNB’s motion for 30‑day extension. PNB filed its Answer on May 25, 2006.
  • RTC denied respondents’ motion for reconsideration by Order of August 9, 2006.
  • CA annulled the RTC’s May 16 and August 9 orders, declared PNB in default, ordered the Answer expunged and remanded the case (Decision of February 26, 2007).
  • Supreme Court resolution under review: petition by PNB seeking reversal of the CA ruling (Supreme Court decision denying the petition).

Applicable Law and Rules Cited

  • Constitution: 1987 Philippine Constitution (applicable due to decision date).
  • Rules of Court: Rule 11 (Sec. 2 and Sec. 11 relating to time to plead and extension of time), Rule 13 (sections on modes of filing and service), Rule 1 (Section 6 — liberal construction).
  • Relevant jurisprudence cited in the decision: Vda. de Victoria v. CA; Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. v. CA; Bernardo v. People; Luz v. National Amnesty Commission; Industrial Timber Corp. v. NLRC; Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Far East Molasses Corp.; and others referenced for principles on extension, mode of filing, and default.

Procedural Issue Presented

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in annulling the RTC’s orders (May 16 and August 9, 2006), declaring PNB in default, and ordering expunction of PNB’s Answer, given the RTC’s prior grant of a motion for extension and subsequent denial of the motion to declare default.

Supreme Court Holding (Disposition)

The Supreme Court denied PNB’s petition. It upheld the CA’s annulment of the RTC orders and the declaration of PNB in default, finding that PNB’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer was fatally defective and untimely and that attendant conduct and representations showed lack of good faith and inability to justify relief under the rules.

Timeliness and the Basic Rule on Extension

The Court emphasized the fundamental rule that a motion for extension of time to file a pleading must be filed before expiration of the period sought to be extended. Because the 15‑day reglementary period expired on May 5, 2006, and PNB’s motion was received by the RTC only on May 15, 2006, the motion was filed after the lapse of the prescribed period and therefore there was no period left for the court to extend. The Court treated the late filing as a jurisdictional impediment to the trial court’s discretionary power to grant the extension.

Misrepresentations, Counting Errors, and Evidentiary Points

The Court found material inconsistencies and misleading representations in PNB’s submissions: the process return showed service on April 20, 2006, while PNB’s motion asserted receipt on April 24; the Motion for Extension was dated May 5 but was transmitted later; PNB’s counsel later offered inconsistent explanations (including assertions of misplacement and of preparation dates). The Court also noted the incorrect computation of the extension period and the apparent attempt to date the motion so as to appear timely. Those inconsistencies undermined any claim of excusable neglect or good faith.

Mode of Filing and Service — Use of Private Courier

The Court criticized PNB’s use of a private courier (LBC) to file the Motion for Extension without offering an explanation, observing that Rules of Court prescribe recognized modes of filing and service (including registered mail and personal filing). The Court considered the chosen mode unjustifiable given proximity of counsel and availability of acceptable alternatives, and it noted that use of private messengerial service appeared calculated to obscure the lateness of filing.

Trial Court’s Anticipatory Remark and Procedural Concerns

The RTC’s statement that it was “inclined to reconsider or lift an order of default” was viewed by the Supreme Court as procedurally improper because it anticipated remedies and signaled a predisposition before the relevant issues and evidence were properly presented. The Court contrasted the present facts with precedents where late answers were admitted under different circumstances (e.g., Indiana Aerospace University v. Comm. on Higher Educ.; Sps. Ampeloquio, Sr. v. CA), stressing that in those cases there were distinct justifications not present here.

Good Faith, Excusable Neglect, and the Limits of Liberal Construction

Although the Rules and jurisprudence permit liberality to secure substantial justice, such relaxation presupposes good faith, reasonable explanation, and absence of intent to delay. The Court found the evidence of bad faith and deceptive tactics intolerable: counsel’s notarization of opposing party’s documents prior to filing the case, the networked Legal Department position of counsel, and the contradictory explanations showed negligence bordering on culpable or bad‑faith conduct. Thus, the Court concluded that liberal construction was not warranted.

Practicality of Reopening Evidence and Preliminary Merits Assessment

The Court performed a narrow practical assessment of the likely utility of permitting PNB to reopen presentation of evidence given that respondents had already concluded ex parte presentation of evidence. The Court found that permitting PNB to present a defense essentially consisting of denial and presentation of a written agreement (which respondents admitted to exist) would not serve any practical purpose; the relief sought by respondents would still require proof and was not automatic. The Court also observed that the amount at issue was secured by mortgages and that PNB was not threatened with outright, irreparable deprivation of property that would compellingly warrant relief from procedural default.

Remedies, Appeal Rights, and Final Observations

The Court reiterated that, even if declared in default, a defendant is not d

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